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KETENCI DENIES UNION ROLE IN ECONOMIC DISRUPTION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 18 Mar 82 p 6

[Article by Sukran Ketenci]

[Text] The general meetings of some of our important industrial establishments are being held recently one after another. Thus, financial reports presented at these meetings are, no matter how they are formulated, exposing certain important facts. Before anything else, one sees that interest paid by the industrial establishments to the banks is twice their personnel expenditure. For example, at KORDSA [Cord Cloth Industry and Trade Corporation] financing and advertising expenses amounts to 40 percent of total sales. At LASSA [Rubber Industry and Trade Corporation] while the personnel and administrative expenditure is 11 percent of total expenditure, the financing expenses reach 87 percent of the total.

Our prominent businessmen are now talking, not only at private meetings but also in their public statements, about their biggest problem which is financing and that workers' wages not have a very great share in the expenses....

The economic report prepared by Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] based on studies by DPT [State Planning Organization] stresses that after 1977 the share of the workers' income in the incomes produced by domestic factors has dropped [as published]. While the share of workers' income in 1977 was 34 percent, this share dropped to 28 percent in 1978 and to 26.9 in 1979. Whereas, in developed countries the share of workers' income varies between 50-70 percent. According to another study, real incomes in the manufacturing industry dropped by 8.2 percent in 1978, 17.8 percent in 1979 and 16.8 percent in 1980. In view of these facts, Turk-Is proposes not an increase in real incomes but the maintenance of purchasing power, at least, by taking the 1976 figures as a basis. Turk-Is wants these figures to be taken as a basis during negotiations for the renewal of the collective agreements....

The institute of Labor and Industrial Relations of the Faculty of Economics of the Istanbul University in explaining its views on the Constitution appraises the implementation of free trade union movement between the years 1963-1980. In short, these views underline the following important fact:

"There has been no serious problem in the employee-employer relations at times of relatively favorable economic and political conditions in our country, during such periods not only workers received an equitable share from the rising national income but the domestic production and productivity registered noticeable increases. In contrast to this, at times when the economy was at narrow straits, unemployment was on the rise, the rate of inflation was at a level that could be seen only in very few countries, authority of the state was completely disregarded and the parliament was paralyzed because of sterile strife of the political parties, the employee-employer relations were affected by the situation, duration of collective bargaining was prolonged, strikes and lock-outs increased and illegal activities intensified." The productivity tables in the economic reports of the industrial establishments underline another fact. With the exception of 1980, the year of large scale strikes, a comparison of the productivity tables for the years of 1978, 1979 and 1981 shows that, contrary to the statements made to the public, there is no productivity explosion. Despite the fact that there were no labor movements or trade unions to hamper production, as the employers were used to present them, statistical figures do not show any important production increases beyond the normal yearly increases. Furthermore, as far as we understand from what the employers say, there have been more serious production drops during the past few months. This time there are no trade unions, strikes and labor unrest to complain about to the public. Because of extremely high inventories the production is cut by 50 percent by the employers by their own free will.

In short, two events--undesirable and unwanted in the interests of Turkey and our people--"The economic narrow straits and suspension of trade union rights for a period," provided an opportunity to the workers to clear their names and to show that the trade unions were not responsible for the lack of development of the Turkish economy and industry. These two events in particular proved that the intense propaganda campaign launched after 1977 against the workers and trade unions were not reflecting the youth and that workers and trade unions were not responsible for the economic downturn.

9558

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CP CONGRESS ENDS WITH WIDENING RIFT BETWEEN FACTIONS

Majority Dictated Party Leadership

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 May 82 p 16

[Article by Anneli Sundberg and Janne Virkkunen]

[Text] The Ascension Day of Christ was the day Minister Jouko Kajanoja was elected chairman of the Finnish Communist Party, the day the almost certain election to the post of chairman was lost by First Secretary Arvo Aalto, and the day that support for a so-called third line was found in the party.

At the extraordinary congress of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] which concluded in Helsinki on Saturday, the old factions held their own positions. The conciliators suffered a defeat and the Taistoites resigned from positions in leadership organs while accusing the majority of purges and a dictatorial policy.

The feelings of the badly divided congress were as follows:

Kajanoja: "Unity must be restored to the party immediately."

Taisto Sinisalo: "An extraordinary congress should be convened to repair the damage."

The 2-day extraordinary congress of the SKP came alive on Saturday when personality conflicts bubbled to the surface at all levels and when the extent of the front opposing First Secretary Aalto's aspiration to the chairmanship was observed and the Taistoites discovered that they could obtain help from the third line striving to break loose from the factions.

Some of the representatives to the congress were already on their way home when the list of names for the new leadership of the Finnish Communist Party was presented at 22:55 Saturday evening in the large hall of the Cultural House. Even before that it was already known that the party would end up with a rump leadership; the Taistoites will not participate in the work of the Central Committee and the Politburo.

After complex negotiations, a heated conciliation of disputes, and passionate outbursts, a list of names was finally drawn up with the opposition of the

traditional majority and the Taistoites under the guise of the so-called third line.

Toiviainen Ascended, Sinisalo Fell

The meeting required two separate election committees before it became apparent late in the evening that the party chairman will be Kajanoja, the vice chairman will be Seppo Toiviainen, and the first secretary will still be Aalto, whose stock plunged drastically in one single evening.

Taisto Sinisalo remained in the 10-person Politburo as did Aarne Saarinen, but Sinisalo lost the vice chairmanship when the party's majority pushed through its solutions regarding the selection of individuals.

In the Central Committee selected by the majority there are 28 trustworthy members of the Saarinenite faction, four so-called Saarinenites who are trying to be independent of factional division, 15 guaranteed Taistoites, and three so-called Taistoites. The power relationships and names in the Central Committee were such that the nucleus of the Taistoites could not approve of them even for reasons of prestige. In the old Central Committee the Taistoites had 21 positions.

Taistoites Dumbfounded

The result of the elections surprised the Taistoites, at least the forces around Sinisalo inclined toward compromise. As the afternoon and evening of Saturday progressed the Taistoites trusted in a coalition that came about with the third-liners. The nonaligned and irresolute groups drifted around the Cultural House; no one wanted to make a dramatic walkout. Refusal to participate in the work of the Central Committee and the Politburo was selected as a protest.

The moment the defeat of the Taistoites became evident, the search for guilty parties began. Sinisalo placed all the responsibility for what transpired on Arvo Aalto.

The most guilty one, assured Sinisalo.

However, in the midst of heated and confused feelings Sinisalo was not prepared to threaten the party with dissolution and the establishment of a new party. He thought, however, that this impasse cannot be overcome without an extraordinary congress, for the convening of which the forces of the minority are sufficient. Sinisalo also believes that new representatives would be elected to the congress.

Aalto, who retained his position as first secretary with difficulty, considered the idea of another extraordinary congress to be unrealistic, and furthermore the party's new chairman wanted to sleep through the night and then negotiate with the minority. Within a few minutes after the conclusion of this chaotic congress he already believed in the future; the process of unification is in full swing, the party will be made whole in a short time.

As Aalto and Kajanoja made television statements late in the evening in the empty hall of the Cultural House, from Kajanoja's buttonhole protruded the chairman's red rose, which Arvo Aalto may have considered to be his own in the morning of this eventful day.

Aalto was supposed to have the broad if somewhat reluctant support of the majority for his aspiration to be chairman. The Taistoites were violently opposed to Aalto, but they were the minority at the congress. It is argued that it was not until late Friday night and early Saturday morning that it became clear to the party's majority that they had been persuaded to support Aalto by the belief that Aalto was being supported for chairman by all the others also. From that time on Aalto's stock began to plunge and the so-called third line observed that its opportunity had arrived.

The basic idea of the third line was to prevent the dissolution of the congress and excessive disciplining of the Taistoites.

The third-liners, who were viewed with disfavor by the Taistoites and who placed themselves behind majority members striving to play fair as well as Markus Kainulainen and Urho Jokinen, came up with a conciliatory plan, which they attempted to sell to the Taistoites as well as Arvo Kempainen, the chief of the majority's rebellion movement.

In this plan Kajanoja was proposed as chairman, Chairman Aarno Aitamurto of the Construction Workers Union, who is the favorite of the northern rebellion movement, as first secretary, and Toiviainen as vice chairman. Positions in the Central Committee would have been divided in a ratio of 30--20, which would mean the Taistoites would have lost only one position compared to the composition of the previous Central Committee. The plan contained the idea that several third-liners would become members of the Central Committee and Kainulainen as well as Jokinen would be kept out of leadership positions.

Putting their faith in the conciliatory plan the third-liners and members of the majority who were persuaded to join them together with the Taistoites prevented a discussion of the proposal of the unsuccessful election committee so that the conciliatory plan could be realized.

By a vote of 269--246 a majority unique in the history of the SKP decided that a new election committee would be established to determine the selection of individuals. There were clearly more majority members than the third line forces required in the front with the Taistoites.

The new seven-member election committee included Kajanoja (chairman), Paivi Elovuori, Kempainen, and Ossi Virtanen, the chairman of the former election committee, from the majority. The minority was represented by Sinisalo and Ensio Laine as well as Harri Sneck, who represented Tampere, which had adopted a favorable attitude toward the third line.

Conciliatory Plan Fell Through

According to the expectations of the third-liners the election committee was supposed to present the conciliation solution that had been planned in advance.

However, this did not happen and Kajanoja presented an only slightly revised list of names, which the Taistoites immediately rejected. According to Ensio Laine Kajanoja did not even consent to negotiate, but presented the Taistoites with a ready-made list with the statement, take it or leave it.

The Taistoites left it and the decision concerning the selection of individuals at the congress was left entirely to the majority, which was joined by the unsuccessful third line. Before the vote Martin Scheinin, a representative of the third-liners, attempted once again in the hall to have the list returned to the committee and increase the representation of the Taistoites, but to no avail.

Thus the consequence was a victory for the hard line of the majority and a further retreat for the Taistoites. Aulis Juvela, an MP belonging to the hard-line majority, was even able to boast that now at last a good foundation has been built for rebuilding unity.

Third Line Protested

At the first meeting of the new Central Committee of the SKP, in which the Taistoites did not participate, representatives of the third line also withdrew attempting in vain to prevent the selection of a Politburo without the Taistoites.

Among the members in accord with the Central Committee's third line SKP former Vice Chairman Maija-Liisa Halonen offered her position to the Taistoites so that they could be returned to the leadership organs. A couple others are considering the same move.

However, the SKP's majority leadership does not believe that conciliation can be achieved in this manner.

Former Chairman Aarne Saarinen, who was presented with flowers before a half-empty hall on Saturday evening, thinks that political negotiations with the minority and perhaps their inclusion in the Politburo could bring the Taistoites back into the Central Committee. He could not put any faith in an extraordinary congress. He also did not consider the failure of this extraordinary congress to be a catastrophe.

According to Saarinen's understanding the following will take place before a real reconciliation: the extreme sides will become temporarily more inflexible, the middle ground will grow and create a basis for unity.

The appearance of the third line in the Cultural House along with the rebellion movement and other factions resulted in unprecedented combinations in the Communist Party. After a slow start as many junta-makers could be found as there are generals in a Mexican revolution. Seppo Toiviainen, who refused the position of vice chairman, noted bitterly that the final result was not achieved by party democracy, but by a hard line.

New Leader Believes in Conciliation

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 May 82 p 16

[Article by Anneli Sundberg and Janne Virkkunen]

[Text] Otto Wille Kuusinen, Kuulervo Manner, Edvard Gylling, Yrjo Sirola, Poika Tuominen, Ville Pessi, Hertta Kuusinen, Aimo Aaltonen, Aarne Saarinen and Jouko Kajanoja.

Familiar names in the history of Finland's workers' movement. But who is Jouko Kajanoja? He is the individual who will continue the work of SKP veterans, the new chairman of the Finnish Communist Party.

Kajanoja's breakthrough into the leadership of the SKP means a revolution in the SKP. After an era of underground communists, workers, and bricklayers, the SKP is being led by the foster child of a bourgeois household, a candidate of jurisprudence, and an economist, Jouko Kajanoja, who did not join the party until 1971, became a candidate member of the Central Committee 4 years later, and finally last year a full member of the Central Committee and its Politburo, a small select group of individuals who determine SKP policy.

Kajanoja believes that even after the extraordinary congress the SKP has realistic conditions for being more unified than it has been in a long time.

"The first task is to repair the damage since a portion of the members was left out of the Central Committee. The message that was received during the Saturday evening meeting of the Central Committee indicated that an agreement is not far off."

Kajanoja states that he is in contact with Vice Chairman Seppo Toiviainen, who has been left out of the Central Committee and the Politburo. In the discussions it was confirmed that the issue will be brought up again, states Kajanoja.

"Unity Will Become Stronger"

He also believes that the unification process, which has been going on in the party for a year and a half, is becoming stronger. As an example Kajanoja mentions the Metal Workers Union as well as youth and student organizations.

According to Kajanoja this process can also be seen in the fact that the congress did not approve the first list of members for the party leadership. "The meeting was in the hands of the representatives."

Kajanoja considers it natural that in breaking 15-year old patterns setbacks will be encountered.

"I, however, do not believe that it is a question of a catastrophe. Sinisalo has even announced that the idea of establishing a new party is dead."

No Concessions Will Be Made

Even after sleeping through the night Kajanoja did not have a clear understanding of how a solution can be found and how the Taistoites and third-liners can be included in the work of the party leadership.

"Concessions are not a consideration. The Central Committee has been irrevocably selected. It could be a question of procedures. Issues could be mediated on the basis of collective preparation carefully taking everyone's opinions into consideration. We must get away from factional disputes and consultations. But the party will never become such that everyone will think in the same manner."

Upon becoming chairman, Kajanoja after a moment's pause consented to describe his position as follows: "It is a good thing that I am not as involved in the internal disputes of the party as many others are. Probably, I have fewer burdens than the others."

Kajanoja believes that Arvo Aalto, who remained as first secretary, is pleased with the outcome. According to him Aalto made a proposal on the issue at a meeting of the Central Committee.

Even at this meeting of the SKP Taisto Sinisalo, former vice chairman and a leading figure of the Taistoites, after the selection accused the majority of a policy of punishment and discrimination. Sinisalo also referred to a letter of the CPSU.

Kajanoja does not agree with Sinisalo's arguments. In his opinion the Central Committee reflects the understandings in the movement in a rather equitable manner.

Kajanoja explains the weakening of the actual position of the Taistoites by the fact that the Central Committee was selected in a different manner than before. It does not reflect factional divisions since quotas were given up in the district organizations, states Kajanoja and adds that he has seen trends toward "collectively considering what would be the best group".

Interpretation of Saarinen's Speech

On Sunday Kajanoja had not yet read Aarne Saarinen's toughly worded speech accusing the CPSU; he, however, consented to read it.

Together with Saarinen Kajanoja is of the same opinion that the CPSU letter exaggerated issues in the SKP. In the SKP there is no visible, influential anti-Soviet attitude, states Kajanoja and adds that he cannot, of course, give a guarantee for all the tens of thousands of members in the SKP. However, Kajanoja would have rewritten that point in Saarinen's speech in which the former chairman of the SKP accused the CPSU of smuggling a weapon into the congress of the SKP.

Kajanoja also disputed the CPSU's accusation that Arvo Kempainen, Mikko Ekorre, and Aulis Juvela are anti-Soviet. The allegation does not hold true on basis of what I know about them, stated Kajanoja.

The SKP's new leader is of the opinion that the SKP became independent as a party a long time ago already. "Without a doubt, the relationship with the CPSU was different in the past, but it was connected with Otto Wille Kuusinen."

In Finland a Finnish communism is being built under the leadership of Kajanoja and in building this communism experiences which have been obtained elsewhere will be taken into consideration.

Arvo Aalto's Disciple

Jouko Kajanoja, 39, will begin to lead the SKP together with First Secretary Arvo Aalto in a situation in which he displaced Saarinen's "logical" heir, Aalto, from the position of chairman.

Kajanoja is in fact Arvo Aalto's disciple. The SKP needed economic policy brains when it rejoined the left and the center in government cooperation.

Kajanoja was the assistant director of the area development fund in Kuopio. In 1978 it was arranged that he be made director of the housing administration fund so that he could be transferred to Helsinki. At that time Arvo Aalto led the Communists' ministerial faction.

When Arvo Aalto returned to direct affairs in the party office before the SKP's 19th Congress, Kajanoja became a minister at Aalto's request.

And now a year later Kajanoja has rejected his patron and has become his superior. However, many estimated that it is Kajanoja himself who saved Aalto as first secretary.

Healing of Ranks Failed

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 May 82 p 16

[Article by Anneli Sundberg and Janne Virkkunen]

[Text] For the Communists the restoration of unity always seems to be at the end of another extraordinary congress. For years it has been within reach according to the arguments of party leaders, but it continues to elude them. The Soviet Communist Party negotiated a settlement in the SKP in 1969 when it was on the verge of dissolution. At the extraordinary congress over the weekend Finnish Communists attempted to restore unity by themselves. Those who opposed the restoration of unity as well as those forces which supported it came to power and the final result satisfied no one.

In the hallways of the Cultural House it was asked in the early stages of the meeting what this extraordinary congress can possibly cost a poor party. The answer was: "The future".

The rebellion movement within the majority seemed to be the most composed and satisfied. In describing the situation at the conclusion of the meeting

the somewhat self-important Arvo Kempainen together with his own representative faction gloated that it would certainly have been apparent even in the dark.

In addition to the Taistoites, the most disappointed were those Communists who attempted to dissociate themselves from factional division, the so-called third line, which was accused of cheating, unscrupulous power politics, and an abandonment of their own principles when an opportunity arose to become a part of the Central Committee.

It was easy to place the blame on the third-liners. There were still relatively very few of them. They were completely of the intelligentsia, whom the backwoodsmen find difficult to consider as the vanguard of the proletariat.

They had more power in the corridors than in the meeting hall.

Coming into the meeting the third-liners were uncertain as to whether it was worthwhile to fight for their positions. In the beginning their power seemed to be too delicate to play the role of a mediator. However, their self-assurance increased as the hours went by and they drew strength from the fact that First Secretary Arvo Aalto was not doing well and that Jouko Kajanoja, who was fascinated by the favors extended by the third-liners, could even become chairman of the SKP.

Indeed, this union experienced setbacks from both sides during the meeting but Aalto was the one to lose. The representatives of the majority had come to Helsinki in the belief that nothing could be done about Aalto's election. Only after they had felt out each other's opinions at the meeting, did the representatives discover that the Communist Party should not be any kind of a Christian League in which a proclamation from on high is sufficient to select a chairman.

The SKP's extraordinary congress was chaotic and at no time was it under the control of the third line and the minority any more than it was under the control of the traditional Saarinenite majority.

The chaotic feeling was further depicted by the fact that Aalto had to look for members of the Central Committee from a nearly empty meeting hall on Saturday evening.

Evidently, enough of them were found and the majority members remaining in the Central Committee selected a new party leadership, from which the minority members announced they would abstain.

Then what is the majority to do with a party in which nearly half has announced that it will remain outside of the leadership organs. The first task is to heal the party, states new Chairman Jouko Kajanoja and makes it understood that the conditions are right. However, the threshold on the path to unity is high. It is higher than it was before the meeting since the decisions now made are permanent. It is doubtful that the Taistoites will submit after the meeting since they did not submit during the meeting.

In addition to party division, the Kajanoja-Aalto party leadership has another problem: relations with the Soviet Communist Party, which certainly will not approve of Aarne Saarinen's strongly worded speech.

Relations between the SKP and the CPSU have been strained since last fall's presidential question. It resulted in the cancellation of a trip to Moscow by a delegation of the SKP.

The SKP's extraordinary congress made the division of the party even deeper; hopes for a speedy restoration of unity will have to be postponed in the leadership organs, which probably means a transfer of the struggle from the party leadership to the party's rank and file. A reconciliation seems impossible without the extraordinary congress demanded by the minority since the defeat of the Taistoites at the congress will push the Taistoite camp toward the TIEDONANTAJA position represented by Urho Jokinen.

The open satisfaction of hard-line district secretary Markus Kainulainen after the decisions of the congress provided a foretaste: "This is the way it goes when one is naive."

The Tampere District, which has represented a conciliatory line in the minority, also lost its influence in the Taistoite camp. The Tampere District was not represented in the final decisions of the congress since "the busses were already headed for home".

The forces in Saarinen's majority which attempted to effect a conciliation were also defeated at the congress. MP Inger Hirvela of Central Finland, chairwomen of the Women's League, was left out of the Central Committee. Also no support was given to Assistant City Director Anna-Liisa Hyvonen's attempt to place Helvi Niskanen from Oulu as well as third-liner Martin Scheinin in the Central Committee.

As to how the events of the congress on Sunday will be reflected in the SKDL's parliamentary faction and in the SKDL congress to be held in a couple weeks is completely subject to conjecture.

In any event when Taisto Sinisalo emptied out his desk drawer on Sunday at the Cultural House and left his key ring on the table, one phase in the SKP's stormy history came to a close.

Paper Looks At Congress

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 May 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Search for Unity Once Again Concludes in Rift"]

[Text] After years of fruitless conflict and unsuccessful preparatory phases no one could reasonably expect a miraculous breakthrough from the SKP's extraordinary congress. Representatives to the congress had most likely prepared for the worst so that the chaotic conclusion of the meeting did not come as a surprise to many.

Retiring Chairman Aarne Saarinen again put himself into the fray when he presented a report on his work to the congress, which for the most part was done in his own name. Saarinen accomplished this in a manner which justifies considering him as the most persuasive party chairman in our country in the last decade. But even a continuation of his influence turned out to be limited.

At first, it seemed that the factions had exhausted their power in previous struggles and that reconciliation could be achieved between the minority and the majority from a certain degree of tolerance. However, those travelling along the third line, who are few in number, succeeded in the final stage in confusing the situation.

When Chairman Saarinen had to confirm that there are no supporters for the conciliatory position outlined by him, he mentioned the CPSU's well-known stand as a kind of decisive factor in a summary of the discussion. He described it as a provocative weapon that had been smuggled into the meeting hall in the presence of all the people. The majority of Finnish Communists probably subscribes to the opinions of this chairman.

Even though Saarinen's impression of the message from the SKP's fraternal party was only a more emphatic reiteration of his criticism already presented in Moscow, there is also reason to consider this as a more forceful declaration of the SKP's more independent policy. To be doubly sure Saarinen lashed out at the Taistoites for neglecting their national roots.

The party leadership received a partly surprising, but flawed composition that is incomplete in its preparation. Its operational possibilities seem to be even weaker than those of its predecessors. What did not succeed at the extraordinary congress must now be put together with the help of the negotiating ability of the leadership and the new Central Committee.

As far as future government policy is concerned the most important contribution of the congress can be reduced to the affirmation that the Conservative Party continues to be the party of big capital, with which the SKP is reluctant to enter into a joint government. The differences were tied up in personality and procedural conflicts so that, to a considerable degree, the congress was satisfied with carrying out the visions of the 19th congress with respect to future policy.

The conclusion of the congress, which was classified as chaotic, is best seen in the fact that even before it came to a conclusion inquiries were already being made into the possibility of convening a new congress. Even though the minority did not carry out its threat to establish a new party, unity in the SKP is subject to even weaker ties and conditions. The unsuccessful meeting at the Cultural House must have been a traumatic experience for those present, which does not forebode a positive future for the party.

10576

CSO: 3107/117

SKDL MAVERICK BJORKLUND QUITTING PARLIAMENT IN DISPUTE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 24 Apr 82 p 7

[Article by Tom Vuori]

[Text] "I am not exactly bitter, but I must admit that the political frustration I feel is behind my decision. I have done what I could."

Ilkka-Christian Bjorklund, outspoken and controversial Swedish SKDL (Finnish People's Democratic League) politician for just over a decade, has had enough of parliamentary politics. His announcement the other day that he would not run during the next election was a surprise.

"This decision has been a long time coming. I have never seen myself as a career politician. I was in parliament to further a cause and express an opinion. I was usually alone, beating my head against a wall for causes that were not supported even by my own party."

I. C. Bjorklund makes no secret of the fact that he has had difficulties locating his own position in the political spectrum. "What am I to do if the communists are not democratic enough and the social democrats are not socialistic enough?" he often asks.

It is also obvious that he is not happy over the newly achieved "unity" in his party.

In his column in NY TID Bjorklund strongly criticized Minister of Communications Veikko Saarto's attempt to bring the parliamentary group together and forgive all the sins of the minority members if they would just vote with the others on the employers' social welfare tax. Bjorklund believed it was unrealistic that "a single vote on a dubious compromise could lead to real and lasting unity" and he said that, instead, they should have waited until after the party congresses of the Communist Party and the SKDL to see if conditions really were right for a merger.

Saarto got his way. Formally, the group is united. Thus, the minority has regained considerable influence over the group.

"It looks bad," Ilkka-Christian Bjorklund says today. "The split is not so

bad. We are rather used to it and it has given our group a certain freedom. A forced unity that provides no room for different ideas is much more dangerous. It will be interesting to see how independent a policy the People's Democratic League can now carry out."

As a result of his decision Ilkka-Christian Bjorklund, who always loves to act on a large stage, now will be much less in the limelight.

Bjorklund will not say what now will become of his almost 10,000 votes--second most for SKDL in Nyland in the previous election. He also denies having any particular successor in mind.

"It is too early to say anything about that, but a SKDL woman from Nyland perhaps would be best."

Bjorklund, now 35 years old, was elected to parliament in 1972 as a young radical of the sixties. Even at that time he was a member of the SKDL executive committee, a position he still holds, but now has decided to relinquish.

"I will also continue to work for a 'third line' within our movement. We have not forgotten Eurosocialism and the 'third path' growing in Europe is well known here, as well."

Bjorklund said he had no particular job in mind. His main task now will be to complete the thesis for his master's degree.

In addition, he has never said that he was leaving politics for good. He is merely taking a "rest" from his work in parliament, but it is possible only to speculate about the future form of a possible political comeback for Ilkka-Christian Bjorklund.

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CSO: 3109/160

LIBERAL PARTY LEADERS APPROVE MERGER WITH CENTER PARTY

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 Apr 82 pp 1,16

[Article: "LFP's Governing Board Approved Merger with Center Party"]

[Text] At a meeting in Helsinki on Saturday the governing board of the Liberal People's Party approved steps by the party's executive committee to bring about the union of the Liberal People's Party and the Center Party.

The governing board recommended further that the party convention, which will be held in Joensuu in June, approve the agreement.

The governing board approved a resolution according to which the Liberal People's Party would continue its activity based on the heritage of its liberal ideology and on the challenges of the future. According to the resolution, the organizational changes to strengthen the political middle would increase the activity and influence of the Liberal People's Party.

The party's vice-chairman Paavo Nikula criticized the agreement between the two parties and withdrew from all activities on the national level. Representatives of the party's youth organization also criticized the agreement.

The governing board voted on the resolution, with 21 members for, 3 against, and 8 abstaining.

Center Party chairman Paavo Vayrynen said that the middle parties and the Social Democrats should continue to form the foundation of the government. At the same time, he is prepared to broaden the government in the direction of the National Coalition Party. Vayrynen spoke at the governing board meeting of the Center Party which convened in Imatra on Saturday.

The Center Party governing board began its 2-day meeting with a debate over the proposed new party platform and plans for an Environment Ministry. The question of the Liberal People's Party merger with the Center Party also was discussed briefly.

The government question was the dominant subject of chairman Vayrynen's speech. He assumed that the Center Party and the Social Democrats would continue to

bear the responsibility of forming the government but, according to Vayrynen, if a broad government cannot be formed after the next parliamentary elections, the only alternative would be based on the expected majority of the Center Party and the right.

"Such a majority seems probable. A government based on center-right cooperation is a viable alternative both in principle and in practice," Vayrynen said in answer to questions from the National Coalition Party.

"I repeat, however, that a broadly based government of middle parties would be more effective," Vayrynen said sagaciously.

Vayrynen also said that the Center Party was continuing to strengthen its position. The consolidation would not cease because of the merger of the Center Party with the liberals, he said.

According to Vayrynen, the Christian League had shown a tendency to move toward the political middle in recent time. He said that closer cooperation between the Center Party and the Christian League would be possible if the Christian League would approve middle-oriented policies.

Vayrynen also perceived moderate centrist forces within the National Coalition Party. Their effort is directed toward liberating themselves from the true rightist forces within the party and broadening the base of the government. According to Vayrynen, they now have given up this effort and are attempting to increase their support at the cost of the Center Party.

9336

CSO: 3109/160

SKDL LOST 36 PERCENT OF ITS SUPPORTERS TO KOIVISTO IN VOTE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 28 Apr 82 p 16

[Text] In the presidential election last January over one third of the supporters of the People's Democratic League voted for Mauno Koivisto's Social Democratic electoral candidates, while barely half voted for the League's own electors. This was one result of the opinion poll taken by the Finnish Gallup Institute, commissioned by the four largest parties.

Among supporters of the People's Democratic League, 36 percent supported Mauno Koivisto, while 48 percent supported the league's own candidate, Kalevi Kivisto. Twelve percent did not say how they voted in the presidential election.

Among Social Democrats, 89 percent voted for Koivisto's electors, while 1 percent supported Harri Holkeri of the National Coalition Party. Ten percent failed to answer the question.

Among Center Party supporters, 69 percent voted for the party's candidate Johannes Virolainen, while 14 percent chose Mauno Koivisto. Holkeri was supported by 6 percent and Kalevi Kivisto by 1 percent. Ten percent left the question unanswered.

Among Coalition Party supporters, 68 percent supported that party's own candidate, Harri Holkeri, while 17 percent voted for Mauno Koivisto. Virolainen was supported by 7 percent, the liberal candidate Helvi Sipila by 2 percent, Raino Westerholm of the Christian League by 1 percent, and Jan-Magnus Jansson of the Swedish People's Party also by 1 percent. Four percent did not indicate how they voted.

The opinion poll does not indicate in detail how supporters of the smaller parties voted in the presidential election. Candidate Jan-Magnus Jansson of the Swedish People's Party was supported by 18 percent of the small party supporters, however. Mauno Koivisto was supported by 35 percent, Harri Holkeri by 5 percent, Johannes Virolainen by 3 percent, Veikko Vennamo by 5 percent, Helvi Sipila by 8 percent, and Raino Westerholm by 14 percent of the small party supporters. Twelve percent did not indicate how they voted.

BRIEFS

SKDL SOCIALISTS FORM OWN ORGANIZATION--Socialists within the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) wish to form their own central organization within the league, according to a delegation of SKDL socialists who met in Helsinki on Saturday. According to their plans, the socialist would also form separate district organizations. The delegation announced that the activity of the new central organization would begin shortly after the SKDL congress to be held in Kuopio in late May. The socialists within the league believe that elections held at the national congress will strengthen the independent role of the SKDL. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 Apr 82 p 16] 9336

MINISTRY OFFICIAL ON 'ZONE'--At present there are no clear signs that a nuclear-free zone could be established in the Nordic countries within the near future, according to the head of the political section of the Foreign Ministry, Jukka Seppinen. Seppinen presented the Foreign Ministry's point of view on the present situation at a seminar on a Nordic nuclear-free zone, arranged by the student union of Tammerfors University. The main prerequisite for a nuclear-free Nordic zone is a guarantee of safety from the nations that possess nuclear weapons, Seppinen said. Even though the fundamental principles of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries have been worked out, this does not mean that concrete definitions may be made, for example in the territorial question, he added. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 Apr 82 p 1] 9336

CSO: 3109/160

GOVERNMENT, PSF, SOCIALIST DEPUTIES' RELATIONS REVIEWED

Paris LE MONDE in French 6 May 82 p 7

[Article by Jean-Yves Lhomeau: "After 1 Year--A Team Which Sometimes Does Not Pull Together"]

[Text] Every Tuesday, Francois Mitterrand takes his breakfast in the company of Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy and First Secretary of the Socialist Party Lionel Jospin. Pierre Beregovoy, secretary general of the Elysee Palace, is present.

Every Wednesday, the president of the republic has as his luncheon guests, after the cabinet meeting is over, Messrs Mauroy, Jospin and Louis Mermaz, president of the National Assembly; Pierre Joxe, president of the socialist bench in the National Assembly; Laurent Fabius, minister of budget, Jean Poperen and Paul Quiles, the number two and number three men, respectively, in the PS [Socialist Party], and sometimes Minister of Interior Gaston Defferre. The secretary general of the Elysee Palace is also invited.

Every Thursday, the chief of state takes his breakfast in the company of his guests of the preceding day. Pierre Mauroy does not attend. The secretary general of the Elysee Palace is always present. And so it has been, week after week, since 10 May 1981.

These personalities--representatives of the executive and legislative branches of the Socialist Party--meet and talk with sustained and continuing regularity, as they met, talked and debated when they were responsible for the Socialist Party alone. It is their goal to reach agreement and they seem to take all the time necessary to achieve this. How does it happen, then, that the team in harness--the executive authorities, the Socialist Party and the parliamentary majority--sometimes gives the impression that it is not pulling together?

What is the reason that the agreement does not always seem to be perfect, while the socialists established in the Elysee Palace and Matignon, in the key ministries, control the party with electoral dominance and--a rare phenomenon in the Fifth Republic, because it did not occur to the benefit of the Gaullist party until 1968--an absolute majority of the seats in the National Assembly?

What is the reason that those who control each of these poles of power feel the need, a year after the 10 May triumph, of reviewing their methods of operation or expression? Francois Mitterrand seems determined to take a hand in government affairs more frequently. Pierre Mauroy is trying to define the methods of "governing in a different way" and the boundaries of a less secret exercise of power than in the past. Lionel Jospin hopes that the party he directs will no longer content itself with being the "guardian of the socialist program" but will become the inspirer of government action. Pierre Joxe has been led to liberate the expression of his parliamentary group, henceforth carefully "wrapped and tied," somewhat.

In the initial period, the executive branch had a fine time. It was necessary to move quickly, to nationalize, to decentralize, to establish what Pierre Mauroy called the "basis for change." The task was an exalting one. There was hardly any discussion about the content, because it corresponded basically to the socialist program. In the process, some rather indigestible dishes were forced down the throats of the elected representatives and the party: a more burdensome nuclear program than had been planned, and a law on the "free radio stations" which was more stifling than liberating. As the "guardian of the program," the Socialist Party allowed some variations. The guarantors of the achievement of the aspirations of those who voted for them, the deputies agreed, following sometimes agitated debate--on the nuclear issue, the free radio stations, and the conditions for the entry and residence of immigrants, in particular--to submit to the law of political "realism," the rules of which can be more readily assessed in the regime than in the opposition.

Sounding the Alarm

The regime feared that the masses of "freshmen" placed in the National Assembly by their militant groups would succumb to the maximalist temptation. They went no further than certain excesses in speech. Doubtless they learned very quickly that the work of a deputy is a more thankless task than it had seemed and that the dramatic public political battles are often relegated to the background, behind the obscure work of the committee rooms. There they discovered the gap existing between their ambitions and the aspirations of those who elected them.

They were the first to note that with the enthusiasm immediately following victory in the past, the regime would have to deal with a passive attitude rather than a popular mobilization. They were the first to translate this sentiment from a distilled model formula which they heard in their districts: "We have done our part of the work by voting for you. Now it's your turn to work. Manage as best you can!"

They were the first to understand to what extent the regime would have to compromise with the contradictory class interests, the frustrations, whether justified or not, the sociological conflicts, the weights slowing the development of customs, the farmers who say "This is only for the workers" and the workers who think that the government employees are getting too much.

They were the first to become concerned about the difficulty of making the change concretely visible in the daily life of French citizens. They were the

first to say to cabinet members, as Mrs Denise Cacheux, deputy from Nord, who is close to Mr Mauroy, did publicly as early as August, 1981, that "major speeches are not enough," since it is also necessary to "provide explanations on ground level."

In gathering together this mass of impressions and data, the socialist legislators carried out one of the traditional missions of any parliamentary majority. But it was not possible for them to go as far as they deemed desirable. In any case, the alarm was not heeded until late: the results of the district elections in the month of March showed this. Concerned about avoiding the probable excesses of inexperienced elected officials, exercising close control over the activities of a plethoric group, and preventing confused scrambles and discussions impossible for a group of 285, the leaders of the socialist group purposefully channelled the deputies' statements. To the point that a number of them felt they had been victimized.

The freedom of expression in political discussion on which the socialists rely has naturally been limited by the exercise of power. The parliamentarians have felt this, and the party has too.

The PS is having difficulty finding its place in the team in power. The "guardian," as Lionel Jospin put it during the Valence congress, of a program which the government has respected, it has naturally had to suffer the inconveniences of being confused with the regime, and therefore the feeling of longer existing as itself. In the months which followed the triumph of the left, it emerged from this void only once, at the Valence congress. And to what an extent! Whereas Jean Poperen had thought he had set the tone when he launched the discussion on the subject of social peace--"We do not want war," he said--the congress slipped away in the opposite direction, calling for "heads to roll."

Picking Up Speed

As an electoral machine conceived to oppose and defeat the regime in power, the PS had accomplished its task, and for lack of opposition, had not further defined itself. As a thinking apparatus, the PS had naturally surrendered its substance--in men and ideas--to the new regime. The definition of its role was a delicate matter. It did not want to return to being a simple relay mechanism nor a challenging force. It did not want to become either a "military boot party" or a "state-socialist party" alliance. If in the initial phase it seemed to be more aligned and submissive than critical, it was because it could produce another image of itself. The regime did not expose itself to charges of "deviationism" or corrections of its trajectory.

Matters may be different now that the regime, with the "basis for change" established, is obliged to adapt its policy to an unfavorable economic context. A basic economic debate on the most effective means of relaunching investments is already taking shape. The government decided to encourage private investments by granting employers substantial aid. There are many in the PS who think that the private employers, after having boggled at investing under the government of Raymond Barre, have no reason to evidence any enthusiasm whatsoever under a

leftist government. They believe that it is urgent to embark upon a massive public investment policy. This, more than aid the results of which are uncertain, would in their view be likely to lead private investors to follow suit.

This economic discussion parallels one of a political nature. It is a question of establishing the limits of the "compromise" with employers in which the regime can engage, and thus what concessions and guarantees must be obtained from them before bringing any negotiation to a conclusion. The socialists have the feeling that in this connection Mr Mauroy has engaged in a topsy-turvy commitment. The concessions made by the prime minister are known. They have to do with the financial responsibilities of enterprises and the reduction of the weekly work schedule. The concessions the employers made are not known, and the socialists believe that Mr Mauroy may well receive no thanks for the "gifts"--to use the word employed by the communists--made to the employers.

In this connection, the socialist party is once again revealing the difficulties it is having in accepting its new situation. The leadership reveals excellent intentions when it states that it is the duty of political parties and not the cabinet members to engage in public discussion. But each time thus far it has suffered from "delayed ignition" in responding to the charges made by Pierre Joxe concerning government action. However, the PS struck just the right note when its leading committee asked the government on 3 April to show greater consistency in explanation and action and more authority in the implementation of its policy in order to give French citizens the feeling of being governed. This recommendation did not it is true prevent Messrs Gaston Deffere and Robert Badinter from laying out their differences on security in public, but even if ineffective, this at least had the merit of being done in time.

The PS is making an effort to regain its full capacity to make proposals, which presumes that when it deems this necessary, its reflections will precede those of the government. Its task would doubtless be easier if it admitted, as Claude Estier, a deputy from Paris who is the spokesman of the socialist group in the national assembly explained, that it is in no way "shocking" to maintain, when one is in power, "provisions which are not in every respect identical to those one defended when in the opposition."


In the meantime, the socialist leaders are making the best use they can of the old reflex, which calls for existing by opposing. They had had some difficulty implementing the theme developed by Jean Poperen during the leadership committee meeting on 3 April, to the effect that the left should deal with the strategy of "destroying the stability of the regime" on which the authoritarian right wing, headed by Jacques Chirac, was said to have embarked. But the elements making up this strategy could not be clearly perceived, in any case not clearly enough to lead to the mobilization of the left.

Popularity and Unpopularity of the Three Leading Ministers

On 5 May, LE MONDE published a chart showing the curves representing satisfaction and dissatisfaction with Georges Pompidou, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand during the first year of their 7-year terms. Below we show the curves pertaining to their prime ministers, as indicated by the surveys made for FRANCE-SOIR by the IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute].

While after almost a year in the Hotel Matignon, Messrs Chaban-Delmas and Chirac saw an increase in the number of French citizens indicating satisfaction with them, Mr Mauroy is one point below his initial level (53 percent). To this must be added an increase of 21 points in the percentage of those dissatisfied. For Messrs Chaban-Delmas and Chirac, that percentage of those dissatisfied had increased by 17 points.

While the satisfaction level for Mr Chirac did not surpass that for Mr Giscard d'Estaing in the first year of his 7-year term, the figures recorded in September 1981 for Mr Mauroy, on the other hand, were better than those for Mr Mitterrand. This situation of greater satisfaction with the prime minister than with the president of the republic early in their exercise of power occurred on two occasions, at the expense of Georges Pompidou (a first time in December 1969, and to an even greater extent in February 1970, during which month the surveys indicated a rate of satisfaction of between 53 percent and 56 percent for Georges Pompidou and 57 percent for Mr Chaban-Delmas).



ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN POST-FRANCO PERIOD ANALYZED

Madrid REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLITICOS in Spanish Sep-Oct 81 pp 9-31

[Article by Jose Maria Maravall: "Party Support in Spain: Polarization, Fragmentation and Stability"]

[Text] From the outset of the transition to democracy in Spain it was clear that above and beyond the segments of society that had been mobilized, Spanish society was characterized by a remarkable moderation. This moderation also extended to a certain extent to wideranging segments of the working class itself,¹ although this class's ideological leanings were both egalitarian and reformist, and it was further marked by a strong identification with socialism. This moderation can be seen even more clearly in the case of the electorate as a whole. It is a fact that throughout the crisis of Francoism and at the beginning of the transition, Spain's citizens clearly expressed their democratic ambitions, not just in political rallies but also in opinion polls. In 1975 and 1976 clear-cut evidence began to emerge that around three-fourths of our citizens supported a full-fledged and unrestricted democratic option for the country's political evolution. At the same time, it is also a fact that these democratic leanings were far from being extremist. Thus, if we look at the kind and the pace of democratic change that citizens said they wanted, 61 percent of the respondents said they preferred a "gradual" transition process, while 22 percent stated, in contrast, that they wanted a "quick and radical" change. Even within what would later constitute the leftwing voting bloc, those who preferred a "gradual" change had considerable weight: 43 percent of the communist vote, for example.² These political leanings are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Proportion of Democratic Options at the Outset of the Transition

<u>Democratic Options</u>	<u>Percent in Favor</u>
1. Support for a move towards a Western-style system (May 1975)	74
2. Support for the democratic principle of universal suffrage (December 1975)	70

- | | |
|--|----|
| 3. Support for democratic political representation
(May 1976) | 78 |
| 4. Support for a "gradual" democratic change | 61 |

If we now compare the standing of the Left and Right on a scale from 1 (Far Left) to 10 (Far Right), we will see that the average for the Spanish electorate³ is 5.47, which is almost exactly in the middle and very close, for example, to the German electorate (5.63). A closer look at the breakdown appears in Table 2.

Table 2. Ideological Distribution of the Electorate


<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Far Left	(1+2)	4
Left	(3+4)	17
Center-Left	(5)	23
Center-Right	(6)	18
Right	(7+8)	15
Far Right	(9+10)	4

Thus, 44 percent are on the left of the political spectrum, and 37 percent are on the right. Now then, the important thing is that the weight of the Center-Left and Center-Right segments was crucial: They accounted for 41 percent of the electorate, and this was going to largely dictate the logic of party competition. The weight of the Center/Center-Left was a major centripetal element in Spanish politics and lessened the risks of party polarization. It seems clear that the ideological moderation of Spanish society contributed decisively to the political moderation of the main parties in the transition to democracy. Graph 1 shows the spatial distribution of the electorate over five ideological positions throughout the transition process.⁴ The graph clearly reveals the great stability that characterizes the distribution of Spanish citizens on the ideological spectrum, with a slight gain for the Center and Left sectors at the expense of the Right (position 4). This increase also seems to show up in other survey data analyzed by Juan Linz.⁵

If we compare the average position of the Spanish electorate with the average positions of other European electorates and in particular with those of the nine members of the European Economic Community,⁶ we will see that it fluctuated between 2.69 and 2.58 on a scale from 1 to 5 throughout the political transition and was thus more towards the center than in southern Europe's two main democracies: Italy (2.34) and France (2.52). British society was next on the Left/Right scale (2.68), with the electorates in the other countries farther to the Right. Furthermore, Graph 2 shows a bimodal distribution that is worthwhile contrasting with the distributions furnished by Sani and Sartori for eight countries.⁷ The closest model in terms of the distribution profile seems to be Austria. The center of the scale was less crowded in Spain than in the United States, the FRG, Switzerland or the United Kingdom, but more so than Italy or Finland (societies in which the

Gráfico 1 (1)

Distribución del electorado en una escala Ideológica (1977 - 1980).



Key:

1. Distribution of the electorate on an ideological scale
2. Far Left
3. Far Right
4. Average position of the electorate

extremes of the political spectrum attract more support). The distribution in Spain was clearly asymmetrical in favor of the Center-Left/Left. This meant that with the existing parties on the Spanish political scene, there would be strong competition between a Eurocommunist PCE [Spanish Communist Party] and the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], that the PSOE should also try to lure/convert centrist sectors and that the UCD [Democratic Center Union] could not allow its image to shift to the Right and at the same time would have to try to represent rightwing factions (the voters in positions 3 to 5 in Graph 1).

What was the ideological breakdown of the various parties' voters? Table 3 shows this breakdown for 11 political parties, as well as the average position of each of these constituencies on a 1 to 10 scale. The information in Table 3 refers to the personal political position of the voters, in other words, the ideological distribution of electoral support for each of the major parties in Spain's political system. If we examine the four main parties in Graph 2, we will see where the constituencies of these parties overlap and the percentage of the total electorate that each of these parties has backing it. I would now like to take a look not at how voters classify themselves ideologically but at how they evaluate their parties. This will enable us, first, to compare the two scales and to see how the spatial positions of the voters compare with the positions of the parties and, second, to continue analyzing overlappings and ideological gaps, but this time in terms of party image, not between voters.

Table 3. Ideological Distribution of Party Voters

Party	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>No Answer</u>	<u>Average</u>
CD	--	--	--	--	12	17	23	17	15	5	5	4	7
UCD	--	--	2	3	46	11	9	5	1	1	13	8	5
PSOE	3	10	31	26	9	3	1	--	--	--	9	7	3
PCE	19	26	30	12	1	--	2	--	--	--	5	4	2
UN	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	19	--	75	--	--	9
CiU	--	--	--	16	39	19	2	3	--	--	17	4	5
ERC	4	10	9	62	4	5	--	--	--	--	5	--	3
PNV	--	--	6	29	46	4	2	1	--	--	7	5	4
EE	6	39	46	4	3	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	2
HB	31	33	21	12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	2
PSA	2	14	26	27	20	--	6	--	--	--	--	5	3
Total	3	6	12	11	19	6	4	3	1	1	18	16	4

To what extent, then, did the ideological position ascribed to the parties tally with the ideological position of the voters themselves? If we look at the data from 1978, on an ideological scale from 1 to 5, the electorate placed the PCE at 1.7, the PSOE at 2.2, the UCD at 3.2 and the AP at 4.4 (the average position of the electorate was 2.68). In other words, the PCE was located one point to the left, the PSOE

a half point to the left, the UCD a half point to the right and the AP 1.7 to the right. In 1980,⁸ on an ideological scale of 1 to 10, the voters placed Democratic Coalition (DC) at 7.9, UCD at 5.9, PSOE at 3.4 and the PCE at 2.3. Since the average position of the voters in this instance was 4.5, the PCE was 2.2 points to the left, the PSOE 1.1 points to the left, the UCD 1.4 points to the right and CD 3.4 points to the right. Table 4 contains information on how the voters of each party evaluated their own party and its competitors.

Table 4. Ideological Location of the Parties According to the Voters
(Scale of 1 to 10)

<u>Position According to Voters of:</u>	<u>Position of:</u>			
	<u>CD</u>	<u>UCD</u>	<u>PSOE</u>	<u>PCE</u>
CD	7.7	5.6	3.0	1.6
UCD	7.8	5.6	3.1	1.9
PSOE	8.0	6.0	3.5	2.4
PCE	8.4	6.3	3.7	2.6
All voters	7.9	5.9	3.4	2.3


If we take a look at the differences in the placement of the parties by the various groups of voters, we can see a tendency to locate the parties that they do not support at the far end of the political spectrum, whether to the Left or to the Right, and to position their own party near the Center. We can notice this by looking at the vertical columns in Table 4. The voters of the PCE pushed the other parties to the Right. The voters of the PSOE pushed the PCE to the Left and the UCD and CD to the Right. The UCD voters placed the PSOE and PCE further to the Left, and the CD voters placed the other three parties further to the Left.

If we compare the personal position of party voters with the position that those voters ascribe to their party, in other words, Table 3 with Table 4, the proximity between the two positions becomes clear. This ideological-spatial proximity between voters and parties would thus seem to provide a good explanation of electoral backing for each party. In fact, the political parties pursued this type of analysis with the devotion and ingenuousness of a political sociology student. Nonetheless, there has been a longstanding and complex academic debate going on as to whether the proximity of positions on a Left/Right scale is a causal factor in voting.⁹ I feel that in this debate Sartori and Sani are generally right when they assert that "the Left-Right identification is attitudinal and is related to specific political issues."¹⁰ The two authors have shown that there is a strong relationship between position on the ideological spectrum and stands on social equality, change, foreign policy, religion, equality of the sexes and support for interest groups. Furthermore, we should make some other points about the usefulness of analyzing ideological spaces. In the first place, the significance of where citizens place themselves on a Left/Right scale seems to vary from country to country. The French or the Italians are more willing to place themselves on this

Gráfico 2

Distribución de los votantes de cada partido.

Breakdown of the voters of each party




scale than American are, for example. Secondly, there is great consistency among countries as to the positioning of parties on the Left/Right scale. For example, the Italians, French, Germans and Swiss¹¹ place their Communist and Socialist parties in practically identical positions (with fluctuations of 3 and 2 points, respectively, on a scale of 0 to 100). Thirdly, the position of the voters themselves on the scale correlates not only with specific issues but also with their votes.¹² The willingness of voters in Spain to indicate their position on the Left/Right scale has been similar to the willingness in European democracies. Those unable or unwilling to do so have ranged from 26 to 29 percent in the 1978 and 1979 Center for Sociological Research (CIS) polls, totaled 19 percent in the DATA survey and numbered 27 percent in another survey of a nationwide voter sample.¹³ Moreover, neither the position of the voters nor their placement of the parties have varied substantially in the various studies.¹⁴ Finally, there has also been a strong correlation between an individual's position on the ideological spectrum and party voting.¹⁵

By analyzing the positions of parties and voters on a spatial Left/Right scale, we can look into the issue of the degree of Spanish society's polarization as reflected in the ideological distances between each party electorate and the other parties. We have already seen the ideological distribution of the electorate of each of the main parties (Table 3) and the position of each party according to the various groups of voters (Table 4). With this information we can estimate the distances between partisan voters (in accordance with their own placement of themselves) and the distances between the parties as they were positioned by the voters. These distances, again on a 1 to 10 scale, appear in Graph 3.

The distance between the parties further to the Left and the ones further to the Right illustrates the range of ideological polarization in the Spanish party system, the system's "spatial elasticity" as Sartori puts it. Graph 3 is concerned only with the four main nationwide parties, which took 83 percent of the vote in the 1979 elections. The distance could also have been gauged in terms of the minor parties in the Spanish Parliament, which nonetheless have considerable "antisystem" significance (to use Sartori's term once again) as well as a capacity for destabilizing political polarization (National Union or Herri Batasuna, for example). I have taken a more restrictive approach, however: the parliamentary significance of polarization, with the limits set, therefore, at the Spanish Communist Party and Democratic Coalition. Thus, the distance between the average positions that the voters of the two parties ascribe to themselves is 4.9 points on a 1-10 scale. In turn, the distance between the average positions in which voters in general placed the two parties is 5.6 points. Thus, the distance and polarization between voters generally tended to be less than the distance and polarization between the positions attributed to the parties. This tendency no doubt had a centripetal effect on political competition. These distances are similar to the ones that other studies have calculated: 4.3 between PCE-CD voters according

Gráfico 3.

Distancia entre partidos y votantes en el espacio ideológico. (1)



----- = distancia entre la posición de los votantes de un partido y la posición de los votantes de otro partido. (3)
 ————— = distancia entre la posición de los votantes de un partido y la posición atribuida a otro partido. (4)

Key:

1. Distance between parties and voters in ideological terms
2. Voters
3. Distance between the position of the voters of one party and the position of the voters of another party
4. Distance between the position of the voters of one party and the position attributed to another party


to Sani and Sartori, and 5.9 between the positions attributed to the PCE and CD according to Linz. The distance index that Sani and Sartori have given for Spain is 0.47.¹⁶ According to my data, it was 0.53. In both cases, it is very close to Italy's (0.51 between the PCI and the PLI [Italian Liberal Party]) and to France's (0.57 between the PCF and UDR). Hence, it reflected a polarization of the Spanish party system that was typical of southern Europe and that contrasted with the narrower polarization in northern European countries (0.32 in the United Kingdom between Laborites and Tories); 0.27 in the FRG between SPD and CDU). Now then, unlike Italy and France, the polarization affected the two minor parties and, therefore, was not marked by a bimodal distribution in which one of the two modes at least was far from the center. On the contrary, as we have seen in Graph 1, the two modes of the spatial ideological distribution were not located towards the extremes, which lessened the weight of polarization in Spain's case.

Polarization can again be estimated in Graph 4, which shows the distance between and overlapping among the four main nationwide parties and three nationalist parties. Instead of ideological scales, this graph is based on the responses of voters to the question of whether they considered themselves very close to, close to, far from or very far from these parties.¹⁷ Graph 4 provides information on the electorate in general but also on the constituencies of each of the parties and on nonvoters. As far as nationwide parties are concerned, we should first underscore the high percentage (around 60) of communist voters who felt very close to the PSOE. Second, socialist voters felt much less close to the PCE (35 percent) but even less close to the UCD (about 10 percent). Third, the voters of the UCD said they were closer to Democratic Coalition than to the PSOE (25 as against 20 percent), although the percentage that felt close to the CD was double what it was in the reverse case; these two data confirm the "positional" information in Graph 2. Fourth, one out of three CD voters expressed a closeness to the UCD. As far as the nationalist parties are concerned, both the voters of Convergence and Union and of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) were somewhat closer to the UCD and to the PSOE (although in the case of the CiU it was barely 20 percent and in the case of the PNV, 25 percent), whereas the PSA voters were very close to the PSOE (close to 65 percent). In conclusion, the nonvoters said they felt closer to the PSOE, which confirms the impression that the mounting abstentionism in the successive elections during the transition hurt the Socialist Party the most.

These spatial approaches of Left/Right and proximity or distance of parties and voters are unquestionably useful with an eye towards electoral strategies. Now then, this does not mean that there are not many other factors influencing ideological positions, the political expectations of citizens, their personal political choices and, when taken together, the entire political party system in Spain. Table 5 shows that for leftist voters, a party's platform, its political strength and its

Gráfico 4

Proporciones del electorado de cada partido que se siente cerca o lejos de los demás partidos (1)



Key:

1. Percentages of the voters of each party who feel close to or distant from the other parties
2. Voters
3. Nonvoters
4. Very close
5. Close
6. Distant
7. Very distant
8. Don't know/no answer
9. Entire electorate

political tradition were the main factors in their vote, whereas among UCD voters, leadership counted more than among the voters of leftwing parties.¹⁸

Table 5. Reasons for Voting for Political Parties (Percentages)

<u>Reason</u>	<u>PCE</u>	<u>PSOE</u>	<u>UCD</u>
Party tradition	23.3	19.6	14.7
Family influence	15.1	14.6	16.7
Its political strength/ It can do something	51.3	50.0	45.4
Party leaders	13.3	20.3	32.3
Party platform	51.5	47.0	32.7
Total responses	154.5	151.5	141.8
(N)	(307)	(1,117)	(1,150)

These reasons complicate the explanation of a given vote as the result of ideological proximity between voter and party. Leadership, party strength, tradition and political program are also additional factors. As far as family influence is concerned, it seems to have played a bigger role than the voters themselves have acknowledged. I have examined this issue in other studies, and Table 6 below once again shows the relationship between the ideological position of a representative sample of the adult population (as they placed themselves on a Left/Right scale) and the ideological position of their parents, as the sample of voters said they remembered it.¹⁹

Finally, another element affecting election support is lack of interest in politics, the fact that politics is irrelevant to many people. This is the case with about one-fourth of the electorate, mainly individuals with low levels of education and women. These "indifferent" individuals mostly backed the Center-Right/UCD, and their latent conservatism was aroused into active political support through the high profile of certain political figures.²⁰ It is within this group that Suarez was comparatively more popular and where Fraga, or the memory of Francoism, was viewed less negatively in relative terms (although a negative view was widespread; we should bear in mind that on a scale from 1 to 10, Franco got an average of 3.6 and Fraga 3.3). It seems plausible that this segment of society was the direct result of Francoism's policy of demobilizing and depoliticizing and that it is characterized socially by having had fewer ideological defenses against the "negative" indoctrination of the dictatorship (small shopowners, women, individuals with little education, etc).

The first elections of the transition, in 1977, brought to light two particularly important facts. On the one hand, there was a noteworthy relative balance between the Left and Right. Within these two political spheres, in turn, the the most moderate group had a three to one advantage over the most extremist. This was in keeping with the bimodal distribution

CUADRO 6

CONTINUIDADES IDEOLOGICAS INTERGENERACIONALES (1)

AUTOUBICACION POLITICA DEL ELECTORADO (2)

(3) Orientación política de los padres	(4) Extrema izquierda	(5) Izquierda	(6) Centro	(7) Derecha	(8) Extrema derecha	(9) N/S	(10) N/C	TOTAL
(11) Derecha.....	38 } 100 %	28 } 100 %	69 } % 100	83 } 100 %	80 } 100 %	47 } 100 %	73 } 100 %	51 } 100 %
(12) Liberal	5 } de	11 } de	16 } de	4 } de	— } de	18 } de	4 } de	11 } de
(13) Izquierda.....	57 } 83	61 } 70	15 } 51	12 } 77	20 } 40	35 } 19	23 } 22	38 } 53
S	17	23	39	18	36	74	48	37
C	—	7	10	5	24	7	30	10
(N)	(24)	(408)	(308)	(118)	(24)	(176)	(117)	(1,175)

Key:

1. Ideological continuity from generation to generation
2. Where the voters place themselves on the political spectrum
3. Political leanings of parents
4. Far Left
5. Left
6. Center
7. Right
8. Far Right
9. Don't know
10. No answer
11. Right
12. Liberal
13. Left

of the ideological positions of the citizens. On the other hand, the party system was marked by "polarized pluralism," especially because of the presence of regional-nationalist parties, in addition to anti-system parties, which made the formation of stable governments difficult. Some analysts regarded the 1979 elections as provisional and their results as unreliable. It is unquestionably true that the elections after 1979 were marked by certain changes: on the one hand, much higher abstention, and on the other, an increase in the regional-nationalist vote, which lent considerable weight to HB and EE in the Basque Country and to the PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia] in Andalusia and which again demonstrated the importance of segmented pluralism in Spain. Now then, support for the UCD, PSOE and PCE did not change substantially, but the AP-CD lost considerable backing.

The fact that the outcome of the 1977 and 1979 elections was more or less the same points to a relatively low instability index. The index was 5.1 between the two elections,²¹ exactly the same as in Italy between 1972 and 1976 and markedly lower than in Italy after the Fascists (an instability index of 13.3 from 1946 to 1948 and 9.4 between 1948 and 1953).

Now then, although there was considerable electoral stability in Spain between the two general elections during the transition, there was less stability in the case of the 3 April 1979 municipal balloting 1 month after the general election. The index of instability between the 1977 general election and the 1979 municipal elections was 9.1. At first glance, the municipal elections represented a major triumph for the Left, which took over the governments in 27 provincial capitals (provinces with 10.5 million inhabitants), while the UCD won in 23 provincial capitals with just 2.5 million inhabitants. However, a closer look at the municipal elections shows that they did not represent that resounding a victory for the Left and probably reflected the conditioning factors that the Left had to have on its side for its strategy of the "democratic break" for the transition. The municipal elections went so well for the Left because mayors and municipal governments were chosen indirectly and because of the city governments pacts between the PSOE and the PCE.

The ideological makeup of Spanish society thus seemed quite stable during the transition, with its own peculiar fragmentation at the same time. The fragmentation showed up in the traditional split between Right and Left, the two major poles of the UCD and PSOE, but it was also revealed in a stronger nationalism than in any other southern European country. Thus, the nationalist parties, whose vote had risen in the 1979 general elections (and holding up in the municipal voting that year), made spectacular gains in the elections for home rule parliaments in the Basque Country and Catalonia in 1980.

At these elections, held after the passage of the Basque and Catalan Statutes of Autonomy in October 1979, the instability or volatility of the voting was quite high in comparison to the general elections

in 1977 or 1979. If we take the 1977 elections, the instability index was 22.25 in the Basque Country, and if we take the 1979 elections, the index was 14.65 (looking at how the PNV, PSE-PSOE, UCD, CD, PCE, HB and EE did). The elections for the Basque Parliament in March 1980, therefore, brought a significant shift in the political balance of power in the Basque Country. So then, we have to bear in mind that although in Spain as a whole stability was high between the 1977 and 1979 elections, there was a major shift in the Basque Country (the index for Spain was, as I mentioned, 5.1, whereas for the Basque Country it was 14.8). The elections for the Catalan Parliament in March 1980 revealed an equally high degree of instability: an index of 14.0 if we compare them with the 1977 general elections and an index of 16.95 if our reference is the 1979 general elections (considering the PSC-PSOE, PSUC, CiU, UCD and ERC [Republican Left of Catalonia]).

Hence, although there was a great deal of stability in the vote between general elections, it dropped somewhat between general and municipal elections and was very low between general elections and home rule parliament elections. The trend towards instability or volatility in the latter case was due to the rise in nationalism. The overall strength of the four main nationwide parties (UCD, PSOE, PCE and CD) dropped from 51 to 32 percent in the Basque Country and from 64 to 53 percent in Catalonia between 1977 and 1980.

It is true that these distinct election spheres (national, municipal and autonomous regions) are not strictly comparable. In the autonomous regions in particular, voters seemed to support parties that symbolized Basque or Catalan nationalism. Given the history of these two nationalist movements, these parties were conservative parties above all. Rather than backing a particular left- or rightwing ideological option to run the country, the voters were trying to eliminate competition for the autonomous community, and to this end what could have been better than a party that had nothing to do with Madrid. We might thus conclude that the reason behind the vote in the elections for home rule parliaments was to support parties with a strong nationalist and cultural identity, even though they did not coincide, in Right/Left terms, with the parties that these voters would back in the general elections. The voting rationale in the general elections would be the opposite: to back the party that could "best" exercise power from the central government in accordance with a view more in tune with "class interests" or Left/Right ideology. Therefore, the abstention in the general elections was not the same as it was in the elections for the Catalan and Basque Parliaments. In the latter, abstention was heavy among the immigrant worker population (this segment of society had stayed away from the polls in the Basque Country already in 1979, because class-related problems were swamped by the nationalist struggle), while in Catalonia the Barcelona bourgeoisie abstained more in the general elections and less in the autonomy elections (the opposite was the case among immigrant laborers). This three-rationale interpretation of voting patterns is reinforced by the responses of voters to the question of whether their vote varied with the type of election. Nineteen percent said yes,²² and 48 percent said it was not affected.

To determine the "stability" or "volatility" of the vote I researched the shifts in party support over time. Another approach is to observe individual voting trends and to study their "fluidity." In other words, the point is to study the shifts in votes between and among parties in successive elections. Table 7 furnishes information on the "loyalty" (also called "viscosity") of the voters of the six major parties. This information bolsters the hypothesis that the "sphere of competition" is highly important. Whereas in the two general elections the fluidity index was 13.5, it jumped to 21.3 between the general elections of 1979 and the municipal elections that same year and rose further to 33.7 between the 1979 general balloting and the elections for the Basque and Catalan home rule parliaments in March 1980.

Table 7. Percentage of Loyal Voters in the Various Parties

<u>Party</u>	<u>Between the 1977 and 1979 General Elections (Party Vote in 1977=100)</u>	<u>Between the 1979 General and Muni- cipal Elections (Vote in General Election=100)</u>	<u>Between the General Elections of 1979 and the Basque and Catalan Parliamentary Elections in 1980 (Vote in 1979 General Elections in Basque Country and Catalonia =100)</u>
UCD	87	76	45
PSOE	87	84	59
PCE	89	80	72
CD	75	63	50
CiU	93	77	83
PNV	88	92	89
Viscosity index	86.5	78.7	66.3
Fluidity index	13.5	21.3	33.7

Where did the "fluid vote" go in these various electoral contests? To put it another way, what parties did these voters vote for, and what kind of shifts were there between parties? Table 8 shows the main shifts (only those accounting for at least three percent of the original party vote).

In the preceding pages we have examined some of the features of Spain's party system and politics during the transition. To summarize, we should keep the following points in mind:

1) Throughout the transition to democracy, Spanish society showed considerable political moderation, which was particularly noteworthy because during the dictatorship many predicted that post-Franco Spain would be characterized by ideological extremism. This moderation took four forms: the responses of citizens to what kind of political and social policies for change they wanted; how individual citizens placed themselves ideologically on the Left-Right spectrum; the bimodal

Table 8. Vote Shifts Between Parties

<u>Party</u>	<u>Between the 1977 and 1979 General Elections (Party Vote in 1977=100)</u>	<u>Between the 1979 General and Muni cipal Elections (Vote in General Election=100)</u>	<u>Between the General Elections of 1979 and the Basque and Catalan Parliamentary Elections in 1980 (Vote in 1979 General Elections in Basque Country and Catalonia =100)</u>
UCD	4 percent to PSOE	5 percent to PSOE 5 percent to abstention	15 percent to CiU 4 percent to PNV 3 percent to PSOE 8 percent to abstention
PSOE	2 percent to PCE	2 percent to PCE 5 percent to abstention	5 percent to ERC 4 percent to CiU 4 percent to PNV 4 percent to abstention
PCE	2 percent to PSOE	4 percent to PSOE 9 percent to abstention	6 percent to ERC 5 percent to PSOE 3 percent to abstention
CD	15 percent to UCD 3 percent to PSOE	11 percent to UCD 12 percent to abstention	15 percent to CiU 7 percent to UCD 7 percent to ERC 8 percent to abstention
CiU	2 percent to ERC	3 percent to UCD	4 percent to abstention
PNV	6 percent to PSOE 2 percent to HB 1 percent to EE	--	5 percent to abstention

distribution of the population on this spectrum, with the two modes corresponding to moderate Left-Right stands, and party electoral support.

2) The moderation of Spanish society proved to be very stable throughout the transition. A wide range of attitude indications revealed that this was a deeply-rooted trait of Spanish society, not a temporary, tentative feature of still fearful citizens, nor an isolated characteristic of a ideologically fluid and changing society.

3) The degree of polarization or ideological distance between the main parties was quite similar to what it is in the societies of Italy and France. Moreover, the polarization was stable throughout the transition, and its extremes were represented by parties with minor representation in Parliament. Thus, due to the significance of the two poles, the polarization was less important than in Italy or France.

4) An individual's ideological position on the Left-Right spectrum was a major determinant of his vote. Nevertheless, other factors are involved in ideological-spatial proximity between voters and parties. Particularly important were family political tradition and, for leftist voters, a party's tradition, its platform and an element of pragmatism (the ability of the party to pursue a policy), while for rightist voters, pragmatism and leadership seemed to be crucial factors in determining political support.

5) There was considerable ballot stability between the first two elections of the democracy. This once again contradicted the views that support for parties was provisional and shaky. The stability was not as great between general elections and municipal elections and was especially low between general elections and the elections for the Basque and Catalan autonomous parliaments in 1980. This pointed to a different voting rationale in the three "spheres of competition" in politics and underscored the importance of regionalism-nationalism in Spanish politics.

6) Thus, regionalism-nationalism was the main factor in vote centrifugation and electoral instability, outweighing the stability and centripetal trend that characterized the strict division between Left and Right. Hence, the stability of political support in the future would seem to hinge on factors relatively independent of the ideological leanings of the citizens. On the one hand, success in institutionalizing the home rule system could either mitigate or heighten regional-nationalist tensions and, inversely, the influence of Spain's nationwide parties; on the other, the organizational and ideological stability and consistency of the political parties, which have weakened in the UCD since the spring of 1980, could lead to a political restructuring of the Right, independent, to a degree, of the ideological leanings of this segment of the electorate.

FOOTNOTES

1. See V. Perez Diaz, "El orden politico y el orden economico," in "Clase obrera, orden social y conciencia de clase," INI [National Institute of Industry] Foundation, 1980. Table 1 contains some of the data in the article. The survey was conducted in 1978 among a sample of 4,154 persons representative of industrial wage-earners. I have tended in the table to preserve the style of the questions.
2. The sources are the following: For 1, the "Metra 6" poll of a population sample from our seven main cities (INFORMACIONES, 31 May 1975); for 2, the CONSULTA poll of a nationwide sample (CAMBIO 16, 1 December 1975); for 3, the Public Opinion Institute's poll of a nationwide sample in May 1976; for 4, the Center for Sociological Research's poll of a nationwide sample of 3,457 persons, which I conducted along with J. Santamaria and J.L. Toharia for a study of Spanish political culture (a retrospective question in August 1980 concerning personal desires for political change at the outset of the transition).
3. Data obtained from the information furnished by J.J. Linz, "Il sistema partitico spagnolo," in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA, 3, 1978. The poll was conducted among a representative national sample of 8,837 persons in January and February 1977.
4. Graph 1 is based on the data furnished in the polls by the Public Opinion Institute and the Center for Sociological Research in September 1977, July-August 1978, December 1979 and August 1980 among representative nationwide samples of 1,154, 5,348, 1,147 and 3,457 persons, respectively. I was able to make my own tabulation of the original 1978 study data thanks to the facilities provided by the center's administration. The 1980 poll data are from a study that I conducted with J. Santamaria and J.L. Toharia, with the Center for Sociological Research (CIS) doing the field work and the tabulation.
5. J.J. Linz, "The New Spanish Party System," in "Electoral Participation. A Comparative Analysis" (R. Rose, ed), London and Beverly Hills, Sage, 1980, pp 101-189 and, in particular, Table 7 in this chapter.
6. See R. Inglehart and H.D. Klingemann, "Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension among Western Mass Publics," in "Party Identification and Beyond" (I. Budge, I. Crewe and D. Farlies, eds), New York, Wiley, 1976, pp 243 and ff.
7. The countries are the United States, the FRG, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Holland, Italy and Finland. See G. Sani and G. Sartori, "Frammentazione, Polarizzazione e Cleavages," in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA, 3, 1978, pp 339-361.
8. The data for 1978 and 1980 are from the polls that I referred to in Footnote 4.

9. See S.H. Barnes, "Representation in Italy. Institutionalized Tradition and Electoral Choice," University of Chicago Press, 1977, pp 97-116, 179-180, and by the same author, "Left, Right and the Italian Voter," in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 4, 1971; G. Sartori, "Parties and Party System, Cambridge University Press, 1976, Chapter 10; D. Butler and D. Stokes, "Political Change in Britain," Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971, Chapter 9, and R. Inglehart and H.D. Klingemann, "Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension among Western Mass Publics."
10. G. Sani and G. Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies," in "European Party Systems" (H. Daadler and P. Maier, eds), soon to be published (Spanish translation in REVISTA DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO POLITICO, Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia, No 7, Fall 1980).
11. See R. Inglehart and D. Sindjanski, "Dimension Gauche-Droit chez les Dirigeants et Electeurs Suisses," in REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, October 1974, p 1009.
12. Data for 10 countries can be found in R. Inglehart and H.D. Klingemann, op. cit. Additional information can be found in S.H. Barnes and R. Pierce, "Public Opinion and Political Preferences in France and Italy," in MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 15, 4, 1971; H. Klingemann, "Testing the Left-Right Continuum on a Sample of German Voters," in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 5, 1, 1972, and A.P. Frognier, "Distances entre Paris et Clivages en Belgique," in RES PUBLICA, 2, 1973.
13. See Footnotes 3 and 4. The additional poll was taken in June 1978 on a representative nationwide sample of 3,004 persons and is the groundwork for research by S.H. Barnes, P. McDonough and A. Lopez Pina. The references are from a work by these authors: "The Spanish Public in Political Transitions," in the BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 11, 1, 1981.
14. Compare the numbers in my tables 3 and 4 with Table 9 in J.J. Linz, "The New Spanish Party System," p 131, and with the averages for Spain in Table 5 of G. Sani and G. Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies."
15. See F. Alvira, "La conducta electoral en Espana: un modelo explicativo," report presented at the European Consortium for Political Research, Brussels, 17-21 April 1979. The main conclusion is that the ideological factor explains a higher percentage of the variance than the socio-demographical factor and than the leader assessment factor.
16. Sani's and Sartori's distance index is the absolute difference between the average positions of the two groups of voters divided by the maximum theoretical distance, 9 on a 1 to 10 scale.

17. The question is from the 1980 poll mentioned in Footnote 4.
18. Table 5 is based on a poll that Emopublica conducted for the PSOE in May 1979 on a representative nationwide sample of 4,175 persons. I must express my appreciation to Guillermo Galeote for allowing me to introduce questions in the poll and to reanalyze the original findings.
19. Data based on a CIS poll in 1979 on a representative nationwide sample of the electorate consisting of 1,175 persons. I thank the CIS administration for allowing me to introduce questions in the poll questionnaire and to analyze the findings.
20. S.H. Barnes, P. McDonough and A. Lopez Pina, op. cit.
21. The "instability index" is the arithmetic sum of the percentages of the party vote shifts (positive or negative) between two elections, divided by two. In connection with this index and for data on Italy, see M. Barbagli et al., "Fluidita elettorale e classi sociali in Italia," Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979, pp 27-39 and 111-121.
22. The question was the following: "In Spain, as in other Western democracies, there are people who always vote for the same party and people who vote for different parties in the case of local, regional or national elections. Which one of these groups do you tend to be in?" The question is from the 1980 poll referred to in Footnote 4.
23. See M. Barbagli et al., "Fluidita elettorale e classi sociali in Italia," Chapter 2 of the first part and the third part; W. Ascher and S. Tarrow, "The Stability of Communist Electorates: Evidence from a Longitudinal Analysis of French and Italian Aggregate Data," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 19, 1975, pp 475-499.

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PATTERNS OF POLITICAL AFFILIATION ANALYZED

Madrid REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLITICOS in Spanish Sep-Oct 81 pp 33-72

[Article by Jose Ramon Montero Gibert: "Parties and Political Participation: Some Notes on Political Affiliation During the Initial Stage of the Spanish Transition"]

[Text] This work is a condensed version of a paper submitted to the Round Table on "Party System and Political Participation in the New European Democracies," organized by the Spanish Political Science Association and held in Madrid from 27 to 29 May 1981. I would like to thank Professor Ramirez Jimenez, president of the association, for having kindly invited me to take part. The paper also analyzed the political leanings and attitudes of the affiliates, but this has been left out of this article so as not to make it too long. This work is part of a broader research project on political participation in Spain. The startup of this project was made possible by the fellowship that the Joint Hispano-American Committee awarded me, thus enabling me to spend the summer of 1980 at the Survey Research Center at Berkeley University, and its development, in conjunction with Professor Bar Cendon of Zaragoza University, has been facilitated by assistance from the Center for Sociological Research. My most sincere appreciation to both institutions, which, of course, neither subscribe to nor are responsible for the opinions and conclusions expressed in this article.

Introduction

In an influential work published some time ago, Stein Rokkan outlined three crucial problems that any systematic study of the structural context of political participation must broach. They involve an analysis: a) of the set of decisions that establish the formal conditions for the political mobilization of masses of unassociated individuals within each territory; b) of the current rates of mobilization towards political activity and of the conditions conducive to higher and lower rates, and c) of the conditions for certain links between political party activities and involvement in other politically pertinent groups, associations and organizations.¹ Although Rokkan presented this agenda of a sort with the intention of encouraging comparative studies on participation, the above issues are obviously of fundamental importance

for a study of political participation in our national context. This is because of the perhaps peculiar nature of the complex transition in Spain. The point here is that those three dimensions emerged in Spain practically simultaneously. Thus, if we follow the line of thought expressed by Rokkan, in a very short space of time we have witnessed, first, the making of decisions leading to the establishment of a democratic framework that would enable a people hitherto subject to an authoritarian regime to participate; second, the outward expression of participation by Spaniards, with a bias stemming specifically from the continuum of characteristics ranging from the weak crystallization of their political attitudes to the contradictory nature of the political stimuli they have received, and lastly, the institutionalization of a system for channeling participation, the extension of which, in relation to the parties, seems to be accompanied by far from intense involvement.

These three dimensions can obviously be analyzed individually, and there would be a great many levels within each of them. In contrast to what has happened in other political systems, such analyses and levels would be extraordinarily complex because, as we have stated, the three dimensions emerged at relatively the same time. I feel, nevertheless, that this paper, which focuses on the dimension of parties and participation, can facilitate a perspective that to an extent can accommodate the other two. This is because of the role played by the parties during our transition. On the one hand, the traditional organizational weakness of the Spanish people and the need to urgently create channels for participation at the outset of the democratic system favored party channels and bolstered their tendency to become the sole and exclusive channels. On the other, the parties have unquestionably played a leading role in all of the decisions defining our political space, decisions that began with the agreed reform, continued with the consensus draft constitution and are currently in the coordination stage. In short, the attempts by the parties to be exclusive channels, their leading role and the enormous public visibility of their activities explain to a degree why the parties are one of the causes of the syndrome that we call disenchantment, whether fully or hardly justified. As we all well know, one of the signs of this disenchantment is the downward trend in already low levels of political participation.

All of this underscores the timeliness of considering parties and participation together. I am aware that the identification of the two terms raises an initial and reasonable objection, bolstered by the scant number of studies on the issue in other democracies. The objection has to do with the limited field of analysis, inasmuch as political parties fulfill many functions other than as channels of participation and because modes of participation are not limited to political parties. In our case, the link between parties and participation still has the drawback of being restrictive, but in light of the above reasons, what we might lose in breadth we will likely gain in depth. Therefore, this article will discuss party affiliation and affiliates with the following three limitations. As far as the

number of parties is concerned, I have considered only Popular Alliance (AP), the Democratic Center Union (UCD), the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). With regard to the sphere of participation, I have included only formal participation through individual registration in a given party, and in terms of the data, I have been obliged to use not always reliable numbers, because the parties have insurmountable misgivings about furnishing membership figures.²

Two Hypotheses on Affiliation During the Initial Stage of the Political Change

Stephano Bartolini, an expert on the subject of membership in mass parties, has written, and correctly I think, that "in spite of the little value attached to it, the study of party affiliation still warrants consideration, not despite but precisely because of the fresh emphasis of publications on the problem of the 'crisis of the parties.'"³ The phrase "crisis of the parties" is, in fact, heard often in Western democracies, Spain included.⁴ It is generally understood to mean many things, including the difficulties that parties have in achieving effective political representation, their apparent failure to incorporate substantial segments of the electorate and the pressures they are under to successfully channel political involvement. A few of the major consequences of all this are their encouragement, by omission, of the emergence of political organizations outside party structures, the widespread feeling of indifference to the institutional system and, in short, the erosion of the model of a mass party characterized by intense mobilization and a strong, active membership. The upshot of all this, obviously, is a seemingly irreversible decline in the quantity and quality of members of today's political parties.

Spain's version of this membership crisis presents some peculiar traits, because although certain common symptoms are noticeable, everyone is aware of the decisive influence of a radically different set of causes. Francisco Murillo's general description of our society also seems to hold for our politics; he said that Spain was moving from the preindustrial to the postindustrial era without having completed or even partially experienced the industrial stage.⁵ It would seem, hence, that as far as political affiliation is concerned, the parties have come back before they ever left. In other words, except for the brief experience of the Second Republic, our parties seem to have moved directly from the factional model of the Restoration⁶ to the aforementioned symptoms of the crisis without having experienced, far from it, intermediate partisan stages.

The Franco period of course is the dominant factor in any explanation, like a giant interlude after which we must seek out the true keys to an understanding of current political processes and behavior. In this regard, a naively evolutionist interpretation that argues that the pendulum has to swing to full-fledged democracy after so many

years of dictatorship would wager on a boom in membership as a differentiated political behavior during the transition. This view would be based on several factors, which can be roughly and succinctly outlined as follows: i) the desire for democratic participation felt by a broad segment of the Spanish people, 80 percent according to the latest FOESSA Report;⁷ ii) the experience of many European countries after the Second World War; iii) the "extraordinary orphanhood" of the Spanish people in terms of political organizations after the disappearance of the dictatorship, to use Cebrian's graphic language;⁸ iv) the leading role of the parties (or, if you wish, of a particular elite and particular party labels) in resolving what Weiner calls a "crisis of participation"⁹ in late 1975 and throughout much of 1976; v) the intense politicization during the same period, accompanied by the politics of mass mobilization and, at times, by a palpable collective enthusiasm; vi) the success of the parties (or, once more, of a particular elite and particular party labels) in constructing, via a complex network of negotiations and decisions, a new participatory institutionalization by setting up new party organizations and initiating an electoral process, and vii) the possibility that the parties would from the outset repair the serious damage done to the Spanish people's political attitudes, in other words, that they would agree to channel the people's demands, to expand their scant political resources, to bolster their identification with the new political system and, in a nutshell, to do something about the lack of solidarity that was so widespread in Spain in the 1970's.¹⁰ We can cite two examples of the belief that a mass membership movement would be forthcoming. At the PCE Congress in Rome and in 1976, Santiago Carrillo stated that the party's goal was 300,000 affiliates immediately after its legalization.¹¹ And at the first UCD Congress in Madrid and in 1978 Rafael Arias Salgado expressed his satisfaction that the party had boosted its membership by 80 percent in just 4 months.¹² Likewise, when several Socialist researchers mentioned at the same time and in passing that the PSOE had close to 200,000 members, they were probably voicing their hopes rather than just the actual numbers.¹³

There is, however, an alternative interpretation that points to other, no less important countervailing factors. The most important of these are the political culture of Francoism, which has four basic traits: demobilization, depoliticizing, apathy and antiparty feelings. We are familiar with all of them at least since the Restoration, when the overlapping of a rural society and an artificial urban political structure brought about a factional party system based on bossism. The writings of reformists and regenerationists contain abundant examples of the complaints about "Spanish abulia," about that "populace of children and eunuchs" and their "Moroccan resignation"¹⁴ or about parties "that are not even similar to the groups that bear that name in the other nations of Europe" and whose activities are compared to "children's games" and that have to be defined as "factions or cliques of a decidedly personal nature, caricatures of mechanically founded parties."¹⁵ But their basic continuity under Franco, when

after the Republican interlude, those antiparty attitudes and conditions acquired a structural and ideological status in a radically different society, would necessarily condition any future political behavior. The question of the current political culture remains to be researched, and it is of such significance that hasty, error-prone assertions should be avoided. Nevertheless, without lapsing into the sort of determinism that proclaims the automatic conversion of attitudes into actual behavior, we can probably say that the contradictory nature of the political stimuli during the transition have not appreciably altered the map of the Spanish people's political attitudes.¹⁶ What we have, then, is a genuine historic holdover, aggravated by all of the problems during the transition and by the inadequate socialization that emerged from the new system, which, in turn, cannot but have an impact on its degree of legitimacy and efficacy.¹⁷ We would assume, then, that structural matters aside now, the intense politicizing would be all the more abrupt and short-lived to the extent that political attitudes failed to crystalize, which certainly seems to have been the case;¹⁸ that the stimuli for political mobilization would be offset by the cynical Francoist messages that belittled politics and made it synonymous with corruption,¹⁹ as well as by the political and social experience of Spaniards over many long years;²⁰ that the opportunities for political involvement would not be taken advantage of because of scant interest in politics and because of an effective assimilation of the values of resignation and passivity,²¹ and that the propensity to join a party would be counteracted by the repulsive images of them so often conveyed in official speeches and which were also reflected in everyday language.²² In conclusion, in comparing Spain with countries that were under totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, we must remember that our parties lacked the advantages enjoyed by the European parties after the Second World War, because membership was often a strict requirement to have access to certain social and economic activities.²³ Nor can we forget the special makeup of our single party in connection with the authoritarian regime. In contrast to what happened in Italy, for example, where the 20-year influence of the Fascist party reinforced the Italians' propensity to join the postwar parties, Spain's single party very quickly abandoned its monopolizing designs on civilian society and especially on the channels of access of the political elites and, amid mounting discredit and oblivion, restricted itself to controlling just a few factions of the union bureaucracy.²⁴

Some Provisional Data

Amid the interplay of these two sets of influences, the fact is that political affiliation among Spaniards is at a decidedly low level, both in absolute and in relative terms. Although we are still too close in time to perceive any trends, certain existing data are extremely illustrative. In January 1978, just six percent of the Spanish population said they were members of a party, and this dropped to five percent in the summer of the same year (Table 1). And although a further breakdown shows that the leftwing parties have the most members, almost two-thirds at the time, the overall breakdown clearly reveals what weak social roots all parties have.²⁶

Table 1. Percentages of Party Affiliation in July 1978

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percentage of Affiliates of All Parties (N=273)</u>	<u>Percentage of Total Sample (N=5,345)</u>
AP	6.2	0.31
UCD	6.6	0.33
PSOE	29.7	1.51
PCE	31.5	1.60
Others	6.6	0.33
No answer	19.4	0.99
Total	100.0	5.07

Source: Poll conducted by the Center for Sociological Research in July-August 1978 on a nationwide sample of 5,348 persons representing the Spanish adult population.

Since, however, these figures could have been subject to some degree of distortion, which is implicit in any sample selection procedure, it would perhaps be advisable to refer to the absolute numbers provided on occasion by the parties themselves. One can never be too cautious in this area. Exaggerated numbers tend to gain credibility as they are quoted from publication to publication, until they wind up being regarded as virtual facts. We should be wary about the figures for each and every one of the parties in our study, and perhaps in inverse proportion to the misgivings that their leaders harbor when they are asked about how many members they really have. For example, a high-ranking official in Democratic Coalition stated in 1979 that membership ranged from 50,000 to 100,000 no less,²⁷ when it was probably no higher than 30,000. A study on the elections that same year gave the PSOE 200,000 members, a number that should probably be halved.²⁸ A Madrid paper asserted that the PCE had renewed only 10,000 membership cards at the time;²⁹ even giving the party the benefit of the doubt over a possible missing zero, a membership of 100,000 is still far from the 160,000 that the Central Committee reported publicly.³⁰ The UCD is in a really strange situation. Whereas Arias Salgado said at the October 1978 Congress that the party had close to 86,000 members, Calvo-Sotelo estimated at the March 1981 Congress that the UCD had just 61,000 members that October, which is 29 percent fewer.³¹

Given these reservations, it seems likely that membership in the four main parties does not even total a half million. Table 2, which is based on fragmentary, incomplete and poorly verified data, illustrates the trends since 1975. If we are to believe the parties' figures, the PCE is winning the membership competition, with 160,000 affiliates, followed by the UCD with 144,000, the PSOE with an estimated 107,000 and, far back, the AP, which most likely has no more than 30,000, although it has been impossible to get any numbers, inflated or otherwise, from the party. Now then, elementary prudence would advise against any major interpretations based on these figures, much less categorical

pronouncements on the hypothetical strength or weakness of these parties. It would be excessively prudent, however, to judge as premature any studies that might be conducted on this issue, as one author has done.³²

Table 2. Trends in Political Party Affiliation (1975-1981)

<u>Party</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>
AP				50,007g		
UCD			10,000d	61,256h	70,007g	144,097h
PSOE	4,000a	8,000c	51,552e		101,082j	107,000k
PCE	15,000b		201,740f	168,175i		160,000l

Sources:

- a. Maravall, "La alternativa socialista," p 9.
- b. Carlos Elordi, "El PCE por dentro," in LA CALLE, 95, 15/21 January 1981, p 24.
- c. Maravall, op. cit., p 10.
- d. In September, according to Arias Salgado in "La solucion a un reto," p 43.
- e. Before the elections, according to the Federal Group of Sociological Studies, directed by Jose Felix Tezanos, from the Federal Organizational Secretariat of the PSOE, "Estudio sociologico de participacion. Encuesta a los afiliados del PSOE," Madrid, 1981, p 26.
- f. In "Noveno Congreso del Partido Comunista de Espana. Informes, debates, actas y documentos," Madrid, Ediciones PCE, 1978, pp 470-471.
- g. According to Gunther, "Strategies, Tactics and the New Spanish Party System," p 13.
- h. Report by Calvo Ortega at the Second Congress, p 62.
- i. According to the Organization Secretariat, as of 1 December 1978.
- j. "Mandatos representados en el XXVIII Congreso del PSOE," in "Estudio sociologico de participacion," p 26.
- k. Actual number of members as estimated in "Estudio sociologico de participacion," p 26.
- l. According to the Central Committee, in EL PAIS, 17 May 1981.

All of the figures, except those from the PSOE, have yet to be verified at the provincial levels, an undertaking that is beyond our scope and that only the parties themselves can perform.³³ Therefore, the membership figures should be taken not as supposedly accurate gauges of the numerical strength of each party but as indications of their weak hold on the electorate. Regardless of whether they are accurate or not, the fact is that we are looking at abnormally low figures, even more so in comparison to the European averages. As we know, the membership percentages in European countries range from the very low 4 percent that Converse and Dupeux calculated for France (which must have surely gone up) to one-third of the Swedish electorate, as calculated recently by Merkl. In between are countries such as Austria, whose 28 percent affiliation, estimated by Nie and Verba, is due basically to the strength of the "Lagermentalitat"; Great Britain,

with 25 percent, estimated by Butler and Stokes and also including membership through the unions; the FRG, with 15 percent according to data provided by Conradt; Holland, with 13 percent according to Nie and Verba, and Italy, where, according to a survey taken by Barnes, at least 7 percent of the respondents (which other analysts think is too low) acknowledged that they were affiliated with a political party.³⁴

Thus, the PSOE and the PCE, the two organizations that proudly call themselves "parties of the masses," have two of the lowest member/voter ratios in Europe, and the member/electorate ratios of all Spanish parties are less than one. Tables 3, 4 and 5 contain abundant information in this regard. We should perhaps clarify, however, that the two ratios have different uses. The first measures a party's membership as a percentage of its voters, and Bartolini has recently questioned its value for purposes of comparison. Though he does not deny its importance, the Italian author points out the well-known fact that electorally weak parties with a medium-sized membership achieve a higher ratio than others whose social and political importance is beyond question. A glance at Tables 4 and 5 confirms this. Among the Socialist parties, both the Italian PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party] and the Norwegian DNA have almost identical member/voter ratios, but their electoral weight, on the other hand, cannot be compared. Whereas the former mobilizes less than 4 percent of the electorate, the latter garners support of more than 40 percent. And among Communist parties, it is very deceiving to look just at the identical ratios of the Italian and Danish groups, because their performance at the polls is so different: more than 30 percent for the PCI and less than 2 percent for the DKP. The situation becomes absurd in the case of the British Communist Party, which by garnering the votes of two-thirds of its members and just 0.1 percent of the entire electorate, achieves a ratio much higher than 100. Because of all this, Bartolini suggests that this ratio is particularly useful in showing the proximity between members and voters, serving as a sort of indicator of the subcultural strength of each party. The higher the index, the better chance there is that the voters have been firmly integrated and that the party organization has a broader scope.³⁵ Even given this restrictive interpretation, the ratios of 8.7 and 1.8 achieved by the PCE and PSOE are the lowest of the European parties that can be compared to them in electoral terms (with the expected exception of the French Communist party, whose lower ratio is explained by its voter falloff in June 1981). We can thus see its weak subcultural hold, though the socialist group is even weaker. In any case, the other index, the member/electorate ratio, which measures the proportion of members to the total vote, enables us to make much more reliable and meaningful comparisons. Based on this second ratio, we can see that the PCE is in last place among the Communist parties whose electoral support ranges from 10 to 17 percent and that the PSOE is in the same position among the Socialist parties that range from 28 to 38 percent electoral backing. We thus have unequivocal evidence of the structural weakness

Table 3. Membership and Voting Levels for Spanish Parties(1979)

<u>Party</u>	<u>Votes in the</u> <u>1979 Election(a)</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>of Total</u> <u>Vote(b)</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Member/Voter</u> <u>Ratio</u>	<u>Member/Electorate</u> <u>Ratio</u>
AP	1,070,721	8.0	50,000	4.7	0.3
UCD	6,292,102	35.02	70,000	1.1	0.4
PSOE	5,477,037	30.5	101,082	1.8	0.6
PCE	1,940,236	10.8	168,175	8.7	0.9

a. According to the National Statistics Institute, "General Legislative Elections of 1 March 1979. Results," Madrid, 1980.

b. The sum of the valid votes cast.

Table 4. Membership and Voting Levels for Various European Socialist Parties

<u>Country</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Votes in</u> <u>Last</u> <u>Election</u>	<u>Percentage</u> <u>of Vote</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Member/Voter</u> <u>Ratio</u>	<u>Member/Elec-</u> <u>torate Ratio</u>
Austria	SPO	2,412,778	51.0	716,000	29.7	15.1
Sweden	SAP	2,356,234	43.9	1,000,000	42.4	18.3
FRG	SPD	16,262,096	42.9	1,000,000	6.1	2.6
Norway	DNA	962,728	42.4	100,000	10.4	4.4
Denmark	SD	1,213,456	38.3	125,000	10.0	3.9
France	PSF	9,432,362	37.5	200,000	2.1	0.8
Great Britain	LP	11,509,524	36.9	669,000	5.7	2.1
Holland	PvdA	2,810,636	33.8	120,000	4.3	1.4
Spain	PSOE	5,477,037	30.5	101,082	1.8	0.6
Portugal	PSP	1,672,093	8.4	75,000	4.5	1.2
Belgium	PSB	719,926	13.0	180,000	25.0	3.2
	BSP	684,465	12.4	130,000	19.0	2.3
Italy	PSI	3,486,356	9.8	450,000	12.5	1.2
	PSDI	1,403,873	3.8	150,000	10.7	0.4

Source: "Estudio sociológico de participación," p 27, to which I have added the column "Member/Electorate ratio," updated in the case of France and with some minor corrections. The elections referred to in the second column in this table and in the following one are the ones in 1977 in Norway and Holland, 1978 in Belgium, 1979 in Austria, Sweden, Great Britain, Denmark, Spain and Italy, 1980 in the FRG and 1981 in France.


of the two Spanish parties, which have even displaced the French parties from the last place that they have traditionally occupied in studies on party membership.³⁶ A report by the Socialist Executive Committee estimated that if the party's membership in proportion to Spain's population were similar to that of the Austrian SPO or the Swedish SAP, the PSOE would have close to 4 million members.³⁷ Another PSOE source, emphasizing that the party garnered the highest voting percentage of all Mediterranean Socialist parties, attributed its low membership to the conditions in the country under Franco and to the newness of our democratic system.³⁸ We have already noted some of the factors, beginning with Francoism, that could at least partially explain the structural weakness of Spanish parties. To them we should now add the ones suggested in the conclusions of the latest FOESSA Report: the memory of the Civil War and the repression of the activists and members of a wide range of associations; the crisis of Catholic organizations; the existence of founding groups with very young political personnel, which hampered the entry of middle-age individuals, as well as their clear-cut ideological nature, which caused disillusionment, rejection or withdrawal on the part of supporters without any immediate tasks to perform.³⁹ Let us look from a different standpoint now at some of the characteristics of party membership trends during the initial stage of our transition.

Table 5. Membership and Voting Levels for Various European Communist Parties

<u>Country</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Votes in Last Election</u>	<u>Percentage of Vote</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Member/Voter Ratio</u>	<u>Member/Elec- torate Ratio</u>
Italy	PCI	11,107,883	30.4	1,796,597	16.1	4.9
Portugal	PCP	1,009,358	17.1	142,000	14.1	2.4
France	PCF	4,065,540	16.1	330,000	8.1	1.3
Spain	PCE	1,940,236	10.8	168,175	8.7	0.9
Sweden	SKP	305,420	5.6	14,500	4.7	0.3
Norway	SV	94,016	4.1	10,000	10.6	0.4
	NCP	8,355	0.4 ^{4.5}	2,000	23.9	0.09
Belgium	PCB	180,088	3.2	20,000	11.1	0.4
Denmark	DKP	58,901	1.9	9,500	16.1	0.3
Holland	CPN	143,420	1.7	27,500	19.1	0.3
Austria	KPO	45,270	1.0	20,000	44.1	0.4
FRG	DKP	72,230	0.2	42,453	58.8	0.1
Great Britain	CP	16,858	0.1	20,599	122.1	0.06

Source: The membership figures are contained in Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," pp 56-57, and in Alan J. Day and Henry W. Degenhardt (eds), "Political Parties of the World," London, Longman, 1980. Most of the election returns are from "Keesing's Contemporary Archives."

GRÁFICO 1 (1)
EVOLUCION DE LA AFILIACION POLITICA (1975-1981)



Key:

1. Trends in Political Party Membership
2. In thousands

The Main Phases of Political Party Affiliation

Graph 1 shows the trends in membership since 1975 in their two distinct phases. During the first phase, up to 1977, the leftwing parties recorded an ongoing rise, and their leaders usually describe it, with graphic correctness, as the era of the "flood" of new members.⁴⁰ PSOE membership increased 20-fold after Franco's death, and the PCE's almost 15-fold. The key event during this period was, of course, the June 1977 election, especially for the PSOE. As we can see in Table 6, almost half of its current members joined the party immediately after the election. Although I am not familiar with similar data for the PCE, most of its members probably joined before June 1977 as a result of its massive and intelligent drive to recruit new members,⁴¹ which nevertheless must have suffered something of a setback after the party's unexpectedly poor electoral showing. Thus, only eight percent of the delegates attending its Ninth Congress in April 1978 had registered that and the previous year. The significance of this is relative, of course, in light of the probable screening process that every party organization subjects new members to in selecting delegates to its congresses. In any case, the percentage is almost double in the case of the Socialist delegates who, with less than 2 years seniority, attended the 28th Congress in May 1979. The differences in this regard

Table 6. Membership in PSOE and PCE by Period (in percents)

<u>Period</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Delegates to Congresses</u>	
	<u>PSOE</u>	<u>PSOE(a)</u>	<u>PCE(b)</u>
During the Second Republic	13	6.1	9.0
During the Franco era	5		
Between 1949 and 1959		1.7	
Between 1960 and 1969		3.4	
Between 1970 and 1974		12.3	
Between 1939 and 1950			4.2
Between 1951 and 1960			9.1
Between 1961 and 1970			32.0
Between 1971 and 1976			37.8
Between November 1975 and June 1977	32	54.7	
Since 1977	49	15.9	7.6

a. 28th Congress, May 1979.

b. Ninth Congress, April 1978.

Source: The first column, "Estudio sociológico de participación," p 54; the second, in Jose Felix Tenazo, "Radiografía de dos Congresos. Una aportación al estudio sociológico de los cuadros políticos del socialismo español," in SISTEMA, 35 (1980), p 90; the third, in "Ninth Congress of the PCE," p 471.

between the two parties are even more obvious if we compare the 45.4 percent of communist delegates who formalized their membership between 1971 and 1978 with the 82.9 percent of the socialist delegates who

joined between 1970 and 1979. These cold numbers aside, this issue leads to another of much greater significance, one on which we obviously cannot dwell: the specific course pursued by each party to incorporate the new elite and the new personnel in their leadership groups, which in turn has had a major impact both on their internal workings and on their influence among voters.

The second phase is marked by two opposite trends. On the one hand we have what has come to be known as the "membership crisis," which has particularly affected all leftwing organizations, including those not represented in Parliament.⁴² PCE membership dropped 16 percent, and the PSOE, though it managed to stabilize at 100,000 members, saw its upward trend since 1977 halted. On the other hand, we have the steady growth of the UCD, which recorded a rise of more than 50 percent from 1978 to 1981. We must still have reservations about the absolute membership numbers. Leaving aside the AP, which has refused to provide any information, and with the exception of the PSOE, whose data have been suitably verified, the trends evidenced by the UCD and PCE raise serious doubts about the rounded off numbers they quote. Some isolated data confirm the impression that the falloff in communist membership has been greater than the slight drop suggested in Graph 1.⁴³ And as far as the UCD is concerned, we should remember that any comparison of the parties must take into account their official criteria for membership, because although they are all similar, the UCD's seem to be especially flexible.⁴⁴

We lack empirical evidence to accurately interpret these two phases. Perhaps a valid approach would be the dual perspective that Bartolini uses for other objectives.⁴⁵ This approach attempts to integrate the individual and the organizational perspective in party membership trends, but with the additional and oft-cited difficulty of the relative simultaneity with which membership opportunities and party institutionalization processes occur. We would assume then that at the outset of the transition the minority of people joining parties were merely confirming their high degree of previously existing politicization as a way of formalizing a prior political commitment, bolstered by their much higher than average political knowledge and interest and by the desire to fulfill their inclinations towards political involvement, which were also much stronger than the average. With regard to modes of participation, there would be three dimensions to membership: the individual himself, because it would enable him to meet his needs to identify with and join a closed community of which he was hitherto just vaguely but intensely aware; the political party, because registration would help it to consolidate and grow, which would in turn bolster the member's sense of identity; and the political system that was being built, because a larger membership would better enable the party to promote its ideological line within the system. Furthermore, the intense processes of politicization and ideological awareness among individuals were consistent with the leading role being assumed by the party organizations with their many ideological programs. In short, it was a sort of moral decision⁴⁶ in which the sense of belonging

was compounded by a perceived ability to alter the political system.⁴⁷ And if the parties (the leftwing parties, obviously, given the belated organization of rightist forces) were unable to offer new members the material attractions and rewards that were customary in Italy, Germany or Austria after World War II,⁴⁸ they could, on the other hand, provide them with excellent opportunities to channel their feelings of solidarity. Clearly, the listless organizational life in Spain could not satisfy a potential affiliate's desire for involvement, and even if he were to belong to a volunteer group, the brand-new party organizations would exert a much greater attraction.

For its part, the organizational perspective provides further evidence of the importance of the membership process during the initial stage of the transition. S. Rokkan has, in fact, underscored the great importance of members in political education and promotion activities, as well as in rallying supporters.⁴⁹ Bartolini has written that "the historic function of party members and activists must be considered a basic element in the development and structure of the politics of masses."⁵⁰ For the PSOE in particular the incorporation of new members gave it the chance to establish the infrastructure of the party apparatus, to recruit an intermediate-level elite to meet the needs of its own expansion and to activate channels of political communication with other countries. Logically, it also gave it the opportunity to expand the party's human base. The head of "Estudio sociologico de participacion," Jose Felix Tezanos, has estimated that 19 percent of the current members had engaged in what he calls "latent membership," inasmuch as their entry into the party, after Franco's death, was preceded by personal contacts with other members during the Franco era.⁵¹ It would not be overbold to conclude that these forms of semimembership, albeit in a different context, became more widespread during the stage in which the parties were tolerated. Thus, with its membership now representing a sort of political capital, the mobilization strategy of 1976 was soon joined by the election campaign work the following year, during which political activism had to be both effective in its performance and attractive to potential new members. The election results greatly promoted the membership trend among the broader minority with less structured political attitudes that had remained careful spectators during the initial phase of party institutionalization. As we know from Table 6, 49 percent of the current members of the Socialist Party chose to join at this time.

We have no empirical data either on the reasons for the second phase, that is to say, the falloff of the PCE, the PSOE's leveling off and the rise of the UCD. The rise of the UCD has to be compared with membership trends in other European Conservative parties, trends that are even strong in those that lack the network of Catholic organizations that channel their members into Christian Democratic parties.⁵² The UCD's gains are perhaps less surprising if we place them in the appropriate context. What we have to explain is not why the UCD seems to have so many members, but why other parties, especially the leftwing parties,

have so few. The origin of the UCD should give rise to a weak organization and, therefore, to a small membership. We should recall that the UCD was promoted by the government, consolidated by its hold on power and formed by a group of parties in which there was just a small core of leaders. Thus, Huneus has written that "this type of emergence (...) makes it very difficult for the party to expand nationally and regionally."⁵³ The same author has also suggested that it is inappropriate to evaluate the UCD on the basis of its membership or its degree of organization in local committees that pursue stable and meaningful political activities.⁵⁴ Even if we acknowledge that we must analyze the UCD "from the top down" to understand its political development and ideological content, the relatively high membership numbers cited by its official sources could stem from two factors of varying importance. The first has to do with the impossibility of comparing the degree of psychological commitment that UCD leaders expect of their members with the degree of commitment that socialist and communist leaders say they expect of their members.⁵⁵ The latter tend to speak disparagingly of the weak ties between party and members that results from this, regarding them as incomplete and inadequate, but this sort of relationship might be one of the UCD's attractions in the segments of society from which most of its members are recruited. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt about the passivity of UCD voters.⁵⁶ The second factor is much more important in my opinion. Close to 25 percent of UCD members hold positions in the Cortes, in city government, in delegations and in regional bodies, as opposed to just 13 percent for the PSOE.⁵⁷ The percentage would rise substantially if we included the UCD members who hold posts in the central or peripheral government, of which there must be many. Thus, to an extent the UCD's channels of participation, which are of limited scope due to the presumably low level of its members' psychological commitment and to the nature of internal party rivalry, overlap with the view of the party as a recruiting tool for the many spheres of government. The increase in its membership thus seems to be dictated by a combination of its election victories, the expectation of receiving favorable treatment from a ruling part that is held together by its being in power and the opportunities for patronage in a country like Spain.⁵⁸ In any event, it will be a while before we can tell whether it actually has that many members, whether membership remains stable or whether the upward trend continues.

In the case of the PSOE's falloff, the suppositions are radically different. As we all know, the "membership crisis" has usually been explained away by citing the facile expedient of "disenchantment." It is not of much help in resolving the problem, however, to claim this is the direct effect of a cause that is, best, ambiguous and equivocal. What is needed is a qualitative investigation into the underlying reasons. Perhaps we are just caught in a cyclical process of mobilization and demobilization, albeit with the aggravating factors of a scant number of individuals mobilized and the potential intensity of the opposite trend in a structurally and historically demobilized society. Perhaps we are also witnessing a quantitatively weak trend that has been intensified by the strong emotional impact conveyed by the people involved. The

number of people who have left the party represents an extremely small percentage of the electorate and minor segment of total registered members of parties. But its tie-in with the usually proclaimed dual significance of political disenchantment (as a result of the transition and as a determinant of its future course)⁵⁹ make the upshot of this trend more important than it would be if it were considered in isolation. The newness of the party system and the silence of party organizational secretariats prevent any analysis of what Duverger has called a "paramount distinction": between stable and unstable members, whose respective trend would enable us to distinguish between in-depth transformations of party membership, which would involve the former, and superficial changes, which would encompass only the latter.⁶⁰ We are not familiar either with the reasons for disaffiliation or the type of individuals involved, or how much this trend has affected potential members whose inclination to join a political party might have been restrained by the much-talked-about membership crisis. Many of those who have quit originally joined the parties in search of a series of material and other benefits that they were unable to provide. A good many others who have quit leftist parties joined officially during the Franco era or, more likely, during the first few months of the transition. And they left not only because of the passage of time. The fact is that their high levels of politicization and ideological awareness clashed with the course that the parties have taken since 1978. Tezanos has shown that in the PSOE this type of member has more well-defined political attitudes and a greater propensity for participation than those who joined after the first democratic election. "The members who joined during the Franco era pursue a more involved, ideologically aware and, in some cases, quite intellectualized kind of membership (...) Politics plays a central role in their lives (...) This kind of member is usually to be found in cities, and most of them have 'middle-class' jobs (professionals, teachers, office workers, etc). In addition, they are in the intermediate age groups and have a more 'active' political track record than other members. In other words, they have belonged to or sympathized with other political parties to a greater extent than the average." In contrast, those who entered the party after June 1977 show less of an interest in politics. "Most of them have joined the PSOE as an extension of their union commitment to the UGT [General Union of Workers] or as a way of expressing their political leanings more strongly. In general, these members are neither very activist nor very politically developed or informed, even though the educational and skills levels of some are higher than quite a few of the members who joined the socialist ranks in earlier periods."⁶¹ It is reasonable to think, therefore, that the "principled membership" represented by many of those who joined during the Franco era as a result of their activities in or strong support for the underground opposition groups, was hit hard when forced to adapt to the new political conditions. As Perez Ledesma has written, the constituents of this "principled membership" (characterized by solidarity, personal disinterest, a high level of ideological awareness and opposition to any rigid hierarchical structure) "have steadily dwindled, with the resulting

disenchantment of many longstanding members or of those who joined parties out of their euphoria in the period immediately after they were legalized. Thus, membership has been largely reduced to patronage groups or small factions of principled activists who are still confident about changing the course of their party organizations."⁶² After the enthusiasm evoked by the 1977 election results, the normalization of political life in the abnormal context of the transition conditioned the normalization of party activities through a series of clearly demobilizing processes, and party member involvement could not but feel the effects. In other words, the normalization of the political temperature after the previous intense politicization further underscored the importance of the economic problem, of terrorist violence and of the failure to fulfill the numerous hopes that had been placed in a change of regime, thus prompting a cumulative flood of disillusionments that surely contributed to the perhaps already broad common backdrop of skepticism. The determination of the political space in the parliamentary sphere had to increase the feeling of passivity vis-a-vis problems that were as recurring as they were seemingly insoluble. The course of the negotiations leading to the Moncloa pacts and the development of the consensus that prevailed in drafting the text of the constitution caused a decisive shift of the agents and the places of political decision-making to a few leaders and to spheres that were symbolically and actually far removed from the parties. The ritual appeals to grassroots mobilizations were as insistent as they were ineffective, in view of the abstract problems on which they focused and of the steady drift away from much more immediate and, perhaps, worrisome matters. In a word, the leading role of the parties in the initial phases of the institutionalization of their own channels for participation was prolonged in the form of a different leading role (by consensus, reserved for the elites and far removed, symbolically even, from their supporters). The impact of this was to shift the substance of these channels inward and to hamper the emergence of alternative, concurrent channels of participation. To a substantial minority, disaffiliation was the response to this new state of affairs, a course of conduct consistent with the widespread (whether it was justified is another matter) feeling of disenchantment, which was even stronger among them.

Now then, regardless of the validity attached to the above lines of reasoning, perhaps we ought to distinguish between the disaffiliation trend and the demobilization trends that began in late 1977 and continued during the following year. Clearly, not all new party members displayed a high degree of political mobilization, just as not all citizens with a strong propensity for mobilization had formalized their membership in a political party. In the absence of data on the link between these two courses of conduct, it would seem prudent to avoid proclaiming a direct causal relationship between the policy of demobilization promoted by the parties and the disaffiliation trend. Jose Maria Maravell has remarked, countering those who postulate that the leftwing parties, especially the PSOE and the PCE, intentionally caused the demobilization,⁶³ that the 1977 elections and the formal incorporation into the institutions of representative democracy forced these parties

to combine the pressure potential of a mobilizable minority with an appeal to what for so many years constituted the "silent majority."⁶⁴ To Maravell, "the transition process and its net results, the party system and the balance thereof, the strength of the various political options, cannot be viewed solely as the outcome of the relationship between 'from the bottom' demands by social movements and 'from the top' reforms, a relationship dominated by political organizations that act as representatives of the 'from the bottom' demands and combine and translate them into political grievances. We must also bear in mind the leanings of nonmobilized and possibly hard-to-mobilize segments. It is from them that a political mandate largely derives. Needless to say, the political leanings of these segments of society could be (and for a leftwing organization, must be) regarded as open to influence by political arguments, but if this is taken to an extreme, the parties run the risk of putting off the support of these segments for an indeterminate period of time."⁶⁵ In my judgment, this line of reasoning is substantially correct, but party members are conspicuously lacking. What I mean is that if the parties thought it timely or inevitable to tone down the policy of "hypermobilization"⁶⁶ that they pursued after Franco's death, a policy with which they were highly pleased, to further their legitimacy among broad segments of the electorate and to subsequently devote themselves to the activities characteristic of representative democracy, the logical upshot is not necessarily a policy of neglecting their members. And there are signs that this was precisely the approach that the parties took with respect to their members, or at least that was the approach that many affiliates perceived.

In the absence of detailed studies of the internal workings of the parties during the transition, a number of newspaper reports have underscored the downplaying of the political activities of local groups and the systematic neglect of their constituents. As a member of the PCE's Madrid University Committee asserted, "the crisis of membership (...) is due (...) to the type of policy that has prevailed over the past 2 years. Parliamentarianism has deprived the grassroots groups and rank-and-file comrades of political space. We could say, exaggerating somewhat, that the only remaining work involves putting up posters or sweeping the headquarters building."⁶⁸ With this common groundwork, the two major leftwing parties evinced certain peculiarities. In the case of the PCE, the application of the organizational principle of regionalism entailed the abandonment of sector groups and their replacement by neighborhood or city groups, thus prompting a major crisis among professional sectors.⁶⁹ The policy of moderation and consensus, which was especially visible in the case of the Moncloa pacts, was perceived as a loss of communist identity, aggravated by the absence of a "political pedagogy" to lessen the psychological impact of such measures on members who were hard hit by the economic crisis. This policy of pacts "has eroded the activist mettle of many comrades and has been a cause of disenchantment both inside and outside our ranks, because people have observed that all of the parties are apparently saying the same thing and that there is no clear communist identity

in the PSUC or the PCE."⁷⁰ A prominent member felt that the policy of negotiations and compromise was necessary in spite of its limited impact on the democratization of the State and despite the economic crisis. He added, however, that the inability of the party leaders to provide explanations and to set forth new goals for the local groups has resulted in "frustration, demobilization, holing up in the offices and hostility towards the leadership and towards the policy of consensus."⁷¹ Finally, Pilar Brabo pointed out that the party's basic shortcoming in recent years has been that whereas the party leadership discussed the policy that it itself was going to implement in the institutions, "the party as a whole was asked, at best, for a consensus on the policy and on occasion for conventional rallies in support of it. From my point of view, this is the main cause of the enervation of (...) the [party] groups."⁷²

Similar problems in the PSOE were aggravated by the dynamics that ideological tensions generated at all party levels, culminating in the special congress in 1979. In contrast to the PCE's organizational and political pragmatism, the PSOE seems to exemplify one of the hypotheses suggested in the latest FOESSA Report to explain the low membership in Spanish parties. This was that the ideology of the founding groups and the absence of immediate practical tasks caused ideological debate to divide the initial nuclei, to disillusion some and to oust others, leading, if not to a crisis among the existing members, at least to an abrupt halt to its potential growth.⁷³ The climate of internal tension was accurately depicted by a socialist activist when he pointed out that "the tensions that have been generated in our assembly system have disillusioned many people. At times we dare not bring any sympathizers along. We complain in the party about the lack of intermediate personnel, but the only ones who can stand the tension in the assembly, the only ones who will accept that kind of servitude, are the ones who want to pursue a political career, and there are not many of them."⁷⁴ An internal publication stressed that the main reasons for discontent among members were internal divisions, confrontation and hostility, the existence of factions, the lack of discipline and the lack of solidarity.⁷⁵ Some 44 percent of the Socialist party members surveyed in the "Estudio sociológico de participación" mentioned this climate of antagonism and aggressiveness in debate inside groups, and this impression was more widespread in direct proportion to the size of the group, reaching 58 percent among the groups with more than 250 members. It is significant, moreover, that the members who most clearly perceived the problem of confrontations, compounded by major dissatisfaction with the party's situation, were the ones who sympathized or were affiliated with a party before joining the PSOE, who joined during the Franco era or before the 28th Congress, who possess higher levels of political knowledge and awareness and whose levels of education, professional skills and income are above average.⁷⁶ In other words, we are talking about the "affiliate during the Franco era," who, as we have noted on previous pages, was characterized by an acutely critical view of the course taken by the parties since 1977 and, therefore, was more likely to join the ranks of the disaffiliated. Furthermore,

we should also stress that the members drifted away somewhat from their groups, all the more so in the case of large groups, as reflected in the poor attendance at assemblies and in certain unfamiliarity with political life in the groups.⁷⁷ The consensus is that the degree of involvement is low, as 61 percent of the respondents, especially those who were in the above category, felt that the members hardly, almost never or never get involved. The most frequently cited reasons were "the lack of a socialist awareness," "a lack of interest, of expectations, discouragement" and "the lack of motivation, of usefulness and of satisfaction with what is being done."⁷⁸ In conclusion, when asked to list the main issues relating to party workings, 34 percent mentioned "having more links and communication with the comrades who hold representative posts in the party" as their first or second choice; 31.7 percent called for more attention to young people, and 27.4 percent suggested holding more training courses. Lagging somewhat behind were the desire for greater input in decision-making (19.3 percent), greater activism (18.8 percent), an improvement of internal information (16 percent), greater discipline (11.1 percent) and avoiding "so much internal criticism" (9.8 percent).⁷⁹

Membership and Parties: Other Factors

Based on these general considerations, we can assume that for a great many members of leftwing parties, the problem is not just the different ideological assessments that the members might make of party activities in representative institutions or the cognitive dissonances that they might suffer in seeing their party involved in the compromises and bargaining that characterized the Moncloa pacts and the drafting of the constitution; nor does the problem consist solely of their perception, whether justified or not, that their parties might be abandoning vital issues and postponing demands as a result of the political dynamics generated by their activities in government or the bargaining process. Perhaps the basic problem is that all of this came on top of the structural neglect with which the parties seemed to treat their members and broach any membership policy. And this happened precisely at a time when the drop in the political temperature (in other words, the toning down of the prior "hypermobilization") was conducive to a sustained effort by the parties to consolidate, solidify and raise the membership levels achieved after the flood at the start of the political change. Bartolini has emphasized that from an organizational standpoint, membership depends largely on how the party elite values it as a basic resource and values its "byproduct" of activism. He writes that "the maintenance, increase and even decline of membership and activism levels represent, from the viewpoint of party leaderships, an organizational effort that may or may not bear fruit in terms of money, work and time. In this sense, the membership level represents a function of the efforts put forth by the party organization. This type of assessment by the party organization involves, in any case, a cost-benefit analysis in terms of politics, ideology and economics. Moreover, this cost-benefit analysis cannot be performed in isolation from the party's

other resources, which naturally change over time and, in addition, are greatly dependent on certain institutional traits of the political system..."⁸⁰ Based on these remarks, we could conclude provisionally that the leftwing parties downplayed the resource of membership because of the "costs" that it could entail in the short run and because of the "benefits" (which they saw as much greater) inherent in their playing a leading role and in being highly visible during the initial years of the transition. Even so, the drop in membership to a leveling off at truly low plateaus does not seem to have supported their overall decisions, especially when these same parties continued to maintain their well-known ideological stands on the intensification of democracy and the transition to socialism, the strategic and tactical groundwork for which requires the mobilization of the masses, grassroots involvement and a mass identification with the party as an agent of historic change.

Nevertheless, recognition of the scant importance that the parties attached to the resource of membership should be accompanied by consideration of two factors that I must mention at this point. The first has to do again with Maravall's explanation of the leftwing parties' policy of demobilization. As we will recall, this was a necessary step in going after the social sectors that had not yet been mobilized or that were difficult to mobilize, because it was from them that the political mandate largely derived. Although we noted at the time that a policy of demobilization did not necessarily entail the abandonment of a membership policy, the fact is that both the party dynamics generated by this policy and the developments during the transition necessitated a redefinition of the nature of the parties along the line of "catch-all parties." For example, it is not hard to draw parallels between the terms that Maravall uses and the one language that Kirchheimer employs to describe a catch-all party.⁸¹ We all know, as Kirchheimer himself has written, that one of its basic traits is the "downgrading" of the individual member (...) [whose] role is regarded as a historic holdover that could distort the party's image."⁸² The criticism that the members level at the listless political life in their groups, at inadequate internal participation, at the upper elite's becoming an oligarchy and at the weak influence of members in the formulation of the party's policies, are an effect, if not desired at least cushioned and little avoided, of positioning parties in a political space geared above all towards garnering as many votes as possible by making campaign promises to a great many, at times opposing, segments of society. This trend could not but intensify as a result of the two general elections held in a brief period of time. This was an excellent opportunity to underscore a party's priority ties with the voters who would decide its future role in political and institutional life. We could say that Spain's parties traversed in a few short years the road taken by the European parties after the Second World War, when political, social and economic changes dictated that "their destiny (...) [would be] much more closely linked to their responsibility to the electorate in general than to a possibly far from representative sample made up of their members."⁸³ The 1979 elections were especially significant

in this respect. As Gunther has shown, the main parties adopted catch-all strategies when it came time to select the segments of the electorate that they wanted to attract. All of the parties directed their campaign promises at virtually the entire Spanish population.⁸⁴ This decision was also based on the unimodal distribution of the electorate on the left-right continuum, which led to centripetal competition because of each party's efforts to secure as many votes as possible by moving to the middle of the political spectrum, where most of the voters said they were, or at least that is what party strategists thought.⁸⁵ After the elections, the two main parties began the new stage without making major changes consistent with the consequences of the above assumptions. The ongoing internal tensions among the UCD elite do not seem to have hampered the coexistence of its original multiclass orientation with the process of ideological "clarification" that some of its more conservative constituents want.⁸⁶ We thus get the impression that the membership is a tool in the struggle for power and its distribution among the various sectors of the party. This is a proven fact in Italy, and it would explain partially the UCD's steady growth. It would also bolster the hypothesis that congress years are better indicators of membership fluctuations than election years are.⁸⁷ In the case of the PSOE, Maravall feels that the difficulty in reconciling majority electoral support with political representation of a class could be overcome by a strategy of creating common interests among different social groups so that they all fit within a socialist program. He has also suggested that the theory of the catch-all party does not apply to organizations that preserve an ideology, pursue objectives other than mere "vote-getting" and maintain an acceptable internal democracy.⁸⁸ Even if we leave aside the degrees to which the PSOE meets these requirements, this strategy will probably continue to entail a major decline in the importance attached to the resource of membership. We can see evidence of this both in the attempts at internal "pacification" to soften the ideological conflicts over the proper party model and in the persistence of the broad autonomy granted to party leaders, parallel to the scant influence of the rank-and-file, in formulating party policy to pursue its immediate strategy.

There is another factor involved in the downgrading of party members, and it is to be found in the organization of modern European mass parties, including Spain's, albeit as a result of a much more rapid and intense process. We are talking about the changes that the major political and social transformations over the last four decades have caused in the organizational conditions of mass parties, which, in turn, have substantially altered the functional terms for membership as a basic organizational resource. The Spanish parties have had to assimilate these changes without a break in continuity from the years of the republic, thus causing the expectations of the members to be somewhat out of step with the subordinate role given them. For example, the crystalization of the Social States of Law has deprived parties of many incentives for encouraging various social sectors to join their ranks and for mobilizing to meet demands (health care, labor, cultural, organizational and even athletic) that they had hitherto

satisfied on almost a monopoly basis through their many sections. It also seems clear that government financing of election campaigns and of the parties themselves has profoundly altered the relationship between the central party apparatus and the members, in the sense that it makes candidates and leaders more independent vis-a-vis individual members. Furthermore, public financing discourages a party's organizational efforts to boost membership, inasmuch as the membership's traditional role as the major source of party funds has obviously been diminished.⁸⁹ This does not necessarily mean the disappearance of the inherently "profound importance," according to Duverger, of membership dues as a psychological symbol of belonging and involvement and as a sign of loyalty reinforcing the links between the organization and its constituents.⁹⁰ It is no surprise then that 83 percent of registered Spanish socialists regularly pay their dues and that this heads the list of their activities in recent months.⁹¹ But the scant impact of total dues on the heavy expenditures of a modern party, which are defrayed by public financing in most European countries, cannot be encourage greater independence on the part of the central apparatus and diminish the motivation to boost membership. The fact that just 35 percent of registered socialists say they have taken part in fund raising activities⁹² or the fact that only 10 to 25 percent of them took part in the 1979 election campaign⁹³ illustrates the erosion of the traditional role of the party organization in elections, as most members are assigned to dues-collection and propaganda activities. This role has become somewhat anachronistic in light of the strong trend towards political professionalism and because only a tiny percentage of the enormous sums of money that parties deal in has been provided or collected by the members. Along with the economic dimension, the changes that have taken place in the processes and channels of political communication have also diminished the importance traditionally attached to the membership as an organizational resource. As Bartolini has written, "there can be no doubt that the mass media have replaced the membership as the fundamental medium for the transmission of party political messages to the great mass of voters in the educated, urbanized societies of our day. The traditional activities of mobilization and propaganda, such as local assemblies, local meetings of party candidates and representatives and house-to-house propaganda, all of which are member-intensive, seem to have inevitably gone into decline with the emergence of more effective collective propaganda techniques."⁹⁴ However, the shift in party-voter political communication media, which could be clearly seen in Spain from how election tactics evolved from 1977 to 1979, has also been accompanied by a striking decline in the transmission of political messages within the parties themselves, which seem incapable of effectively socializing the individuals at whom the messages are aimed, of securing their firm support for the institutionalization of their channels of expression or of competing successfully with other communication media. The widespread crisis of the European party press, which has also affected certain Spanish parties that have tried to maintain their own newspapers, reveals both the scant interest in news from the upper levels, which have been replaced by other media more compatible with their greater independence

of action, and still scant interest in news from the local levels, in keeping with the drastic narrowing of political life there. All of this was tangibly evident in the many difficulties that MUNDO OBRERO encountered during the transition in Spain, and these difficulties do not seem to have diminished after the sporadic occasions on which the plenums of the PCE Central Committee, having noticed the small percentage of members that buy it, the fault-finding attitude of some and the indifference of most, have tried to revitalize it.⁹⁵ Similarly, the PSOE's "Estudio sociológico de participación" described as surprisingly low the degree to which members were familiar with its publications. Somewhat less than half of the members said they read the weekly EL SOCIALISTA regularly, and only one-third read the internal newsletter SOCIALISMO ES LIBERTAD.⁹⁶ Finally and in another vein, finances and political communication combine to make up another factor that tends to dampen the incentives for boosting membership. I am talking about the widespread use of the public image of party leaders as a political, electoral and propaganda resource of fundamental importance and which has been an obvious factor in downgrading the role of the members in many spheres of party life. This resource is all the more effective when it further personalizes Spanish politics and parties, until we reach the direct relationship between leaders (personifying the parties and their politics) and public opinion that Molas has underscored.⁹⁷

Obviously it is still too early to predict the future courses of these trends. The newness of all party organizations and the peculiar traits of our transition preclude venturing any hypothesis on what kind of political and organizational shape Spanish parties will take in the coming years. As far as membership levels are concerned, there is reason to believe that the "crisis of membership" has touched bottom, stabilizing at plateaus that are really low but that perhaps will not fall further. If the membership rolls remain that small, however, it could cause other types of problems, but that is another issue. The recent PCE and PSOE congresses have included on their agendas or in their proclamations the need to boost membership or, to put it in trendy terms, "to penetrate the social fabric." The outgoing PCE Central Committee engaged in a degree of self-criticism when it acknowledged the scant attention being paid to the necessary construction of the mass party, its overly slow and even stagnant organizational development and its "political and organizational disintegration."⁹⁸ And among the few criticisms leveled at the the performance of the Socialist Executive Board at the 29th Congress was that of the "zero growth" of membership, a problem that the Federal Committee had previously acknowledged and was hoping to resolve by making the membership system more flexible.⁹⁹ Furthermore, the uncertainty over the future of party membership is compounded by other question marks. Thus, for example, the structural weakness of the parties and the scant legitimacy accorded to them by voters have forced them to reassess their strategies for dealing with various modes of grassroots involvement that are not strictly political and that they have so far systematically ignored or used for their own benefit. The new stage could perhaps begin timidly with the Communist Party's desire to spur the "citizen movement"

or with Socialist Party pronouncements designed to reconcile "social activism" with political activism and to promote "sectoral work" as a form of activism.¹⁰⁰ It will also take time to see how the parties respond to the hypothetical development in Spain of the main forms of the "new politics." This would mean, on the one hand, that the parties would have to compete with new, more active and dynamic and less hierarchically structured and mass-oriented political organizations based on a limited range of interests or demands not taken up by the parties, demands whose satisfaction is perceived to hinge directly on government policies. It would also mean the emergence of new modes of participation, occasionally through nonconventional means and at times lacking the traditional guidance of the politically legitimized elites, in other words, in open confrontation with them.¹⁰¹ Epstein's quip that politics is too broad, diverse and important to be entrusted exclusively or mostly to parties,¹⁰² scratches the surface of the sensitive issue of the crisis of political parties and their organizational and political suitability to cope with the complex conditions that characterize contemporary political systems. This problem also affects our country's political change, even though for the moment debate is limited to the press while the underlying elements are discussed only on the sporadic occasion when a club or foundation is set up. All of this, in turn, leads to the no less thorny question of whether the current developments will ultimately mean just a change in relations between party and society or, in contrast, an irreversible process of decay at the end of which the parties will have to content themselves with being institutions of the State rather than of society. The analysis of this issue must necessarily include the question of membership. Bartolini has rightly concluded that "the study of membership and activism in parties (...) is of enormous importance in empirically ascertaining major aspects of these new changes. Indeed, it becomes one of (...) [their] main indicators. As a traditional and fundamental link between the mass parties and society, membership is still an extremely important key to the deterioration, transformation and even revitalization of this link."¹⁰³

FOOTNOTES

1. Stein Rokkan, "The Comparative Study of Political Participation: Notes Toward a Perspective on Current Research," in Chalmers F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubaer (eds), "Empirical Democratic Theory," Chicago, Markham, 1969, p 352.
2. I must again mention that this article is just an initial installment of a larger research project that will broach political attitudes, a sociodemographic profile of members and other modes of conventional and nonconventional political participation.
3. Stephano Bartolini, "La afiliación en los partidos de masas: la experiencia socialista democrática (1889-1978)," REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLITICOS, 15, 1980, p 67.

4. See, for example, Fernando Claudin (ed), "Crisis de los partidos politicos?" Madrid, Dedalo, 1980.
5. Francisco Murillo Ferrol, "Dificultades," REVISTA DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO POLITICO, 6, 1980, p 8.
6. I should mention in this regard the excellent work by Jose Varela Ortega, "Los amigos politicos. Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauracion (1875-1900)," Madrid, Alianza, 1977.
7. Juan J. Linz et al, "Informe sociologico sobre el cambio politico en Espana, 1975/1981. IV Informe FOESSA," Madrid, Euramerica, 1981, Vol. 1, p 12.
8. Juan Luis Cebrian, "La Espana que bosteza. Apuntes para una historia critica de la transicion," Madrid, Taurus, 1980, p 64.
9. Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Leonard Binder et al, "Crises and Sequences of Political Development," Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp 186 and ff, and M. Weiner and Josep Lapalombara, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development," in the book published by the two "Political Parties and Political Development," Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp 400 and ff.
10. Francisco Murillo Ferrol, "Las actitudes politicas," in Manuel Fraga Iribarne (dir), "La Espana de los anos 70," Vol ii, "El Estado y la politica," Madrid, Moneda y Credito, 1974, Vol I, pp 556-557.
11. Santiago Carrillo, "De la clandestinidad a la legalidad. Informe presentado al Pleno del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Espana," held in Rome on 28, 29, 20 and 31 July (duplicating machine copy), p 42.
12. Speech by Rafael Arias Salgado included in "La solucion a un reto. Tesis para una sociedad democratica occidental," Madrid, Union Editorial, 1979, p 43.
13. Jose Felix Tezanos, "El espacio politico y sociologico del socialismo espanol," SISTEMA, 32, 1979, p 73, and Jose Maria Maravall, "La alternativa socialista. La politica y el apoyo electoral del PSOE," SISTEMA, 35, 1980, p 12. Logically, this number, as Carlos Elordi ("El PSOE por dentro," LA CALLE, 115, 3/9 April 1980, p 14) points out, is from official party sources.
14. The quoted phrases are from Ganivet, Costa and Unamuno, respectively, and are cited by Varela in "Los amigos politicos," op.cit., pp 433-434.

15. This time the quoted phrases are from Picavea, Mallada and Costa, respectively, as contained in Manuel Ramirez Jimenez, "Modernizacion politica en Espana: Hipotesis para su estudio," REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS SOCIALES, 5, 1972, p 120.

16. In a recent careful study, Rafael Lopez Pintor ("El estado de la opinion publica en Espana y la transicion a la democracia," REVISTA ESPANOLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLOGICAS, 13, 1981) implicitly asserted that the political shift to democracy does not in itself imply the crystallization of a democratic political culture. He adds (p 47): "If this is to take place, and I strongly hope it does, it will not be a matter of just a few years. The consolidation of a political culture consistent with the new system of government will depend as much as on how the basic lines of the social and political conflict evolve as on the deliberate efforts of the political actors and the socializing agents. Both these factors, in turn, will be strongly influenced by the cultural weight of Spain's political history. But if largely irreversible socioeconomic and cultural transformations have taken place in this country in a few short decades, why couldn't the same thing happen in the political system? Having doubts is scientifically legitimate, but so is having hopes."

17. See the intelligent observations of Manuel Ramirez, "La socializacion politica en Espana: Una empresa para la democracia," SISTEMA, 34, 1980, pp 91-115.

18. Murillo Ferrol, "Las actitudes politicas," pp 542 and ff.

19. Jose Maria Maravall, "Transicion a la democracia, alineamientos politicos y elecciones en Espana," SISTEMA, 36, 1980, p 105.

20. According to Lopez Pintor's accurate description, the political culture of the majority of the Spanish people was based on "a system of poorly informed ideas with some very solid beliefs (mistrust and misgivings about politics based on the experience transmitted from generation to generation in a politically unstable and socially egalitarian [sic] society). These segments of society respond to immediate political stimuli closely linked with their everyday experiences of security, work, etc. These are segments of the population whose politicization has been systematically hampered by the regime, and if any political idea has even been 'officially' conveyed to them, it has been the unchallengeable nature of the existing authority and the harmfulness of pluralism and controversy." He underscores further on that these elementary attitudes did not originate from a formal process of socialization or political learning, but rather from "the political experience of the people, especially the lowest strata (material poverty, dependence of every sort and fear as reasons for disinterest and mistrust in politics)." ("El estado de opinion publica en Espana," op. cit., pp 14-15 and 11) Regarding the social makeup of these and other

- political cultures, see Rafael Lopez Pintor and Ricardo Buceta, "Los espanoles de los anos setenta," Madrid, Tecnos, 1975, and Antonio Lopez Pina and Eduardo Lopez Aranguren, "La cultura politica de la Espana de Franco," Madrid, Taurus, 1976.
21. Manuel Ramirez, "Espana, 1939-1975. Regimen politico e ideologia," Barcelona, Guardarrama, 1978, pp 112 and ff.
 22. As recently as 1974, Murillo Ferrol detected that the older generations rejected political parties in a reflex action that has been conditioned over time. He went on to say that "the younger generations have partly inherited this climate by listening to or reading what their elders have to say and have partly developed their own reaction for or against the 'party' as a concept when it was the ideological base of the system, on the one hand, and for or against the underground group called the 'Communist Party,' which people view as either a threatening or a hope-giving presence. Obviously, in neither of the two cases are we dealing with groups that constitutionalists and political scientists call parties. But since words are symbols and politics is a largely symbolic activity, it is understandable that the word 'parties' is a strong one for Hispanic public opinion (...) The fact that it entails a cultural lag and a major contrast with the other Western countries is a serious issue (...) that we ought to be aware of." ("Las actitudes politicas," op. cit., p 561).
 23. Ursula Feist, Manfred Gullner and Klaus Liepelt, "Structural Assimilation Versus Ideological Polarization: On Changing Profiles of Political Parties in West Germany," in Max Kaase and Klaus Von Beyme (eds), "Elections and Parties," London, Sage, 1978, p 175.
 24. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," op. cit., p 31, and also Juan J. Linz, "From Falange to Movimiento-Organizacion: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds), "Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society. The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems," New York, Basic Books, 1970, pp 128-201. As Linz and others have written ("Informe sociologico sobre el cambio politico en Espana," op. cit., p 12), perhaps the difference in attitude between Spaniards and Italians towards membership and participation in political parties under democracy can be explained by the habits created under the Fascist regime, when membership in the National Fascist party (PNF)--even if it were 'per necessita familiare,' as comics said--created an awareness of the advantages of having a 'card' (la Fessera) in contrast to the insignificance of belonging to the Movement during the last two decades of Franco. During this period, Spaniards' sole concern was their own welfare, social access and individual goals, the achievement of which had little to do with involvement in political organizations proper."
 25. Francisco Alvira Martin et al, "Partidos politicos e ideologias. Un analisis de la evolucion de la ideologia politica de los espanoles,"

Madrid, Center for Sociological Research, 1978, p 45. In March 1977, when the process of legalizing the parties began, a poll by the then Public Opinion Institute revealed that three percent of the respondents were already affiliated or in the process of doing so (in REVISTA ESPANOLA DE LA OPINION PUBLICA, 48, 1977, pp 418 and 425).

26. We should also underscore the high percentage that refused to specify the party to which they belonged, even though the general question of whether they did belong was answered by more than 98 percent of those polled.
27. Richard Gunther, "Strategies, Tactics and the New Spanish Party System: The 1979 General Election," p 13. Paper presented to the Symposium on "Spain and the United States," held in 1979 in Florida.
28. Eduardo Espin, "Las fuerzas politicas concurrentes," in Jorge de Esteban and Luis Lopez Guerra (eds), "Las elecciones legislativas del 1 de marzo de 1979," Madrid, Center for Sociological Research, 1979, p 82.
29. EL PAIS, 10 May 1981.
30. EL PAIS, 17 May 1981.
31. Speech by Arias Salgado, reprinted in "La solucion a un reto," op. cit., p 43, and "Informe sobre la actuacion de Union del Centro Democratico entre el I y II Congreso Nacional," read by its secretary general in Palma de Mallorca, p 62; also in CAMBIO 16, 481, 16 February 1981, p 22.
32. Howard J. Wiarda, "Spain and Portugal," in Peter H. Merkl (ed), "Western European Party Systems. Trends and Prospects," New York, Free Press, 1980, p 314.
33. On this point we continue to encounter difficulties similar to the ones pointed out by Maurice Duverger more than 30 years ago. See "Los partidos politicos," Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 3rd edition, 1965, pp 108 and ff.
34. See Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeaux, "Politization of the Electorates in France and the United States," in Giuseppe Di Palma (ed), "Mass Politics in Industrial Societies. A Reader in Comparative Politics," Chicago, Markham, 1972, pp 41 and ff; Peter H. Merkl, "The Sociology of European Parties: Members, Voters and Social Groups," in the volume edited by him, "Western European Party Systems," op. cit., p 616; Norman H. Nie and Sidney Verba, "Political Participation," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson H. Polsby (eds), "Handbook of Political Science," Vol 4, "Nongovernmental Politics," Reading, Mass, Addison-Wesley, 1975, pp 24 and ff; Sidney Verba,

- Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim, "Participation and Political Equality. A Seven-Nation Comparison," Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp 94 and ff; David Butler and Donald Stokes, "Political Change in Britain. The Evolution of Electoral Choice," London, McMillan, 2nd edition, 1974, p 21; David P. Conradt, "Changing German Political Culture," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), "The Civic Culture Revisited," Boston, Little, Brown, 1980, p 249; Samuel H. Barnes, "Representation in Italy. Institutionalized Tradition and Electoral Choice," Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977, pp 78 and ff; and Raphael Zariski, "Italy," in Merkl (ed), "Western European Party Systems," pp 129 and ff.
35. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," op. cit., p 35. Margareta Mommsen-Reindl ["Austria," in Merkl (ed), "Western European Party Systems," op. cit., pp 288-289] has applied this ratio as an index of the high "organizational density" of Austrian parties.
 36. Georges Dupeux, "France," in INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, 12, 1960, pp 53 and ff, and Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," p 38, where he underscores France's generally low position in all his graphs.
 37. "Los problemas de la democracia. Informe de la CEF [del PSOE]," Madrid, April 1981, p 4.
 38. Grupo Federal de Estudios Sociologicos, "El PSOE y la Internacional," BOLETIN PSOE, 7 November 1980, p 11.
 39. Linz et al, "Informe sociologico sobre el cambio politico en Espana," op. cit., p 627.
 40. Elordi, "El PCE por dentro," p 24 and "El PSOE por dentro," P 14.
 41. The campaign, which was already under way in early 1976, received a decisive push from the resolutions of the Congress of Rome in October of the same year, to replace individual with mass recruitment methods. The procedure devised for this consisted of the so-called "conferences" in which a communist leader would talk with a varying number of persons, usually between 50 and 300, who were close to the party or in any case opposed to the recent dictatorship. As Carrillo explained ("De la clandestinidad a la legalidad," op. cit., p 57), "the result is that more than 200 persons have joined the party at some of these meetings. Rank-and-file organizations can thus rapidly double and triple their memberships."
 42. In addition to some of the uneven contributions contained in the volume "Crisis de los partidos politicos?" (op. cit.), also significant and equally uneven, from an extraparlimentary or, in any case, dissident standpoint, are some of the writings that appeared in EL VIEJO TOPO, which devoted a special issue to "Los partidos, la izquierda y la militancia" (No 4, 1979, Josep V. Marques, "Olvido,

menosprecio y secreta venganza de la cosa personal en la militancia," and Sergio Vilar, "La explotacion del militante por el dirigente." Also in the same magazine, Jose Luis Pardo, "Por una micropolitica del deseo," 25 October 1978, and Colectivo Leninismo, "Algunas reflexiones sobre la llamada 'crisis de la militancia,'" 22 July 1978.

43. The numbers, which are for 1978 and were furnished by the Secretariat of Organization, show the same membership for Catalonia and Galicia as in 1977. Nevertheless, the various regional or provincial congresses have shown that there has been an actual falloff, which we can also presume in many other provinces over the last 3 years. For example, the 40,000 members that both Elordi ("El PCE por dentro," p 30) and I estimated for the PSUC in 1977 and 1978 has dropped by almost a half. Jordi Borja ("El PSUC entre dos crisis. El fin de una politica," NUESTRA BANDERA, 106, 1981, p 26) estimates 21,000 Catalan communists, in line with the 22,000 that a member of the Executive Committee recently quoted to EL PAIS (11 July 1981). Furthermore, it is also indicative that Vicente Cazcarra, secretary of organization, told the Plenum of the PCE Central Committee in November 1979 that so far that year only 77,625 membership cards had been paid for to the Central Committee and 54,218 to the national, regional or provincial committees; there would be thus quite a few original copies in the possession of the groups, as well as a good many members without cards and, we would presume, a good many cards belonging to former members. The total number of membership cards is, therefore, 131,843. See Vicente Cazcarra, "El Fortalecimiento del partido," Plenum of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, Madrid, PCE Propaganda Committee, 1979, p 39.
44. There are occasional newspaper reports that certain individuals have been ejected from the UCD without their knowledge or consent, but it is impossible to tell how regular or exceptional a practice this is. In any case, almost all parties provide in their bylaws for an official membership with obligatory sponsorship. Strangely enough, the PCE seems most inclined to ease these requirements. In spite of the control that leftwing parties in Austria, Germany and Italy, for example, exerted in the post-World War II period, Spanish Communists, because of their mass recruitment methods, have preferred the policy of expelling a few rather than hampering the entry of the many. Logically, the degree of control that the PSOE seems to exercise is completely absent in the UCD in relation to individuals who had somewhat prominent positions under the Franco regime. More detailed studies could ascertain the scope of the membership policy in each organizational unit and with respect to particularly significant individuals.
45. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," pp 54 and ff.

46. See, for example, Jose Luis Aranguren, "La democracia establecida. Una critica intelectual," Madrid, Taurus, 1979, pp 66-68.
47. Alessandro Pizzorno, "An Introduction to the Theory of Political Participation," SOCIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION, 9, 1970, pp 35 and ff. The work had appeared previously as "Introduzione allo studio della partecipazione politica," QUADERNI DI SOCIOLOGIA, 15, 1966, pp 235 and ff.
48. This did not, of course, prevent certain members from joining the parties to secure such compensation. As Simon Sanchez Montero commented to Elordi ("El PCE por dentro," p 24), the flood of members after Franco's death "even included people who thought that by getting a card they were going to find work."
49. Stein Rokkan, "Citizens, Elections and Parties. Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development," New York, David McKay, 1970, pp 420 and ff.
50. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," p 25.
51. "Estudio sociologico de participacion," op. cit., pp 55-56.
52. Merkl, "The Sociology of European Parties," op. cit., pp 651 and ff, and Arturo Parisi (ed), "Democristiani," Bologna, Mulino, 1979.
53. Carlos Huneeus, "La Union del Centro Democratico, un partido consociacional," REVISTA DE POLITICA COMPARADA, 3, 1981, p 187.
54. Huneeus, op. cit., p 178.
55. The concept of the activist member of the Socialist Party is clearly explained in the "Carpeta del Militante" that the PSOE Training Secretariat has drawn up. The concept of the Communist activist is contained in NUESTRA BANDERA (96, 1978, pp 15 and ff), where Carlos Alonso Zaldivar raises the possibility of combining the ideal activism of a communist affiliate and the passivity of the members of other parties. "The combination would be something like saying that the deepest essence of the communist organization, which is to instill its members with an activist approach to life, is still valid for me (...) but we have to pursue theoretical and practical efforts to make this approach compatible with an underlying respect for and bolstering of independent initiative, and in this we can learn something from other parties" (p 16).
56. Linz et al, "Informe sociologico sobre el cambio politico en Espana," op. cit., p 489.
57. This figure of 25 percent has been arrived at based on the data contained in the "Informe sobre la actuacion de Union del Centro

Democratico," op. cit., p 49; the 13 percent for the PSOE comes from the "Estudio sociologico de participacion," op. cit., p 94. Logically, a breakdown of the figures shows a predominance of mayors and councilmen, who account for 86.9 percent in the UCD and 83 percent in the PSOE.

58. Huneus has also cited this point in "La Union del Centro Democratico," p 178, as a way of offsetting the shortcomings or problems stemming from the UCD's low level of institutionalization.
59. Ludolfo Paramio and Jorge M. Reverte, "Contra las cuerdas," in Claudin (ed), "Crisis de los partidos politicos?" op. cit., pp 189 and ff.
60. Duverger, "Los partidos politicos," op. cit., pp 115 and ff.
61. Jose Felix Tezanos, "Estructura y dinamica de la afiliacion socialista en Espana," p 41; article presented to the round table on "Party Systems and Political Participation in the New European Democracies" held in Madrid, May 1981.
62. Manuel Perez Ledesma, "Los partidos politicos en la transicion," TIEMPO DE HISTORIA, 72, 1980, p 63. In this regard, Jordi Borja ("El PSUC entre dos crisis," op. cit., p 26) has pointed out that from 1977 to 1981 there was a major turnover of activists in the PSUC; many members under age 40 abandoned their active membership, and thus in spite of the fresh influx of older individuals, the human political capital accumulated between 1960 and 1975 was lost. Elordi (El PCE por dentro," op. cit., p 38) has also noted that "a good part of the professional cadres who joined during the last years of Franco and the initial years of the transition have either left the party (without joining another in the overwhelming majority of cases) or have merely renewed their cards annually without taking active part in politics." In more and less descriptive terms, Paramio and M., Reverte ("Contra las cuerdas," op. cit., p 192) have written that "the unfortunate tragedy is that in addition to being unable to win over the generation of the 1980's, we have lost the older generations. The growing awareness that political activism is a potentially (...) alienated form of existence (...) has prompted an incredible exodus (...) We have lost the people with the most imagination, the greatest sensitivity and the most desire to live. We have lost those who want to make up for a few crucial years, which they thought they devoted to democracy and socialism and which ultimately turned out to be invested in politics without a future."
63. Ludolfo Pamario and Jorge Martinez Reverte, "Sin imaginacion y sin principios," ZONA ABIERTA, 18, 1979, cited by Maravall in "Transicion a la democracia, alineamientos politicos y elecciones en Espana," op. cit., p 77.

64. Lopez Pina and Lopez Aranguren, "La cultura politica de la Espana de Franco," op. cit., pp 63 and ff.
65. Maravall, "Transicion a la democracia, alineamientos politicos y elecciones en Espana," p 78.
66. The term is from Huneeus, "La Union del Centro Democratico..." op. cit., p 183.
67. See, for example, the references to the "responsible mobilization of the masses" in "Que es el Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol," published by its Secretariat of Training and Documentation, Madrid, 1977, p 4 and to the "struggle of the worker and popular masses" in the resolutions of the Ninth Communist Congress in "Ninth Congress of the PCE," op. cit., p 339.
68. Elordi, "El PCE por dentro," op. cit., p 98.
69. Manuel Azcarate, "Crear un partido nuevo," NUESTRA BANDERA, 96, 1978, pp 12 and ff, and Elordi, "El PCE por dentro," op. cit., pp 38 and ff.
70. Joaquin Sempere, "Un malestar en busca de coordenadas," NUESTRA BANDERA, 106, 1981, p 30; see also Paul Preston, "The PCE in the Struggle for Democracy in Spain: A Eurocommunist Gamble?" pp 24 and ff; paper presented at the Symposium on "Social Change and Power in Franco's Spain," University of Augsburg, June 1981.
71. Borja, "El PSUC entre dos crisis," op. cit., p 25.
72. Pilar Brabo, "Eurocomunismo y partido," NUESTRA BANDERA, 106, 1981, p 22.
73. Linz et al, "Informe sociologico sobre el cambio politico en Espana," op. cit., p 627.
74. Elordi, "El PSUC por dentro," op. cit., p 16.
75. Grupo Federal de Estudios Sociologicos, "Un PSOE mas unido y organizado," BOLETIN PSOE, 10 February 1981, p 18.
76. Tezanos, "Estudio sociologico de participacion," op. cit., pp 125-127.
77. Tezanos, op. cit., p 134.
78. Tezanos, op.cit., pp 114-116.
79. Grupo Federal de Estudios Sociologicos, "Relacion y comunicacion con los dirigentes," BOLETIN PSOE, 9 January 1981, p 9.

80. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," p 62.
81. Otto Kirchheimer, "El camino hacia el partido de todo el mundo," in Kurt Lenk and Franz Neumann (eds), "teoria y sociologia criticas de los partidos politicos," Madrid, Anagrama, 1980, p 331, where we read that the catch-all party "renounces attempts to morally and spiritually incorporate the masses and directs its attention above all to the electorate. Hence, it sacrifices a deeper ideological penetration to a broader reach and to quicker electoral success. The perspective of more limited political work and of immediate electoral success differs from the older, more comprehensive goals; the feeling today is that yesteryear's goals lessen the chance for success because they frighten a portion of the electoral clientele, which is potentially the entire population."
82. Kirchheimer, "El camino hacia el partido de todo el mundo," op. cit., p 337.
83. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," p 66.
84. Gunther, "Strategies, Tactics and the New Spanish Party System," op. cit., pp 16 and ff.
85. Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad, "Party Strategies and Mass Cleavages in the 1979 Spanish Parliamentary Election," WORLD AFFAIRS, 143, 1980, pp 203 and ff, and Gunther, "Strategies, Tactics and the New Spanish party System," pp 21 and ff.
86. This orientation is even frequently cited as a major argument by those who oppose the party's rightward drift, Rafael Arias Salgado, for example, when he stated ("Al asalto de UCD," EL PAIS, 25 April 1981) that "the party's logical objective is or ought to be (...) to try and expand its electoral base even in light of the further complications involved in reconciling a wide range of at times contradictory aspirations." This, he adds, is the UCD's challenge, which it must face up to, because he does not think that "there is any other way to encompass wideranging segments of the population when they go to the polls."
87. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," pp 62-62.
88. Maravall, "La alternativa socialista," op. cit., pp 35-36.
89. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," p 63.
90. Duverger, "Los partidos politicos," op. cit., p 104.
91. Tezanos, "Estudio sociologico de participacion," p 100.
92. Tezanos, "Estudio sociologico de participacion," p 100.

93. According to Gunther, "Strategies, Tactics and the New Spanish Party System," p 49, where he also cites the higher degree of participation of registered communists, about 60 percent.
94. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," p 64.
95. See, for example, "Plenum of the Central Committee," op. cit., p 57.
96. Tezanos, "Estudio sociologico de participacion," p 89. The data on EL SOCIALISTA should be rounded out by adding that when the poll asked what magazines they read regularly, only 17 percent indicated that weekly. With regard to the internal newsletter, although it is sent to all those surveyed, only a little more than half recalled having received it.
97. Isidre Molas, "Sur les attitudes de apres-franquisme," POUVOIRS, 8, 1979, pp 56 and ff. Also see Peter McDonald, Antonio Lopez Pina and Samuel H. Barnes, "The Spanish Public in Political Transition," BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 11, 1981, pp 59 and ff.
98. EL PAIS, 28 July 1981; "El golpe de Estado," NUESTRA BANDERA, 106, 1981, pp 3 and ff, and Vicente Cazarra, "El fortalecimiento del partido," Central Committee Plenum, op. cit., pp 35 and ff.
99. EL PAIS, 16 October 1981 and 12 June 1981; "Resolucion organica del Comite Federal," BOLETIN PSOE, July-August 1980, p 10; in the same BOLETIN, "Declaracion politica del Comite Federal," 7 November 1980, p 7, and "Extender el partido y mejorar la militancia," 10 February 1981, pp 6-7.
100. See the "Materiales sobre politica municipal y movimiento ciudadano," published by the PCE's Secretariat of Municipal Policy and Citizen Movement, July 1979; "Participacion ciudadana," Madrid, Cuadernos de Formacion y Divulgacion Socialista, 1981; Ciriaco de Vicente, "Militancia social y militancia politica," BOLETIN PSOE, 8 December 1980, pp 4-5, and "Sectorial," BOLETIN PSOE, 3 May 1980, p 2.
101. See the already classic studies by Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics," Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, and by Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al, "Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies," London, Sage, 1979. For a more specific study, see the significant analysis by Jutta Helm, "Citizen Lobbies in West Germany," in Merkl (ed), "Western European Party Systems," op. cit., pp 576 and ff.
102. Leon D. Epstein, "Political Parties," in Greenstein and Polsby (eds), "Handbook of Political Science," Vol. 4, op. cit., p 271.
103. Bartolini, "La afiliacion en los partidos de masas," p 71.

SOCIOLOGICAL MAKEUP OF PSOE RANK-AND-FILE ANALYZED

Madrid REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLITICOS in Spanish Sep-Oct 81 pp 117-152

[Article by Jose Felix Tezanos: "The Structure and Dynamics of Socialist Membership in Spain"]

The data used in this article are from a sociological survey conducted among members of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] by a team of sociologists directed by Jose Felix Tezanos and consisting of Jose Antonio Gomez Yanez, Manuel Casero and Carlos Couto. A total of 1,994 interviews were conducted during the months of October and November 1980 at 200 sampling points (Party groups). The names of the interviewees were obtained by random procedures from the card file of the PSOE's Federal Secretariat of Organization. More than 100 interviewers and zone coordinators helped to conduct the study. The data were placed on punch cards and tabulated at the ODEC Computation Center. In a poll like this, for 95.5 percent reliability with 50 percent/50 percent distributions, the theoretical margins of error can be estimated at +2.2 percent. More extensive information on the findings of this study can be found in Jose Felix Tezanos and Jose Antonio Gomez Yanez, "Los afiliados socialistas. Resultados de una encuesta a los afiliados del PSOE," Madrid, 1981, 235 pgs.

A sample survey among members of a party can assuredly establish in detail a great many sociological traits and characteristics that could not be ascertained from the information in an organization's files. Nevertheless, although the data from a sample survey can be very precise, especially if it is conducted in accordance with rigorous scientific methods, the data must, of course, be properly placed in the precise context of the overall voter census data for the party. Therefore, before analyzing the sociological profile of registered socialists, we must look into the historic evolution of membership in the Spanish Socialist Workers Party.

1. The Historic Evolution of Membership in the PSOE

Although some sociologists feel that one of the characteristics of modern industrial society is the tendency of the individual to withdraw into private life as well as some degree of inhibition about active political commitments, the fact is that the trend in PSOE membership shows it to be one of the most typical mass parties in contemporary Spain.

As Duverger, among others, has pointed out, historically the distinction between parties of cadres and parties of the masses "does not lie solely in the number of members. It is a difference of structure, not size," inasmuch as parties of the masses as such pursue specific political, cultural and financial goals. "This explains," Duverger says, "why the distinction between parties of cadres and parties of the masses also corresponds, more or less, to the division of Left and Right, 'bourgeois' parties and 'proletarian' parties. The bourgeois Right had no need, either financially or politically, to incorporate the masses; it had its own sources of funds, its own notables, its own elites. It judged its political culture to be sufficient...The bourgeoisie's instinctive repugnance towards mass incorporation and collective action was also a factor in this regard, just as the working class's opposite tendency contributed to the mass nature of Socialist parties."¹ Nevertheless, although Socialist parties are still today the best examples of parties of the masses, the fact is that the political dynamics of European history, especially between the wars, have led all major political groups to strive to incorporate a significant portion of their voters in one way or another. We can thus say that in our day and age every great party that seeks power wants to be a great party of the masses.

Hence, the old distinction between parties of the masses and parties of cadres does not have as much latent content as it might have just a few decades ago.² The fact is, however, that forms of membership and degrees of active involvement in the various mass parties today vary considerably, just as the methods by which parties "organizationally" incorporate a segment of their voters into their structures vary quite appreciably. For example, some parties distinguish between different levels of membership (activists, members, sympathizers, etc), while others employ indirect forms of membership (through unions, cooperatives, cultural associations, interest groups, etc).

In the specific case of the PSOE, there is only direct membership at present, and the procedure for joining has always been "regulated," not "open." In other words, to join the PSOE there are certain basic requirements (acceptance of programs and of discipline) and certain formal requirements (sponsorship by two members, filling out forms, acceptance by the assembly of the regional group, etc), and there are certain obligations (the regular payment of dues, among others) which, if not performed entail automatic suspension (for example, when 6 months dues are owed). Thus, any assessments of the current level of PSOE membership should be made with this specific context in mind.

The data in Table 1 show that the PSOE made its real leap to the status of a genuine mass party during the initial years of the Second Republic, coinciding with major electoral gains. Nevertheless, from 1933 to 1936 there was an appreciable drop in membership, which, as we know, also coincided with a falloff in electoral support.

After Franco's death, there was a major jump in membership and in support at the polls.³ At present, survey data indicate that membership is leveling off at 100,000, with 2,800 local groups. These numbers, which could lead to somewhat optimistic comparisons to, for example, the figures under the Second Republic, should be looked at, however, in light of the current levels of membership in comparable parties belonging to the Socialist International and current PSOE vote totals.

Table 1. Evolution of PSOE Membership from 1918 to 1981

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Groups</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>
1918 ⁴	233	14,588
1924	209	8,588
1926	230	8,561
1928	219	9,001
1929	227	10,528
1930	317	18,528
1931	953	67,336
1932	1,119	75,133
1933	--	81,777
1936 ⁵	--	59,846
1977 ⁶	1,423	51,552
1979 ⁶	2,230	101,082
1981 ⁷	2,756	99,385

In this regard, the information in Table 2 shows us that the current level of PSOE membership should be considered comparatively rather low, while the ratio of PSOE members to PSOE voters is one of the lowest of all major parties belonging to the Socialist International.

Table 2. Membership and Vote Levels for Various European Socialist Parties

<u>Country</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u># of Votes</u> <u>Last Election</u>	<u>Percentage</u> <u>of Vote</u>	<u>Seats</u>	<u># of</u> <u>Members</u>	<u>Ratio Members/</u> <u>Voters</u>
Austria	SPO	2,412,778	51.0	51.9	716,000	29.7
Sweden	SSA	2,356,234	43.9	44.1	1,000,000	42.4
FRG	SPD	16,809,311	42.6	43.9	1,000,000	5.9
Norway	DNA	962,728	42.4	49.0	100,000	10.4
Denmark	SD	1,213,456	38.3	38.5	125,000	10.0
Great Britain	LP	11,509,524	36.9	42.2	659,058	5.7
Holland	Dvd.A.	2,810,636	33.8	35.3	120,000	4.3
Spain	PSOE	5,477,037	30.5	34.6	101,082	1.8
Portugal	PSP	1,658,201	28.0	29.7	75,000	4.5
Belgium	PSB	719,926	13.0	15.1	180,000	25.0
	BSP	684,000	12.4 ^{25.4}	12.3	130,000	19.0
Switzerland	SPS		24.9	25.5	55,000	
France	PSF	6,451,151	22.6	20.8	200,000	3.1
Italy	PSI	3,486,356	9.8	9.8	450,000	12.5
	PSDI	1,403,873	3.8 ^{13.6}	3.2	150,000	10.7

With regard to the regional distribution of registered Socialists, Table 3 shows how the membership breakdowns have held fairly steady in the various regions, with a major upward trend in Valencia, Catalonia and Asturias and to a lesser degree in the Basque Country. The membership proportion for Extremadura is down by a half, however, and has declined to a lesser extent in Andalusia, Old Castile, Galicia and Murcia.

Table 3. Regional Distribution of PSOE Membership in 1932 and 1981

Region	1932		1981		Trend
	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>	<u># of Members Represented at 29th Congress 1981</u>	<u>Percent of Total Members</u>	
Andalusia	24,138	32.6	24,547	24.7	-
Aragon	1,471	2.0	2,024	2.0	=
Asturias	869	1.2	4,952	5.0	++
Balearic Islands	980	1.3	1,043	1.0	=
Canary Islands	1,927	2.6	2,038	2.0	=
Catalonia	1,196	1.6	8,917	9.0	+++
New Castile/Albacete/ Madrid ⁹	12,175	16.6	15,872	16.0	=
Old Castile/Leon/ Cantabria/Rioja	7,311	9.9	6,300	6.3	-
Extremadura	8,116	10.9	4,476	4.5	--
Galicia	3,500	4.7	3,321	3.3	-
Murcia ¹⁰	6,328	8.4	4,561	4.6	=
Navarre	339	0.5	434	0.4	-
Basque Country	1,663	2.2	4,244	4.3	+
Valencia	3,990	5.4	14,197	14.3	+++

Source: reports of the PSOE and Federal Secretariat of Organization.

2. Membership Structure by Age and Sex

Both the data from this survey and the analyses done on the data in the PSOE's organizational survey⁸ clearly tell us that at present the PSOE's membership includes few young people and very few women.

The data in this survey show that women currently account for nine percent of the PSOE membership. Somewhat higher than average percentages are found in Asturias (18), Galicia (17), Catalonia (17), Madrid (16) and the Canaries (16), and in general the presence of women is greatest in groups with between 151 and 200 members (16 percent) and with more than 250 members (14 percent), whereas in groups with fewer than 75 members they represent just 6 percent. The data seem to indicate that women tend to join the PSOE only in urban centers, where the party groups usually have more than 150 members.

Moreover, the average age of the women members of the PSOE is younger than the men's, and the women have also completed more years of study; 32 percent of the women have been in higher or intermediate education, compared to just 18 percent of the men. Therefore, most of the women who do work (44 percent) work in offices (35 percent), as professionals (9 percent) or as teachers (17 percent).

The higher qualifications and greater youth of the Socialist women has not, however, translated into more positions of responsibility, just the opposite. Only 26 percent of the women say they have held positions of responsibility in the PSOE, compared to 35 percent of the men.


The issue of women's involvement in the PSOE is further complicated when we bear in mind that a good many of the women who are currently members of the PSOE have a family member who is involved in the party also. No less than 77 percent of the women PSOE members have some relative in the PSOE! Sixteen percent said that their parents belong to the PSOE, 26 percent have brothers or sisters in the party, and among married women, 72 percent said that their husbands belong to the PSOE. In other words, these data seem to indicate that very few women join the party on their own, which together with the low proportion of women in positions of responsibility, makes their actual degree of involvement a great deal less than the aforementioned overall percentages would lead one to believe.

The low levels of active involvement of women in Spanish socialism cannot, of course, be divorced from the broader problems of insufficient participation by women in politics in general and leftwing politics in particular. Nevertheless, some comparative data on other European Socialist parties could help us to better assess the low level of Spanish women's active involvement in socialism. In Austria, for example, women account for 34 percent of total registered Socialists,¹¹ 19 percent in Germany,¹² 13 percent in France,¹³ 16.4 percent in northern Italy and 13.4 percent in central and southern Italy.¹⁴ These numbers should be viewed in light of the influences of traditional outlooks and specific cultures and in the context of a basic socioeconomic factor, the varying levels of female participation in the labor force. In this regard, we should keep in mind that Spanish women account for just 28 percent of our total employed labor force, whereas in most European countries women represent more than 35 percent of the working population.¹⁵

With regard to breakdown by age, the data we have available indicate that the average ages of current PSOE members are, in general, higher than both those of socialist voters and of Socialist legislators and political cadres, as we can see in Graph 1. In Table 4, which contains the results of our survey, we can see how the membership level of young people is very low (only 6 percent of the members are less than 25 years old), whereas persons over age 60 have a considerable presence (23 percent). Furthermore, we should underscore that the tendency

towards an older membership is more pronounced in regions with a significant socialist tradition and foothold. For example, the over-60 group represents 29 percent of the membership in Asturias, 28 percent in Castile-La Mancha, 27 percent in the Basque Country and Navarre, 26 percent in Valencia and Cantabria, etc. If we bear in mind that these regions account for 40 percent of the current socialist membership, we will understand what the real scope of this issue is.

Graph 1. Average Ages in Different Sectors of the PSOE



Key:

1. Socialist electorate
2. Members of the PSOE
3. Socialist members of Parliament
4. Delegates to the 1979 Special PSOE Congress
5. Members of the Federal Committee
6. Members of the Federal Executive Commission

The actual mean age of current registered Socialists contrasts, as has often been pointed out, with the somewhat youthful image that the PSOE currently presents, an image that is merely the result of the appreciably younger individuals who hold internal positions of responsibility and who logically are the ones who project the PSOE's image in Spanish society as a whole.

There are a great many explanations for this age makeup of the socialist membership, but we have to believe that the strong presence of veteran members is due to the special political involvement of the generations that waged the war and that entered active politics within highly politicized contexts. In contrast, the meager involvement of young

TABLA 4
Age Breakdown of PSOE Members by Region (percentages)
ESTRUCTURA DE EDAD DE LOS AFILIADOS AL PSOE POR REGIONES
(En porcentajes)

	Total	Galicia	Asturias	Cantabria	Euskadi y Navarra	Aragón	Cataluña	Baleares	P. Valenciano	Murcia	Castilla-Ledn	Rioja	Castilla-La Mancha	Madrid	Extremadura	Andalucía	Canarias
De 18 a 21 años ...	2	5	2	—	2	6	4	—	1	—	2	17	1	2	2	2	6
De 22 a 25 años ...	4	7	1	3	2	6	8	—	3	2	6	—	4	6	4	2	6
De 26 a 30 años ...	9	11	8	3	2	13	17	9	8	10	10	—	9	7	8	8	13
De 31 a 35 años ...	13	12	12	23	9	10	14	14	13	10	14	50	11	14	14	13	3
De 36 a 40 años ...	11	22	10	6	12	6	9	14	10	10	11	—	7	11	9	11	16
De 41 a 50 años ...	19	17	12	26	20	29	21	18	15	19	14	33	20	14	21	23	16
De 51 a 60 años ...	20	13	22	14	20	17	12	23	23	21	22	—	21	20	22	20	19
De 61 a 70 años ...	15	10	19	17	16	8	9	14	17	19	14	—	18	16	14	13	13
Más de 70 años ...	8	2	10	9	11	4	4	9	9	9	6	—	10	9	6	8	6
Sin información ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	—
(N)	(1.994)	(82)	(90)	(35)	(128)	(48)	(76)	(22)	(316)	(90)	(96)	(6)	(198)	(215)	(118)	(441)	(31)

people in active leftwing party politics (which is not at all an exclusively Spanish phenomenon¹⁶) can be explained not only by the influence of the new youth "dropout" cultures but also by the very inertia of the influence of depoliticization, passivity and individualist indolence during the latter years of Francoism, when the logic of the consumer society had become quite widespread in Spain.

3. Educational Level of PSOE Members

When the individuals surveyed were asked what level of studies they had completed, 36 percent replied that they had never gone to school, while 6 percent said that they did not know how to read or write. Some 38 percent said that they had completed primary school, 4 percent professional training, 9 percent secondary school, 5 percent intermediate schooling and 6 percent higher education, with 2 percent not answering or indicating some other kind of studies.

Considered by themselves and given that they refer to a politically active minority (as are the members of any political party), these numbers might seem surprisingly low, especially if we bear in mind that there are more than 12,000 positions of political responsibility held by various socialist appointees. Nevertheless, if we take the data in the latest "Survey of Cultural Background and Level of Families" (1975) as a yardstick for comparison, we find that although the percentage of registered Socialists who never went to school is higher than the national average among heads of family (29.5 percent in 1975, and 38 percent among male members of the PSOE), the national average of illiterates is slightly higher (8.9 percent) and the proportion of PSOE members with advanced education (6 percent) is also higher than the national average (3.6 percent).¹⁷

Most of the members who have not gone to school or who do not know how to read or write live in rural areas; for example, in small groups and in areas such as Extremadura, Castile-La Mancha and Andalusia, the percentages of respondents who do now know how to read or write were 16, 11 and 9 percent, respectively. Furthermore, illiteracy is much more common among members age 61 to 70 (9 percent) and over 70 years of age (19 percent) and stands at 12 percent among the Socialists who joined the PSOE during the period of the Second Republic (only 1 percent of them said they had taken advanced studies, while fully 56 percent said that they had never attended school).

In contrast, the highest levels of studies are among the members under 35 (16 percent of those between 22 and 25, 12 percent of those 26 to 30 and 13 percent of those 31 to 35 have advanced schooling) and among residents of Madrid (18 percent have advanced schooling), the Balearic Islands (18 percent), Rioja (17 percent) and the Canaries (16 percent). These data thus reflect a two-pronged membership from distinct eras that has followed the same educational trend as in the country as a whole. It thus seems that the level of schooling of PSOE members is going to be continually on the rise. This does not

mean, however, that new members are automatically the ones with the highest educational level. Rather, the data from our research have clearly shown that the educational cross-section of the members who joined the PSOE after the 1977 elections is practically the same as the total membership cross-section. Specifically, the highest percentage of respondents with advanced schooling joined the PSOE under Franco (15) and during the period from Franco's death to the 27th PSOE Congress (13).

In general, we can say based on these data that the educational level of longstanding members is quite low, that a good many individuals with advanced schooling joined the PSOE during the Franco years and that not that many skilled cadres have joined the PSOE after the 1977 elections.

4. Occupational Structure

One of the most important aspects of the study on the sociological profile of PSOE members unquestionably has to do with occupational structure.

Our data show that 65 percent of current PSOE members are actively employed and that 8 percent are out of work,¹⁸ while retirees account for 21 percent and housewives, students and other nongainfully employed persons make up 6 percent of the membership.

The data in Table 5 give us an accurate idea of what specific jobs PSOE members hold (or held in the case of retirees and the unemployed). Four major points can be gleaned from the table:

--Current PSOE members hold down a wide range of jobs.

--The proportion of members who are employed nonsalaried workers is quite high (20 percent).

--Although the largest group of members is made up of industrial and services workers (36 percent), a high proportion of members also hold jobs typical of the "new middle class" (16 percent office workers and salesmen, 4 percent teachers and 4 percent salaried professionals).

--Agricultural workers are also an important factor in the PSOE today (18 percent).

This diversity of occupations provides a very precise context for many aspects of the controversy over the PSOE's current class nature. In this sense, these data seem to indicate beyond question that just as the class structure of Spanish society has grown more complex and diversified, the occupational structure of PSOE members has also become broader and more varied. We can therefore say that the occupational cross-section of PSOE members is at present quite representative of contemporary Spain's salaried and nonsalaried working classes. (Perhaps

TABLA 5
Occupations of PSOE Members by Region (percentages)
OCUPACIONES DE LOS AFILIADOS SOCIALISTAS POR REGIONES
(En porcentajes)

Category	Total	Galicia	Asturias	Cantabria	Euskadi y Navarra	Aragón	Cataluña	Baleares	P. Valenciano	Murcia	Castilla-León	Rioja	Castilla-La Mancha	Madrid	Extremadura	Andalucía	Canarias
Nonsalaried																	
Farm owners	4	1	3	6	—	11	1	—	4	2	4	—	8	2	6	6	—
Self-employed in industry and services	15	16	10	14	9	19	18	5	17	18	15	33	18	12	16	14	10
Self-employed professionals ¹		1	—	—	1	—	3	—	2	2	2	—	1	2	—	—	—
Salaried																	
Managers and directors	1	—	1	3	1	—	4	5	1	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	3
Salaried professionals	4	4	3	3	3	2	6	5	4	1	7	—	2	14	4	1	3
Teachers	4	4	4	—	2	6	4	5	3	9	3	17	2	2	5	3	17
Office workers, salesmen	16	29	18	11	11	11	19	30	12	24	10	17	12	22	16	15	28
Farm hands	14	—	—	9	1	2	—	5	18	10	—	—	25	3	22	25	3
Blue-collar workers in industry and services	36	37	45	49	64	45	40	40	34	26	53	34	29	37	27	31	24
Foremen and supervisors	4	1	9	3	8	2	1	5	5	7	3	—	1	5	4	3	7
Others	1	5	1	3	—	1	—	—	1	1	1	—	1	—	—	1	1
No answer	1	3	7	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	3
(N)	(1,885)	(74)	(79)	(35)	(115)	(46)	(68)	(20)	(302)	(88)	(90)	(6)	(193)	(197)	(113)	(428)	(29)

the only differences would be a slight overrepresentation of active farmers and a relatively smaller proportion of "new middle class" jobs.)¹⁹

Logically, moreover, the breakdown of job categories among the ranks of the PSOE varies from region to region, in accordance with various historical factors, level of development and industrialization and the greater or lesser degree of urban membership. For example, the proportion of manual laborers in industry and commerce is greater in the Basque Country, Asturias, Cantabria and certain areas of Castile-Leon, whereas farmers are more of a factor in Andalusia, Extremadura and Castile-La Mancha, and the percentage of salaried professionals and office workers is highest in Madrid, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, Galicia and the Canaries.

The data give us a more accurate picture of today's diversified PSOE membership and enable us to properly qualify certain impressions that could have come from several sociological studies on PSOE cadres, on the one hand, and on socialist voters, on the other. In Table 6 we have included some overall weighted data on the occupational cross-sections of the various levels of individuals involved with the PSOE, from mere voters to top-level political job-holders, including both the employed and nonworking. We can see from the table that the occupational breakdown among PSOE members lies somewhere between the similar numbers for socialist voters and the overall job cross-section in Spain, on the one hand, and the wide gap between the occupational structure of PSOE political job-holders (many more office workers, professionals, etc) and the national cross-section. Moreover, there is a clear-cut trend towards greater involvement among the nonworking sectors (mainly women and youths), which account for a smaller percentage of PSOE voters than of the total population, dropping sharply among members and falling to very low levels among political representatives.

The greater presence at levels of political responsibility of individuals with what could be classified as "new middle class" jobs can be explained by factors such as their greater qualifications and, probably, the greater availability of information and free time to devote to political activism. Along with the greater qualifications of members under age 35, this also explains why these individuals hold more positions of political responsibility, as reflected in the findings of our survey. Indeed, among the respondents who have held or hold positions of responsibility in the PSOE, the largest groups are nonsalaried workers (23 percent, compared to an average of 20 percent) and, in particular, salaried professionals, office workers and other workers in the "new middle class" (34 percent compared to an average of 25 percent), whereas the levels of involvement of manual laborers are, on the whole, lower (42 percent, compared to an average of 54 percent).

Finally, another important aspect that we must consider in relation to the occupational diversity of PSOE members is their social mobility.

Table 6. Occupational Diversity in the PSOE

<u>Category</u>	<u>Total Adult Population 1980</u>	<u>PSOE Voters 1979 (post- election poll)</u>	<u>PSOE Voters 1979 (post- congress poll)</u>	<u>PSOE Members 1980 (member survey)</u>	<u>Dele- gates to 1979 Special Congress</u>	<u>Federal Committee Members 1979</u>
Nonworkers	51.4	50.2	49.1	26	6.9	6.3
Manual laborers in industry and services	15.4	24.3	24.0	29	7.2	8.3
Peasant (tenant) farmers	9.1	6.1	5.4	11	1.4	1.0
Office workers, salesmen, pro- fessionals, etc	10.0	12.3	13.7	20	63.4	48.9
Self-employed workers in industry and services	5.0	6.4	6.7	11	9.0	5.2
Businessmen, managers and executives	2.4	0.8	1.0	3	2.1	--
Others	6.6	--	--	--	9.9	30.3

Source: The specific references to the aforementioned surveys can be found in Jose Felix Tezanos, "El espacio politico y sociologico del socialismo espanol," SISTEMA, No 32, September 1979; "Radiografia de dos Congresos. Una aportacion al estudio sociologico de los cuadros del socialismo espanol," SISTEMA, No 35, March 1980, and "El Comite Federal," in the newsletter SOCIALISMO ES LIBERTAD, No 1, March 1980.

In this regard, the information in Table 7 shows that in general most of the respondents hold jobs quite similar to their parents'. Among nonsalaried workers, for example, only 39 percent of independent and self-employed individuals come from blue-collar families while accounting for 41 percent of salaried businessmen and 40 percent of office workers and salesmen. In other words, if we exclude the country-city emigration variable (which affects 17, 15 and 13 percent of the job sectors we just mentioned, respectively), we find that only around one-fourth of these nonsalaried workers come from blue-collar families. Moreover, only 12 percent of professionals come from blue-collar families and just 21 percent of teachers.

In general, therefore, these data seem to indicate that for most of the segments of the "new middle class" and for most nonsalaried working people, PSOE membership is not rooted in social factors (working class families); rather, it has independent causes (probably ideological and related to an understanding of the unity of interests among a wide range of occupations, which could prefigure a broad class front or bloc for socialism).

If we compare these data with those from other countries, we find, as we can see in Table 8, that the phenomenon of occupational diversification among Socialists in Spain coincides largely with developments in other European Socialist parties. The greater presence of the self-employed in Spain is explained by the greater weight that these job sectors carry in Spain's current social structure, just as the smaller proportion of "new middle class workers" in the PSOE could be due both to the as yet lesser development of these job sectors in Spain (given the varying levels of industrialization) and to the fact that the socialist policy of opening up to and attracting these labor sectors is more recent and limited (without forgetting the extent to which the varying levels of membership in the PSOE and other Socialist parties have a bearing on these proportions). In turn, the varying degrees of involvement of retirees and nonworkers obviously have to do with factors we have already analyzed.

So then, given these appreciable similarities, we must bear in mind that what these data mean is that Spain's social structure itself will likely prompt a trend in PSOE membership that is consistent with the evolution of class systems in advanced industrial societies. In this connection, we have to think that what will happen in Spain will be somewhat similar to what happened not only in the countries that we have included in Table 8, but also in all of Europe's developed nations. The major traits of this evolution are certainly the downward trend in the relative number of affiliates who are manual laborers and the parallel upward trend for the "new middle class." In Germany, for example, blue-collar workers accounted for 45 percent of the SPD membership in 1952, compared to 23 percent in 1977. Concurrently, office workers and civil servants represented 17 and 5 percent in 1952 and 35 and 15 percent in 1977, to which we must add the 6 percent who are teachers.⁴² In Austria, industrial blue-collar workers made

TABLA 7
Social Mobility from Generation to Generation Among PSOE Members
MOVILIDAD SOCIAL INTERGENERACIONAL DE LOS AFILIADOS AL PSOE.

Occupation of the parents OCUPACION DE LOS PADRES DE LOS ENCUESTADOS	OCUPACION DE LOS ENCUESTADOS Occupation of those surveyed									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1. Skilled workers	30	4	16	1	1	9	14	17	4	10
2. Unskilled workers	15	32	19	2	4	13	12	10	4	1
3. Foremen and supervisors	3	1	15	—	—	1	—	5	4	1
4. Farm hands	24	41	20	88	10	17	15	13	4	10
5. Farm owners	11	7	4	3	75	13	3	6	9	15
6. Self-employed workers	5	4	14	3	4	31	9	13	8	11
7. Businessmen with payrolls	1	1	1	—	—	1	23	3	17	4
8. Office workers, salesmen	5	4	8	1	1	7	7	20	13	17
9. Self-employed professionals	1	—	—	—	—	1	2	5	4	3
10. Teachers	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	4	8
11. Others	1	2	2	1	4	6	10	5	16	17
12. No answer	2	4	1	1	1	1	3	2	13	3
(N)	(364)	(325)	(75)	(258)	(83)	(221)	(59)	(373)	(23)	(67)

Table 8. Job Comparison of Members of Several European Socialist Parties
(percents)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Spain</u> <u>PSOE(20)</u>	<u>France</u> <u>PSF(21)</u>	<u>Italy</u> <u>PJI(22)</u>	<u>Germany</u> <u>SPD(23)</u>	<u>Austria</u> <u>SPO(24)</u>
Manual laborers	37	17	32	23	38
Office workers	17	39	13	25	13
Civil servants	--	2	--	14	14
Farm owners	3	9	7	--	1
Self-employed and independent workers	11	10	10	5	3
Retirees	21	17	8	19	16
No profession, housewives, students	5	6	11	8	13
Others	3	--	8	--	2


up 51 percent of the membership in 1929 and 38 percent in 1972, while office workers, civil servants and professionals rose from 22 to 28 percent of the membership over the same period.²⁶ The data for France are similar. Blue-collar workers and service personnel accounted for 44 percent of the membership in 1952 and 19 percent in 1973, while "middle class" workers accounted for 3 percent in 1951 and 20 percent in 1973.²⁷ The same holds true for Italy and other European countries on which we have comparative information in this connection.²⁸

In the specific case of our country we do not have the proper quantitative information available to ascertain exactly the details of this similar trend. However, if we look at the occupational cross-section of current members at the time they joined the PSOE, we can come up with valuable information on how this trend has developed so far in the party.

Graph 2 shows the occupational cross-section of individuals who joined the PSOE at five decisive moments in Spain's recent history. As we can see, the breakdown of occupations of members who joined the PSOE during the Second Republic is quite consistent with the typical cross-section for a traditional Socialist Party and with Spain's class structure in the 1930's: a large majority of manual laborers and very few white-collar workers. The cross-section of the people who joined during the Franco era is quite different, however. The proportion of self-employed workers is much greater, while the biggest group consists of white-collar workers, even bigger than the segment of manual laborers. In evaluating the occupational cross-section of members during the Franco era, we must not forget the special characteristics of political activism during that period. It is no surprise, then, that this membership cross-section should change significantly during the crucial period from Franco's death to the PSOE's 27th Congress, when the number of nonworking members increased appreciably, the proportion of nonsalaried

members held steady and the previous trend in membership among white- and blue-collar workers was reversed.

Graph 2. Evolution of the Occupational Structure of Members from the Second Republic to the Present



Key:

1. Members who joined during the Second Republic
2. Members who joined during the Franco era
3. Members who joined during the period from Franco's death (November 1975) to the 27th PSOE Congress (December 1976)
4. Members who joined from the 27th Congress to the 1977 legislative elections
5. Members who joined after the 1977 legislative elections
6. Housewives, students and other nonworkers
7. Self-employed
8. White-collar workers (executives, teachers, office workers, salesmen and professionals)
9. Blue-collar workers

The cross-section changes somewhat after the 27th Congress, as we can see in Graph 2. The proportion of nonworking members and, in particular, white-collar members drops, while more and more blue-collar workers continued to join, albeit not to the same extent as during the Second republic. Finally, the cross-section of members who joined after the 1977 elections is practically the same as during the previous period. This means, among other things, that there has been continuity and that the trend in membership has not been similar to that of other European Socialist parties.

In time, it will certainly be interesting to find out whether the new political orientations explicitly taken as of the Special Congress in September 1979 have influenced the occupational cross-section of the PSOE's latest members. Nevertheless and until we have comparative data on what has happened (and will happen) during the 1980's, the evidence seems to indicate that the open-door policy towards the new job sectors has not yet had truly significant practical effects, either in terms of membership or potential support at the polls. We should therefore recall (though it is an obvious fact) that a policy of adapting more to current circumstances does not consist merely of an awareness that the class structure of contemporary Spain is changing; such a policy can work only to the extent that it translates into specific and effective procedures for attracting the new job sectors. We have to keep in mind that the changes in the European Socialist parties that we are talking about have come about not only because of an understanding of the new realities, but also and decisively, because of the desire to achieve a majority, which has inspired and guided these parties' political strategies in breaking through their electoral ceilings. They have thus succeeded in appreciably boosting, in many cases, both their levels of membership and their showing at the polls, logically by attracting and incorporating the new job sectors.

5. Civil Status and Family


With regard to the civil status of PSOE members, our survey has shown that only 13 percent are single, 75 percent were married in the Church, 4 percent were married civilly and 4 percent are widowed. Three percent did not reply to the question, and less than one percent said that they were living together out of wedlock.

Of those who contracted matrimony, 9 percent have no children, 15 percent have one child, 33 percent have 2 children, 21 percent have 3, and another 21 percent have 4 or more. In general, then, PSOE members do not have excessively large families (69 percent have 3 or fewer children), which is in keeping with the smaller families of urban and primarily "new middle class" job-holders.

Although the families of PSOE members are, in general, rather small, there are, however, two clear-cut divisions in this regard. The first has to do with age. Thus, the members over age 40 have considerably more children than the younger respondents. The extreme in this tendency

is represented by members over age 70; 35 percent of whom have 4 or more children, whereas, for example, just 4 percent of the respondents between 31 and 35 have 4 or more children, and only 12 percent of those between 36 and 40 have that many children.

Graph 3. Family Models by Occupation of Respondents



Key:

1. "New middle class" workers (office workers, salesmen, professionals and teachers)
2. Industrial and services blue-collar workers
3. Farm workers (both owners and wage-earners)
4. No children
5. One or two children
6. Three or more children

The second differentiating factor is occupation. As we can see in Graph 3, the differences in family size among PSOE members are the same as usually occur between peasant farmers, on the one hand, blue-collar workers, on the other, and "new middle class" workers on yet another. Thus, among PSOE members farm owners and wage-earning peasant farmers have the most children. Industrial and services blue-collar workers have somewhat fewer children, on the average, than farmers but more than the "new middle class" (office workers, salesmen, professionals and teachers), who on the whole have the fewest children (only 33 percent have 3 or more children).

These statistics are obviously quite illustrative of how PSOE members exhibit some of the specific traits that tend to characterize "new middle class" families in modern societies, in terms of major economic factors, social outlook, family size, etc. This is one more indication of the importance and scope of the occupational diversity among current members of Socialist parties.

6. Religious Ideas and Beliefs

We will now discuss the findings of the survey in connection with two questions on the respondents' religious ideas and beliefs. These questions could obviously be included in a separate chapter on the ideological and attitudinal profile of PSOE members, but I prefer to include them here because the PSOE's recent efforts to develop and expand its own political and sociological space can be regarded as having some connection with the religious ideas of its members. Therefore, it would be advisable to assess the available information in this regard in conjunction with the other findings on previous pages.

Our survey found that 39 percent of the respondents professed religious ideas or beliefs, whereas 58 percent said they did not, and 3 percent did not reply.

Of those who professed to have religious beliefs, 71 percent said they were Catholic, 13 percent non-Catholic Christians, 12 percent said they believed in other religions, and 3 percent did not answer the second question.

Naturally, the greater or lesser presence of individuals with religious beliefs among the ranks of the PSOE is associated with variables that are more or less logically tied in with the religious phenomenon (48 percent of the women have religious beliefs, 45 percent of the members in smaller party groups, 41 percent of farm owners, 61 percent in the Canary Islands, 55 percent in Catalonia, 53 percent in Murcia, 52 percent in Castile-La Mancha, etc). Nevertheless, there is a very direct relationship between the religious beliefs of the members and their age and the year they joined the PSOE, on the one hand, and their occupation and level of schooling, on the other.

The fewest socialists with religious beliefs joined during the years of the Second Republic (23 percent, whereas the most entered after the 1977 legislative elections (45 percent). Thus, the respondents over age 70 were the least religious (17 percent), followed by those age 61 to 70 (29 percent), while the intermediate age groups were the most religious (52 percent of those age 36 to 40, and 47 percent of the 31 to 35 age group).

Moreover, the highest proportions of respondents with religious beliefs are to be found among those with intermediate and secondary schooling (48 percent), those with advanced schooling (44 percent), professionals (65 percent), teachers (51 percent) and office workers (41 percent), as well as the self-employed (42 percent) and farm owners (41 percent), in other words, as we have said, among nonsalaried workers and the "new middle class." The percentages fall to 33 percent, however, among the respondents with no schooling and to 28 percent among unskilled manual laborers, as well as, in general, among lower-income respondents.

We obviously cannot deny that these attitudes have been strongly influenced by the historic image of the Spanish Church as part of the ruling system and by the "social" and even "class" significance that professing or not professing religious beliefs has had for many Spaniards. Nevertheless, the data on the PSOE's most recent members, as well as the higher proportion of believers among members with certain occupations, mark a significant new development on the Spanish political scene,²⁹ a development that is no doubt the upshot of both the major "aggiornamento" efforts by certain sectors of Spanish Catholicism and of the open-door policy of expansion that Spanish socialism has been pursuing in recent years. In light of this new development, the recent traditionalist initiatives in the Church could turn out to be mere theatrics. These renewed attempts to establish dogma on certain issues ignore the fact that hands of time cannot be turned back and also that many Spaniards are no longer willing to allow their coexistence to be artificially thrown into conflict and destabilized for the clear-cut purpose of curbing a promising trend towards secularization.

Furthermore, the fact that religious liberalization is running parallel to the active incorporation of certain job sectors (nonsalaried workers included) in socialism, is a good illustration of both the overall results of these policies and of the new social realities in Spain at the outset of the century's penultimate decade. In this connection, the varying social profiles of the individuals who have joined the PSOE at various moments in Spain's recent history, are the best examples of these historic changes.

7. The Process of Formal Involvement in the PSOE

The special circumstances of Spanish politics during the lengthy period of the Franco dictatorship often make it difficult to determine exactly when the PSOE's members formally joined its ranks. It is likewise impossible to pinpoint any interruptions or gaps in political activism or to identify the true nature of certain forms of involvement and even "latest membership" that exist in any party that has had to spend more than 40 years in the underground and undergo harsh repression and persecution.

With regard to the timing and form of membership of current PSOE affiliates, we have to first distinguish between the moment of formal membership, on the one hand, and, on the other, the kind of contacts and relations that current members had with the party during the Franco dictatorship. This is important because as we will see, there were certain types of "latent membership" during this period.

As far as the first point, the timing of PSOE membership, is concerned, the respondents gave us the following breakdown:

<u>Period</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
During the Second Republic	13
During the Franco era	5
From Franco's death to the 27th PSOE Congress	7
From the 27th Congress to the 1977 elections	25
After the 1977 elections	49
No answer	1

As we have previously seen, the time of PSOE membership is linked to the age, occupation, level of schooling, etc of the members, and there are also differences from region to region. Thus, the following are the regions in which the most members said they joined during the Franco era (though these numbers should be viewed in the context of total membership): Canaries (19 percent), Basque Country-Navarre (10 percent), Madrid (9 percent), Asturias (7 percent) and Marcia (7 percent). The regions where most of the members joined during the Second Republic are: the Basque Country (20 percent), Murcia (18 percent), Castile-La Mancha (18 percent) and Asturias. In contrast, the regions in which party registration was highest after the 1977 elections are: Aragon (79 percent), Cantabria (66 percent), Extremadura (64 percent), Galicia (59 percent), Catalonia (58 percent), etc, in other words, regions in which, in general, the PSOE did not exactly get its highest vote percentages.

Independent of the time of formal membership in the PSOE, however, it is especially significant to examine the kind of contacts that current members maintained with the party under Franco. In this connection, all those who joined after Franco's death were asked whether they had had some sort of contact or relation with the PSOE or some of its activists during the Franco era. Some 23 percent said that they had. In other words, in any attempt to estimate PSOE membership during the Franco era, we must add to the 18 percent who joined during the Second Republic or while Franco was alive, a sizable group of current members who could be described as having engaged in what we might call certain forms of "latent membership." Specifically, this segment of "latent affiliates" accounts for 19 percent of total present membership. Hence, we can say that the Socialists who were involved more or less formally in the PSOE before Franco's death account for 37 percent of the current membership.

With regard to what kinds of contacts they had, the respondents mentioned the following:

<u>Type of Contact</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Conversations with activists	59
Received personal information	46
Attended some meetings	26
Received propaganda	20

Attended publicized gatherings (demonstrations, tomb of Pablo Iglesias, etc)	15
Helped out financially	11
Other contacts	7

As we can deduce from these numbers, the fact that a good many members mention more than one kind of contact, while some were decidedly active (attended meetings, demonstrations, helped out financially, etc) logically lends greater backing to our theory of "latent membership." It was a kind of semimembership and perfectly understandable if we bear in mind the peculiar conditions under which socialist activism took place in Spain, especially in the latter years of the Franco era (differences between the domestic and overseas organizations, greater internal activism with less "formalized" organizational frameworks as a result of underground activities, extension of spheres of influence and sympathies suppressed for fear of repression, etc).

We would emphasize, furthermore, that most of this latent involvement was to be found precisely in the regions with the highest level of socialist organization and activism during the latter years of the Franco era. Thus, 74 percent of current Andalusian members who joined the party after Franco's death said they had contacts with the PSOE during the Franco era, as did 59 percent of members in Madrid, 51 percent of the Valencians, 35 percent of the Basques, 27 percent of the Asturians, etc. If we also take into account that a good part (48 percent) of the members who joined the PSOE during the period from Franco's death to the 27th Congress say that they had such contacts, we can realize how many of these members were already inside the organized or semiorganized sphere of Spanish socialism during the Franco era. The PSOE members who joined after the 1977 elections are in a different category, however, as shown by the fact that only 18 percent of them said that they had been in contact with the PSOE during the Franco era.

Moreover, the survey data show that in the larger urban centers (where the largest party groups are located), the more active variety of contacts and relations (attending meetings and demonstrations, helping out financially) were cited most often by the respondents, whereas those belonging to smaller groups most often mentioned "holding conversations," receiving personal information," etc. Age is also a factor: The members under 40 (and especially the youngest ones) had more active contacts with the PSOE during the Franco era, whereas those over 40 had primarily passive contacts.

Finally, we should mention that the percentages of respondents who said that they had contact with the PSOE under Franco were largest among those with higher (45 percent) and intermediate (29 percent) schooling, and these contacts were most often of the kind that entailed an active commitment. This was also quite frequent among office workers,

salesmen and the self-employed. All of this shows how important the following factors were in political activism under Franco: the intellectuals (in connection with training and the type of work), the varying levels of access to political information, the degree of independence and freedom of movement on the job, etc.

8. The PSOE, a Transition Party?

Without any doubt whatsoever one of the most noteworthy findings of our survey on PSOE members has to do with the way in which the average affiliate is evolving.

In this regard, all of the responses to our survey were cross-checked against the periods in which the various members joined the party (the reference periods were the ones mentioned in the article).

So then, the sociological and attitudinal profiles of the individuals who joined the PSOE in each of these periods reveal specific traits, which shows that the evolution of the different types of PSOE members is an important phenomenon that is unquestionably going to bring major changes in the party during the next decade.

The specific characteristics and variations can be summarized as follows:

- a) The cross-sections are different with regard to the type and proportion of female membership. More women began to join during the Franco era, which no doubt reflects both a change in the traditional view of the woman's role and the start of a real, albeit slow and inadequate, incorporation of women into professional life.
- b) The cross-sections are different in terms of the levels of schooling of the affiliates during each period, with a trend towards steadily higher levels among the most recent members of the PSOE.
- c) The occupational cross-section are quite different, with a trend towards a wider range of jobs represented in the PSOE and towards an increase in the occupations typical of the white-collar work force (professionals, office workers, etc). This trend, which can be clearly seen in Graph 2, obviously reflects the changes in occupational patterns that are themselves taking place in contemporary industrialized societies.
- d) The cross-sections are different as to the religious ideas of the members. Thus, as we saw previously, there has been a clear-cut evolution from the Second Republic (when 23 percent of those who joined at the time said they held religious ideas) to the post-1977 election period (when 45 percent of the new members said they had religious ideas).
- e) The cross-sections are also different as to the type of membership, as reflected in the motive for membership. For example, whereas the individuals who joined during the Franco era and immediately thereafter

enrolled first in the PSOE and then in the UGT [General Union of Workers], many of those who joined after the 1977 elections were members of the UGT first, and their membership in the PSOE was largely an extension of their union commitment. So, whereas 55 percent of those who entered during the Franco era joined the PSOE first and only 11 percent joined the UGT first, 38 percent of those who joined after 1977 entered the PSOE first, and 42 percent signed up with the UGT first.

Furthermore, there is a clear-cut trend as to prior (or present) membership in the JJSS [Socialist Youth]. A sizable percentage of the members who joined during the Second Republic belonged to the JJSS, whereas very few of the rest of the members belonged or belong to the JJSS.

f) There is also a clear-cut differentiation as to the degree of family involvement in the PSOE. It ranges from a very high degree of involvement in the PSOE among the families of the longest-standing members (which almost enables to talk about family clusters of membership) to almost no family members in the party among the most recent members. Graph 4 clearly illustrates this trend, which no doubt reflects two quite different ways of looking at involvement in socialism.


g) Furthermore, the degree of internal familiarity with the organization tends to drop among the members who joined the PSOE most recently. Thus, the members who joined under Franco are much better informed than the average about both some basic facts as to the history of the PSOE (year founded, who the first PSOE legislator was, etc) and its current bylaws and organizational structures. The degree of knowledge drops among those who joined the PSOE immediately after Franco's death and those who joined before the 1977 elections and is very low among the members who signed up after the 1977 elections. Specifically, more than half of the latter members did not know most of the historical and organizational facts that they were asked about in the survey.

h) Moreover, there are degrees of activism among the various groups of members. The trend is towards less activism among the most recent members (as we can see in Graph 5), who are, however, more satisfied with the current situation and operations of the PSOE, in contrast to the greater dissatisfaction and fault-finding among the members who joined during the Franco era.

j) Finally, though the issue has not been exhausted, the ideological cross-sections of the members who joined during one or another period are somewhat different. Thus, among the members who joined during the Second Republic there are more advocates of a violent takeover of power and of a policy of rapid changes, contrasting with the members who joined under Franco, who are more in favor of combined methods (legislation and force) and with the remaining members, most of whom advocate the legislative-democratic route and gradual reforms.

With regard to this point, which has been analyzed in more detail elsewhere, we must bear in mind that, in any case, only 5 percent

Graph 4. Family Involvement in the PSOE According to Period of Affiliation



Key:

1. Joined during the Second Republic
2. Joined during the Franco era
3. Joined between Franco's death and the 27th Congress
4. Joined from the 27th Congress to the 1977 elections
5. Joined after the 1977 elections
6. Some relative belongs
7. Parents belong
8. Brothers or sisters belong
9. Spouse belongs
10. Children belong

of the respondents in the survey said they favored taking power by force, whereas 89 percent came out for the legislative-democratic route, and 4 percent for a combination of the two. Similarly, 76 percent of the respondents said they preferred gradual reforms, whereas 19 percent asserted that once in power it was better to try and change everything quickly. We should thus view the polarization of attitudes between members in a definitely relative light, given the predominance of the moderates. For example, the advocates of taking power by force or a combination of parliamentary action and force represent only 10 percent of those who joined during the Second Republic and 13 percent of those who joined under Franco or immediately thereafter (compared to 9 percent on the average). The trend is similar among advocates of rapid change, who account for 27 percent of the members who joined during the Second republic and 21 percent of those who joined during the Franco era.

In summary, we could say that in light of these historical trends, there are at least three different types of PSOE members:


A) The longstanding member who joined the PSOE during the Second Republic or before and who has strong political commitments and a utopian outlook (in the best sense of the word). This type of member has a great deal of faith in the kind of socialism that was suited to the period between the wars, and his outlook has been strongly influenced by the harsh political and social conflicts at that time. These veteran members belong to the PSOE body and soul, and politics has a central spot in their lives, assuming great overall significance. They therefore try to get their closest relatives involved in the PSOE (and their families do have a high degree of political involvement, which is also quite typical of a particular period of history). At present, because of their age, these members are not very active in outreach efforts but are quite assiduous in other forms of internal involvement and are often to be found at party locals.

B) The members who joined during the Franco era are more ideological, and some of even clearly "intellectual." This type of member is like type A in that politics plays a central role in his life, although his political motivations are less emotional and more cerebral. These members are found primarily in urban centers, and most of them hold "middle class" jobs (professionals, teachers, office workers, etc). They are also in the intermediate age groups and have a more "restless" political track record than the other members; in other words, they have belonged to or sympathized with other political parties more than the average.

C) The member who joined during the democratic transition, in other words, after the 1977 elections, is in a different category. We can describe him as being quite close to the "average Spaniard," and he is different from the other previous members in that politics is not the hub of his life. Most of them joined the PSOE as an extension of their union commitment in the UGT or as a way of reinforcing their

political sympathies. In general, these members are neither very activist nor well-grounded or well-informed politically, although the levels of schooling and occupational skills of some of them are higher than many of the members who entered the socialist ranks during previous periods.

Graph 5. Level of Political Activism According to Period of PSOE Membership



Key:

1. Activists
2. Second Republic
3. During the Franco era
4. From Franco's death to the 27th Congress
5. From the 27th Congress to the 15 June 1977 elections
6. After the 15 June 1977 elections
7. Membership period

FOOTNOTES

1. Maurice Duverger, "Los partidos politicos," F.C.E., Mexico, 1965, pp 93 and 97.
2. This is, perhaps, the reason for the great success of Kirchheimer's proposal to describe the common denominator of major parties in postwar European societies with the clearly pejorative phrase "catch-all parties." This description would apply both to "populist" and "conservative" parties and to the old "class parties of the masses" as they attempt to gain the support of "new political clientele" while maintaining the support of a longstanding working class clientele (Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System," in J. Lapalombara and M. Weiner (eds), "Political Parties and Political Development," Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1972). Nevertheless, although this phrase might be somewhat appropriate to describe the indiscriminate vote-getting policy of some European leftwing parties, the fact is that it cannot be regarded as a precise and satisfactory response to the need to reconceptualize the complex reality of major European political parties. We obviously cannot say in all seriousness that appreciable and significant differences in content and organization do not persist among parties of this or that political persuasion. By the same token, we cannot describe as an indiscriminate "catch-all" effort, the attempts to redefine the main features of the social conflict in contemporary industrialized society and, therefore, the policy of luring the intermediate (nonruling) segments of society into the longstanding political space of the parties with working class roots. In this regard, the "confusion" can obviously stem from and persist on the basis of both the inappropriateness of certain longstanding concepts and an inadequate grasp of the political meaning and scope of certain basic social changes, which cannot be understood through either old concepts or old approaches (or prejudices).
3. Several references as to the trend in the socialist vote can be found in Jose Felix Tezanos, "Análisis sociopolítico del voto socialista en las elecciones de 1979," SISTEMA, No 31, July 1979, pp 105-121.
4. Source: Manuel Contreras, "El PSOE en la II Republica: Organización e ideología," CIS, Madrid, 1981, p 85.
5. Members before the 1977 elections.
6. Mandates represented at the 28th PSOE Congress in May 1979. The mandates represented at the Special Congress in September 1979 were practically the same.
7. Mandates, represented at the 29th Congress of the PSOE in October 1981.

8. "Perfil sociológico del militante socialista (1)," in the newsletter "Socialismo es libertad," No 4, July 1980, and "Los jóvenes y el socialismo," in the same newsletter, No 8, December 1980.
9. In the case of Castile, the name changes have led us to use a combination of the old and new terminology by including the current data for Madrid in New Castile or Castile-La Mancha. Members from Madrid accounted for 7.6 percent of the total in 1932 and represent 7.8 percent now.
10. We should keep in mind that the 1932 data for Murcia include the former provinces of Murcia and Albacete. In any case, with the current members from these provinces added in, there is a slight downward trend.
11. "The Socialist Party of Austria," an SPO publication, Austria, 1980, p 14. The data refer to 1979. I should point out that the participation of women in the ranks of Socialist parties is not the greatest in Austria. The British Labor Party, for example, shows higher levels of involvement on the part of women, although its statistics cannot be regarded as entirely comparable because of the peculiarities of its system of membership.
12. Peter Gluchowsky and Hans Joachim Veen, "Nivellierungstendenzen in den Wähler und Mitgliedschaften von CDU/CSU und SPD 1959 bis 1979," Zeitschrift Parlamentsfragen, Sept, 1979, p 330.
13. Patrick Hardouin, "Les caractéristiques sociologiques du parti socialiste," REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, Vol 28, No 2, 1978, p 228. Although this figure is for 1973, Hardouin cites various subsequent data that point to an upward trend in PSF membership among women. Comparative data on the structure of members, voters and leaders by sex can be found in Roland Cayrol and Jerome Jaffre, "Party Linkages in France: Socialist Leaders, Followers and Voters," in Kay Lawson (ed), "Political Parties and Linkage," Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980, pp 27-46.
14. Almanacco socialista, 1980, publication of the PSI, p 227.
15. INE: "Encuesta de población activa," AVANCE, second half, 1980, p 18.
16. The aforementioned data on other European Socialist parties show, for example, that the members under age 25 make up 5.7 percent of the membership of the French Socialist Party (op. cit., p 229), 4.3 percent in northern Italy (PSI), 5.1 percent in central Italy and 7.2 percent in southern Italy (op. cit., p 227), while they account for less than 10 percent in the German Social Democratic Party (SOCIALDEMOKRAT MAGAZINE, no 4, 1978, p 9).
17. INE, "Encuesta de equipamiento y nivel cultural de las familias," 1975, Vol I, Madrid, 1976, p 106.

18. Keep in mind that when the study was conducted, the unemployment rate in the country was 12 percent of the labor force, which is equivalent to 6 percent of the total population over age 16. (INE: "Encuesta de la poblacion activa," AVANCE, 1980, last quarter).
19. A major issue worth looking into is whether the occupational diversity in the pattern of support for the PSOE has run parallel to the spread of the PSOE's image as a party that represents the interests of this wide range of jobs. We should bear in mind in this regard that research conducted in other countries has demonstrated that the trend towards a diversification of electoral support for Socialist parties has not always translated into a change in the overall image of the parties or into a class identification on the part of their voters. For example, the study by David Butler and Donald Stokes furnishes enough evidence regarding both the persistence of a high degree of working class identification among the voters of the British Labor Party and the perpetuation of an overall image among most of the British voters who mostly identify the "Conservative Party" with the "middle class" and the "Labor Party" with the "working class" (D. Butler and D. Stokes, "Political Change in Britain. The Evolution of Electoral Choice," Macmillan, London, 1981).
20. Survey of PSOE members. The data have been reestimated on the basis of the overall figures so that they can be compared with those from other countries.
21. Patrick Hardouin, "Les caracteristiques sociologiques..." op.cit., p 232. The category "office workers" includes clerks and intermediate and upper-level personnel.
22. David Hine, "Social Democracy in Italy," in Patterson and A.H. Thomas (eds), "Socialdemocratic Parties in Western Europe," Croom Helm, London, 1977, p 84. Note that the percentages do not add up to 100. Also, the "Almanacco Socialista, 1980," (op. cit.) gives 26.3 percent blue-collar workers in the north, 26.1 percent in the central region and 19.4 percent in the south.
23. Peter Gluchowski and Hans Joachim Veen, "Nivellierungstendenzen in den Wahler..." op. cit., p 328.
24. Melanie A. Sully, "The Socialist Party in Austria," op. cit., p 232.
25. Peter Gluchowski and Hans Joachim Veen, op. cit., p 329.
26. Melanie A. Sully, op. cit., p 232. Some data on the Austrian Socialist party can also be found in S. Henig and J. Pinder, "Partidos politicos europeos," Pegaso, Madrid, 1976, pp 309 and ff.

27. Patrick Hardouin, op. cit., p 227. Although the classification criteria can vary considerably in presenting these statistics (as in the case of Hardouin here), we should keep in mind that the office workers alone increased from 8.8 percent in 1951 to 13.3 percent; pp 223 and 232.
28. Some recent complementary information on these issues can be found in Peter H. Merkl, "The Sociology of European Parties: Members, Voters and Social Groups," in Peter H. Merkl (ed), "Western European Party Systems," The Free Press, London, 1980, pp 614-667.
29. We also have to keep in mind that various sociological surveys of the Spanish electorate have shown that most socialist voters say they are Catholic. Practically 36 percent of the people who voted for the PSOE in the 1979 legislative elections said they were Catholic, while 55 percent considered themselves nonpracticing Catholics. (See Jose Felix Tezanos, "El espacio politico y sociologico del socialismo espanol," SISTEMA, No 32, September 1979, pp 60-61).

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CSO: 3110/132

BRIEFS

AIR FORCE PROMOTIONS--The following promotions have taken effect in the Air Force through presidential decree: Cols A. Ilaridis, N. Mimikos, I. Giannakas (flight officer), I. Koskos, G. Gogos, Kh. Ioannidis (financial officer), Kh. Topintzis, G. Lekatos, D. Varounis (supply officer), A. Kharalambopoulos, E. Pendaris, V. Tourvalis (air defense officer), A. Liakandonakis, V. Filis (health services officer) and K. Tsirovasilis (technical officer) have been promoted to brigadier general. Lt Cols N. Papadimitriou, Kh. Kambakis, G. Evangelopoulos, A. Stravopodis, N. Nokas, D. Lazarou, D. Anastasopoulos, D. Kolonis, A. Dimakos, N. Pondidas, N. Volfis, D. Khatzipanagiotis (flying officers), G. Vogiatzis, D. Xanthoudakis, L. Elevtheriou, G. Stafylidis, Th. Liakakis, N. Khrysikakis, M. Kazepis (technical officers), D. Viazis, G. Digaletos, A. Tsekouras, G. Loukas (financial officers), A. Giotakos, G. Markandonatos, P. Tsingakos, P. Papadakis, G. Papadimitriou (supply officers), V. Athanasiou, Kh. Lekkas, V. Papastergiou, K. Manetakis, G. Orfanos, G. Roumbas, P. Melas (air defense officers), A. Alexopoulos (administrative officer) and Th. Bekhrakis, D. Ktoros, A. Katsogiannis, G. Psimmenos (health services officers) have been promoted to colonel. [Text] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 7 May 82 p 8]

CSO: 4621/356

MILITARY EXPORTS UP 27 PERCENT IN 1981

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 6 May 82 pp 14-17

[Article by Ana I. Pereda]

[Text] The cold war is well-suited to the arms industry: In 1981 practically all Spanish enterprises increased their sales, and, in addition, when the armed forces funding bill is passed they will have a horizon of 8 years for fabrication and consumption.

During 1981 most of the enterprises in the arms sector maintained or increased their sales level in relation to the previous fiscal year. In addition, sources in the sector are convinced that the planning that will result from the development of the bill Budgetary Funds for Investments and Support of the Armed Forces--moderate, according to some, wasteful, according to others--will have a positive effect on the enterprises involved in the fabrication of military material, since it will permit them to coordinate their production at least 8 years in advance. These perspectives seem to indicate that in the near future the percentage of Spanish production going to supply the armed forces--approximately 40 percent--will grow, at the same time that it will be possible to increase the volume of military material exported.

Of the 2.15 trillion pesetas making up the total quantity established in the funding bill (which is now being discussed in Congress), 818,707 billion are for support costs and 962,844, 000,000 are for investment in arms, material and infrastructure; personnel costs are excluded from the bill. According to existing calculations, funding foreseen by the bill increases to 230,228,000,000 pesetas in 1983, during 1984 to 240,432,000,000 in 1985 to 252,089,000,000, in 1986 to 262,217,000,000 and so on in the following years in which an annual growth rate of 4.4 percent is maintained. "The bill does not foresee that Spain's defense effort will increase in the 8 years, that is, the proportion of defense in the gross internal product will stabilize at 2.04 percent; in my opinion it is a moderate bill," declared Jesus Palacios, secretary general for economic affairs in the Defense Ministry to ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA.

The existing funding law, initially to cover the period 1972-1979 and extended through 31 December 1982, has undergone several reductions in the amounts that were established, cuts that in 1981 rose to 10.5 billion pesetas and in 1982 to 13.766,000,000.

The defense budget for 1982 rises to 409,283,600,000 pesetas: 26.5 percent is for arms and material and 2 percent is for ammunition and missiles. Personnel costs and Social Security contributions make up 42 percent of the budget total, and if one adds the costs of food, uniforms and billeting this is around 50 percent, exactly half of the "pie." "Every year we decrease the percentage accounted for by personnel costs, as befits a modern army," indicates Palacios.

In regard to the distribution of the current year's budget by armies, it is logical that the biggest part goes to the land army because it is larger: 193.04 billion. The navy gets 95,173,000,000 and the air force 76,248,000,000. The rest, 44,821,000,000, is designated for the Central Organ, comprised of the ministry, under secretariat and other common services.

Informed opinions maintain that the Spanish military industry is in a satisfactory position although, they add, it suffers in regard to the technological level advisable for this type of production, which makes a breakthrough into foreign markets difficult.

During 1981 Spain exported military material valued at 55 billion pesetas, 15 billion more than in 1980. The outlook is for 1982 foreign sales to remain at about the level of last year, a volume which put Spain in 12th place in the ranking of arms exporters, among only 14 countries.

"Of the total export figure, some 30 billion pesetas correspond to arms and material sales to South America. Prominent among importers in this zone are Chile and Argentina, both traditional customers of Spain and among the most important, along with Peru, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. The rest, some 25 billion pesetas, goes to countries in the Middle East, including Libya, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia," says Bartolome Bonet, subdirector general of Industrial Exports.

Since in the case of a military conflict Spanish laws prohibit the supplying of countries at war with military material, due to the Saharan conflict exports to Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania, old customers, have ceased, with the consequent loss of an important part of the market; likewise paralyzed were exports to Iran and Iraq.

In regard to the representativeness of Spanish exports in relation to the international panorama, "Spain's global exports are rather low in relation to the international arms market, whose volume within the Western world is calculated at some \$100 billion (10 trillion pesetas) annually. Its export capacity is equivalent to that of Sweden or Switzerland, although it is considerably below that of France, a country that annually exports material valued at 600 to 670 billion pesetas," concludes Bonet.

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